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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis is concerned with how shame contributes to the development of hegemonic 
masculinities in eighteenth-century British culture. It examines a range of contemporary 
literature in order to understand how feelings of shame, as well as practices of shaming others, 
became a key, if often unspoken, aspect of attempts to define and maintain which forms of 
masculinity were acceptable, and which were not, in a rapidly changing cultural context. The 
thesis explores the effect on men of the newly commercial 'public sphere' that came to 
prominence at the beginning of the century, and tries to track its affective trajectory through 
to the end of the period. Following work on affect by Silvan Tomkins, the American 
psychologist, and its interpretation by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in particular, I view shame as a 
social emotion which simultaneously isolates men from, and connects them to the society they 
inhabit. A crucial part of polite socialisation, I contend that shame is therefore a catalyst for 
creativity and productivity in several forms as well as failure and inertia. 
The thesis is divided into two sections. The first, containing the chapters on The Spectator, 
writing about fops, and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, is concerned with how 
shame helps to form the consensus around polite masculine qualities and actions. The second 
section, containing the chapters on Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling, James Boswell’s 
London Journal, and Olaudah Equiano’s Interesting Narrative, examines how this consensus is 
engaged with and critiqued in lived experience and its literary representations.  
The contribution this thesis makes is to highlight the importance of shame and other 
ambivalent affects in the construction of a set of hegemonic gender identities that are less 
usually associated with these same affects.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is concerned with eighteenth-century masculinity, and feelings of shame. More 
explicitly, it considers, and attempts to make a case for, the integral role of feelings of shame 
in the construction of polite masculinity which came to be viewed as the ideal expression of 
masculinity during the period. To make this case, I will use affect theory to illuminate the ways 
in which the supposedly private nature of feeling, and the public functions performed by polite 
masculinity, are interdependent. In other words, polite masculinity is both formulated and 
consolidated by feelings of shame experienced both on the individual and collective level, and 
is expressed through literary texts. In the six chapters that make up the rest of the thesis, I take 
a different eighteenth-century text or group of texts and consider the ways in which it 
engages, consciously or otherwise, with shame and its attendant feelings. Some, such as The 
Spectator, help to set up idealised notions of masculine conduct that both draw on, and 
threaten, the power of shame in order to consolidate the value of polite masculinity. Others, 
such as The Theory of Moral Sentiments, consider the importance of self-governance and the 
relationship of the self to other, a relationship fraught, as I will demonstrate, with necessary 
feelings of shame. Still others consider the various and surprising ways in which shame can 
motivate and limit the masculine individual in his negotiations with both society and the 
idealised self, as we see in the final three chapters.  
 The thesis is intended to make an intervention in the field of gender studies within 
scholarship of the eighteenth century, and in particular to consider how issues of gender relate 
to the history of emotions. I will say more about gender below, but first let’s consider the work 
on emotion. There is already a rich array of critical work which attends to feeling in 
eighteenth-century culture. This ranges from the work of G.J. Barker-Benfield in The Culture of 
Sensibility (1992), to Markman Ellis’s (1996) work on sentiment and the manifold ways in 
which it permeated eighteenth-century society. In Sentiment and Sociability (1988), John 
Mullan connects feeling and its expression through language and writing in the socialisation of 
subjects. Others include works by Patricia Meyer Spacks (1976, 2003) and Felicity Nussbaum 
(1989), whose close attention to reading practices and their relationship to feeling has been 
invaluable in shaping some of the readings in this thesis. These works have aided our 
understanding of how feeling was a powerful critical tool for thinking about and defining not 
just the self, but also society. Despite this, there is relatively little consideration in them of the 
significance of particular emotions and their roles in structuring sociability. 
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A more recent turn to emotion and the body as understood by eighteenth-century 
writers and thinkers has begun to consider feeling more experientially. These works have 
begun to consider the ways in which sentiment and feeling are embodied and shared amongst 
individuals. Mary Fairclough’s recent book, The Romantic Crowd (2013), considers late-century 
representations of groups and how emotion could be transmitted through the bodies that are 
contained within them, acting as a catalyst for group action. Alex Wetmore’s book Men of 
Feeling in Eighteenth-Century Literature: Touching Fiction (2013) usefully links the moral and 
social insights of the Scottish Enlightenment to the male-centred sentimental novels by Sterne, 
Smollett, Henry Brooke and Henry Mackenzie, arguing that bodies and material objects 
become a self-referential literary technique which destabilises literary conventions and forms. 
Ildiko Csengei’s Sympathy, Sensibility and the Literature of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century 
(2012) is invested in the importance of other bodies and ‘other-regarding passions’, which 
underlines the ways in which emotions are never merely solipsistic, but always felt in regard 
to, and under the constant imagined presence of, other people. Her reading of sympathy in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments indeed imagines solipsism as the foundation of the sympathy 
Smith suggests we feel for others. ‘Many puzzling instances of fellow-feeling in the period 
testify that the ethical foundations of sensibility were based on concepts and theories that 
were curiously Janus-faced’ (30), Csengei informs us.  
Csengei’s conceptualisation of how sympathy worked in the period is made with 
reference to philosophical and scientific theories of causation; the two disciplines, mostly 
separate today, were often contiguous during the eighteenth century. Francis Hutcheson, for 
example, compares ‘universal benevolence’ to the ‘principle of gravitation’, which he reminds 
us is strongest ‘when the bodys [sic] come to touch each other’ (1725, cited in Csengei, 2012: 
37). Touch, of course, is crucial to recent work in affect, as we see in Eve Sedgwick’s Touching 
Feeling among several others. Similarly, David Hume (1740) furthers the idea of 
communication as key to the experience of affect, stating that the individual experiences their 
own emotions ‘more from communication’ than from their ‘own natural temper and 
disposition’. As Csengei paraphrases: ‘a person’s emotions have an instant effect on the 
observer due to the mechanical operations of sympathetic transfusion’ (41). These ideas are 
later developed by Adam Smith, as I explore in chapter 3. Critics like Wetmore, Csengei and 
Fairclough have usefully and rightly begun to emphasise the role of materiality in eighteenth-
century feeling, but the body of critical work largely leaves us with feeling mediated through 
discourses of aesthetics or natural philosophy. This means that as critics we can still be 
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seduced by texts into reading them as conceptually coherent. Foregrounding affect means we 
can start to uncover the ways in which emotions power them as much as discourses.  
It becomes clear from the above snippets of Enlightenment thinking about sociability 
that an interest in what we would now call affect was in fact crucial to the epistemological 
project of the eighteenth century. In ideas of touch, as we see with Hutcheson above, and 
communication, in Hume’s words, it is as if the eighteenth-century philosophers and modern 
day affect theorists are in fact working beside each other, despite being separated as they are 
by a gulf of time. This investment in mapping the importance and omnipresence of feeling 
provides someone like myself, with an interest in understanding the eighteenth century 
through the lens of affect, with an intriguing starting point. While there is a wealth of excellent 
and useful work existing in critical studies of the eighteenth century concentrating on 
sentiment and sensibility as aesthetic and, latterly, material discourses, there is now a need for 
affect theory’s prescient observations to be brought to bear on eighteenth-century texts in 
order to take account of powerful private and shameful feelings.  
 To what extent, however, can we make the claim that affect can be understood as 
private in a period in which affect was so often externalised? What do I mean when I use the 
term ‘private’? Increasingly, men and women expressed emotional responses in ways that will 
be familiar to anyone reading sentimental literature: the fear and anxiety of Pamela; the 
irrepressible joys of picaresque heroes; the tears and melancholy of Harley; all are expressions 
of affect that are highly externalised, almost performative. I think it is here, in the idea of 
performance, that we can make the distinction that is necessary to be made. Performance 
suggests both ritualisation and idealisation. As examined by critics such as Julie Ellison (1999), 
the act of weeping, particularly by men, is linked to ‘sympathy extended downward on the 
social scale and outward to imperial venues’ (12), especially in sentimental literature such as 
The Man of Feeling. Here, masculinity’s public significance is integral to the performance of 
emotion; men’s tears are shed in response to, and part of an action plan to deal with, the 
inequalities suffered by those of lower social status than themselves. It is, in particular, a 
bourgeois male performance of emotion inextricably tied to the public sphere, perhaps even 
to the empire. Unlike sorrow, shame is a less ritualised affect. Performances of shame are few 
and far between in any era. Shame is not an affect that is taken on willingly; often it is rejected 
or referred on. Shame often remains powerfully hidden.  
Weeping bourgeois men bring us to the subject of gender. The long eighteenth century 
was a period of great change in the conceptualisation of gender. This change was multivalent, 
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from changes in theories of the body to the developing capitalism and imperial power that saw 
great changes in social structure. In their introduction to English Masculinities 1660-1800, Tim 
Hitchcock and Michele Cohen contend that the older ‘one-body’ theory, which saw gender as 
more of a spectrum or continuum, was being replaced by a more solid sense of male and 
female as intrinsically separate genders (1999: 6-7). This obviously had implications for the 
ways in which individuals and society ideated their gender identities. As Hitchcock and Cohen 
observe: ‘man had to be constructed in difference not just from woman but from the 
effeminate’ (8). 
There is an interesting body of work on eighteenth-century masculinity and its relationship to 
effeminacy, as E.J. Clery notes in her introduction to The Feminisation Debate in Eighteenth-
Century England (2004). Clery observes that while Randolph Trumbach’s work on the sodomite 
and molly has allowed for a more substantial place in history for the queer male, his aligning of 
effeminacy with homosexuality is a problematic one, eliding as it does the very different 
conceptualisation of effeminacy which prevailed at the time (8-9). The work of Philip Carter 
has gone some way to redressing this, and his analysis has informed my own work in chapter 
two. Carolyn Williams sums up eighteenth-century concepts of effeminacy as potentially 
describing: ‘a man who resembles women, or who desires women. It may mean both at once: 
the use of effeminacy to denote both deficient masculinity and excessive heterosexual activity 
fosters a tendency to connect these phenomena’ (cited in Clery: 9). With these definitions in 
mind, effeminacy is therefore a much more mobile concept than it is today, and can attach 
itself to potentially any man who fails to scrutinise himself closely enough. The ways in which 
the effeminate male managed to influence the concept of masculinity, and the self-perception 
of individual men, especially through the threat and experience of shame, is explored in 
chapter two. Here, it is enough to say that the idea of the undesirable masculine was at least 
as powerful in hegemonic gender formation as more positive ideals such as independence and 
reason. Hitchcock and Cohen even go on to suggest that from the evidence of rising birth rates 
and extramarital penetrative sex in the second half of the eighteenth century, it is possible to 
theorise that men were engaging in these activities ‘as a way of demonstrating a “normal”, and 
increasingly problematic, masculinity’ (11). An atmosphere of social obligation based in an 
increased perception of innate gender separation can be traced in some of the texts analysed 
in this thesis, such as Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling, and especially Boswell’s London Journal.  
Independence and action, along with the ritualised performance of affect, become key 
to the reformulation of masculinity at this time. The notion of independence carried with it 
political and nationalistic connotations well before the American War of Independence in the 
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middle decades of the century. As Matthew McCormack (2005) explains: ‘Personal 
“independence” concerned not just freedom per se, but a consciousness of liberty, a 
libertarianism that was supposedly inherent in all true Englishmen’ (2). He goes on to observe 
that ‘personal freedom was a prominent aspect of a Georgian man’s sense of his gender – as 
well as his social and political being – and this was commonly articulated in terms of “manly 
independence”’ (2). Independence meant having the financial and political security to be 
immune from influence by others. It was promoted over and against the perceived cronyism of 
France in particular. Articulated this way, it became an important part of the consolidation of a 
sense of national character which prepared the ground for the sort of imperial masculinities 
that dominated the later eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It became 
increasingly important, therefore, for individual men to buy into it, for fear of being perceived, 
or perceiving themselves to be, undermining the national good. The independent man, as an 
individual, could be extrapolated out to the society in which he lived, and this goes some way 
to demonstrating how porous the line between the public sphere and the private individual 
was at this time.   
 Another key, and linked, facet of the developing masculine hegemony was the special 
place reserved for the notion of action. Although this was nothing new – the active male has 
been a feature of ideal masculinities since classical civilizations – the concept became 
especially fecund in this period because it was much more compromised by lived experience 
than ever before. A capitalist society required relatively few warriors, and with aristocratic 
influences now conflicting with an increasingly powerful bourgeoisie, men were presented 
with a dilemma: how to reinvent the idea of action so as to maintain its place in the locus of 
masculine definition. Much handwringing is carried out through the writing of the period 
which attests the ways in which the question of action remained a thorny issue, as we see in a 
letter from William Temple to his friend James Boswell: 
The constitution of human nature plainly proves that we were born to do something 
more than speculate, and that a state of pure reflection is unnatural to man. It is not 
therefore he who thinks most, but he who is most active for the good of his country 
and of mankind, that merits the glorious character of a man of virtue. (Quoted in 
Jeremy Gregory, 1999: 96) 
This passage displays the effects of ideology about the ideal man in this period in microcosm. 
Temple uses natural philosophy to prove a ‘right-ness’ or fitness to the ideal of the active male. 
The man of action is also tied to patriotic and moral ideals, finally giving him the ‘glorious 
character’ of the ‘man of virtue’. Temple and Boswell, of course, as a glance at the latter’s 
journals or the letters they sent each other will indicate, could not easily give themselves this 
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title. Boswell in particular is given to melancholy and navel-gazing, and is a man of feeling 
rather than one of virtue or action. His long and quixotic quest to join the military is viewed by 
all around him as unsuitable. Boswell is a product of his time, keenly infatuated with 
hegemonic ideals, temperamentally unsuited to achieving them.  
 These hegemonic ideals derived from polite culture. Politeness, and its formation in 
and of the public sphere, was developed alongside and in response to the developing 
commercial and capitalist culture that emerged in the late seventeenth century in Western 
Europe. J.G.A. Pocock explains that the emergence of commercial capitalism, through the 
Financial Revolution, had quite sudden impacts on social structures. Tory commentators, 
alarmed at what was seen as a domination of politics by a new class of money men, attempted 
to devalue the contributions of such men by exalting the idea of the landed, impartial patriot 
(1985, 108-9). ‘The ideal of the patriot or citizen entailed the image of a personality free and 
virtuous because unspecialised’ (109) Pocock tells us.  
The man of commerce needed representation, as did the systems he was created by, 
and which he engendered and represented. These included the stock market, practices such as 
material consumption, and groups such as the burgeoning middle classes able to gain wealth 
through these previously unavailable means. Through these increased resources, the man of 
commerce found a language and the means to express himself. What followed is succinctly 
summed up by Lawrence Klein: ‘in the eighteenth century, those without formal political 
power found new institutions and media through which to exert themselves; they also found a 
new legitimacy in their exertions. This is what Jurgen Habermas means by the appearance of a 
public sphere in the eighteenth century’ (1994: 13-14). Through Habermas and others, we see 
that early capitalism allowed for the expansion of what came to be called the middle classes, 
and the rise in prestige of the labour these middle classes carried out, namely trade and the 
professions. Not only their labour, however, but their opinions, also came to be valued highly: 
Habermas calls this the ‘people’s public use of their reason’ (1989: 27). 
This increase in public expression of individual reason was facilitated by the flourishing 
of cultural arenas such as coffee houses, and the expansion of print media consumption. These 
venues allowed for the discussion and formulation of politeness, as we see with the work of 
Addison and Steele, along with other periodical writers. Politeness was mobilised by Whig 
commentators in order to rebut the accusations of Tory supporters that the man of commerce 
had no place in a virtuous society. It also attempted to describe the relationship between 
public reason and private virtue, allowing as it did for the pursuit of private interest allied to 
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virtuous action. Within this dichotomy, one should naturally inform the other. Where this 
thesis makes its intervention is in this hesitant zone, in this incessant dialogue between what is 
external and what is internal. Shame, as explored more thoroughly below, is both internal and 
external – we feel shame when the outside gets in, and when the inside gets out, as it were. 
Shame, then, is about the unintentional shifting of affect to a place where it is visible, where it 
can be felt by one individual, a group or a whole nation.   
The public sphere encouraged the contradictory modes of public sentiment and 
private, independent masculinity that help to define politeness in men of the period. This also 
helped to create a sense of compromised selfhood, as Michael Warner suggests in his essay 
‘The Mass Public and the Mass Subject’: ‘One reason why virtue was spoken about with such 
ardor in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was that the discursive conventions of the 
public sphere had already made virtuous self-unity archaic. In the bourgeois public sphere, talk 
of a citizen’s virtue was already partly wishful’ (1992: 378). This wishful thinking – and the 
ways in which the adoption of a self-consciously virtuous character functioned as a form of 
wish fulfilment – creates a gap between public and private selves: ‘what I ought to be’ (public) 
and ‘what I see myself to really be’ (private). Any disconnection (or disunity) between these 
two positions allows for shameful feelings, which might be experienced thus: 
 This is what I ought to be, but this is what I perceive myself to be  
This is how the world sees me, but this is how I see me 
This is who they think I am, but this is who I am 
As we see above, the first half of each phrase denotes the external perception of others, with 
the second half representing the internal self-perception. The linking connective ‘but’ not only 
highlights the contradiction between these two positions, but also the fact that they are linked 
to and co-dependent on one another. Note that any of the three phrases above could be re-
read as defiant, proud assertions of selfhood in spite of the apparently opposing view of the 
world. This is the clever trick that shame plays; it allows us the choice of feeling negatively or 
positively. The public sphere as described above also allows for choice; with the increase in 
resources for self-fashioning comes an increase in self-responsibility. For many bourgeois men 
in the eighteenth century, life now offered more choice, and more anxieties about making the 
correct choices, than would probably have been available to their forefathers. Capitalism 
offers us choices (while, of course, simultaneously closing down other forms of choice) that 
feudalism, for example, does not. With choice comes responsibility, and with responsibility, 
shame. Shame, then, has a peculiar affinity to capitalism.  
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There has been some focus in recent years on capitalism and its relationship to affect, 
particularly in the work of Lauren Berlant among many others. Nigel Thrift (2010) comments 
on the ways in which economies (especially capitalist ones) ‘must be engaging: they must 
generate or scoop up affects and then aggregate and simplify them in order to produce value, 
and that must involve producing various mechanisms of fascination.’ (290). These fascinations 
are hugely powerful, especially as the range of affects they engender can be both compulsive 
and highly contradictory. Sianne Ngai (2012) analyses various ‘minor’ affects such as zaniness, 
cuteness, and the ‘merely’ interesting in terms of their cultural, and capitalist, capital. Her 
reading of cuteness can stand as an example of this almost pathological tendency of affect to 
fracture: ‘an aesthetic disclosing the surprisingly wide spectrum of feelings, ranging from 
tenderness to aggression, that we harbor toward ostensibly subordinate and unthreatening 
commodities’ (1). In a historical culture which increasingly privileged the affects as part of its 
power, shame worked to both keep men within capital’s gravitational pull, and encouraged 
them to believe in its liberating potential.  
Affect and its relationship to socialisation prompts me to make a few salient points 
about my critical approach. My use of affect theory largely derives from the American 
psychologist Silvan Tomkins and the use of his work by Eve Sedgwick in particular to connect 
individuals and society through affect. As Moira Gatens suggests, we are led by affect to 
‘question commonsense [sic] notions of the privacy or “integrity” of bodies through exposing 
the breaches in the borders between self and other evidenced by the contagiousness of 
“collective” affects’ (cited in Probyn, 2010: 76). Masculinity in the eighteenth century, as I 
argue throughout this thesis, is deeply invested in the power offered by the illusion of privacy 
and, by extension, independence. The private, unknowable body and emotionality of the polite 
male is repeatedly employed by the likes of Mr. Spectator, a character who sets the tone for 
much idealised masculinity which comes after; we see James Boswell struggling with his 
attempts to master it fifty years later. What affect theory allows us to do, then, is to 
interrogate the nature of polite masculinity by questioning its basic premise, that masculine 
bodies are safely sealed units exchanging messages with each other through polite and 
sanctified forms of communication. Affect, as many of its students insist, is messy – it refuses 
to see the divisions set up by juridical, social or capitalist conventions aimed at limiting the 
transfer of affect between bodies which, as Deleuze reminds us, are radically porous and 
‘always already wholly implicated in [their] milieu’ (Gatens, cited in Probyn, 2010: 76). 
 Affect studies may be a relatively recent arrival, but affect itself is as old as humanity. 
For that reason, it is malleable enough to receive the impressions of a whole range of 
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disciplinary probings, while at the same time, compromising the solidity of these disciplines 
and moulding them into something less familiar. As Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth 
(2010) point out, in their long and fairly comprehensive list of fields in which affect theory can 
or has made some ingress:  
The seventh [field in their list] appears in critical discourses of the emotions (and 
histories of the emotions) that have progressively left behind the interiorized self or 
subjectivity (thus, following from the third item, how to think or feel in an era “post”-
cogito?) to unfold regimes of expressivity that are tied much more to resonant 
worldings and diffusions of feeling/passions – often including atmospheres of sociality, 
crowd behaviors, contagions of feeling, matters of belonging…and a range of 
postcolonial, hybridized and migrant voices that forcefully question the privilege and 
stability of individualized actants possessing self-derived agency and solely private 
emotions within a scene or environment. How might emotion – taking on then 
decidedly affectual qualities – be reconsidered without requiring place-positions for 
subject and object as the first condition? (8) 
This provides a space for thinking about affect in a historically-informed way, understanding 
affect as inherent in bodies and their interrelations with one another, and how these charged 
‘between’ spaces come to define the functioning of the larger societal body. Affect is the 
deprivatisation of emotion; as a result, we can use it to undermine the notion of the masculine 
individual, often prevalent in eighteenth-century thought as private and independent, opening 
himself up to affective transference only when advantageous to do so. Affect theory also 
focuses attention on the powerful influence and necessary presence of the supposed ‘free 
radical’ – the effeminate or foppish man, as well as the failed commercial man, or the non-
European - as the quotation above suggests in its references to ‘hybridized, and migrant 
voices’.  
My primary interest is, of course, masculinity in its relationship to shame. In defining 
shame, I am using Tomkins’s theory of affect, based on the idea of nine ‘innate’ affects, two 
positive (enjoyment-joy and interest-excitement), one neutral (surprise-startle) and six 
negative (distress-anguish, anger-rage, fear-terror, shame-humiliation, disgust and ‘dissmell’ 
(contempt)). Several of these affects appear in pairs, indicating the weaker (first) level of the 
affect, and the more acute (second) level. The final three negative affects listed above appear 
later in an individual’s development than the others (although not much later, especially in the 
case of shame), and are conceived to be learned through social interaction. This renders 
shame a fundamentally social affect, which is of course crucial given the strong emphasis on 
sanctioned social interaction men were expected to participate in during the period covered 
by this thesis.  
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 Silvan Tomkins’s definitions of shame are nuanced and expansive; for that reason I 
quote him at length here: 
If distress is the affect of suffering, shame is the affect of indignity, of defeat, of 
transgression, and of alienation. Though terror speaks to life and death and distress 
makes of the world a vale of tears, yet shame strikes deepest into the heart of man. 
While terror and distress hurt, they are wounds inflicted from outside which penetrate 
the smooth surface of the ego; but shame is felt as an inner torment, a sickness of the 
soul. It does not matter whether the humiliated one has been shamed by derisive 
laughter or whether he mocks himself. In either event he feels himself naked, 
defeated, alienated, lacking in dignity or worth. (Tomkins, in Sedgwick & Frank, eds, 
1995: 133) 
In this introduction to his theory of shame, Tomkins implies that it is one of the most 
persistently powerful of the affects. This is in part due to its many causes and its many forms of 
expression, but also because of its disturbing our very deepest places, what Tomkins calls 
‘sickness of the soul’. He goes on to demonstrate how shame is implicated in a range of 
feelings: 
Shyness, shame and guilt are not distinguished from each other at the level of affect, 
in our view. They are one and the same affect… The conscious awareness of each of 
these experiences is quite distinct. Yet the affect that we term shame-humiliation, 
which is a component of each of these total experiences, is one and the same affect. It 
is the differences in the other components which accompany shame in the central 
assembly or, in other words, which are experienced together with shame, which make 
the three experiences different… the total field in which shame is embedded in the 
central assembly of components of the nervous system at the moment will give quite 
different flavors to shame depending upon its intensity and upon the objects which 
appear to activate it and the objects which appear to reduce it. (133-4) 
So even when we are not experiencing shame, feelings like guilt and even shyness can be 
traced back to what is nonetheless, in the hardwired affect system, an aspect of shame-
humiliation. This has far-reaching consequences: ‘the failure to grasp the underlying biological 
identity of the various phenotypes of shame has retarded our understanding of these 
consequences as well as the magnitude and nature of the general role of shame in human 
functioning’ (134). This has clear implications for a study of shame’s role in helping to 
construct the hegemonic ideal of a gender identity. Following Tomkins’s lead here, my use of 
‘shame’ as a term indicates a polymorphous affect experienced in a variety of ways that 
encompasses feelings which could also be termed guilt and shyness. This is not to muddy the 
waters but rather to indicate that these feelings are traceable back to a sense of failure of the 
self.  
If we have been slow to understand shame’s role in human functioning, then, we 
might ask, what are we missing by not placing shame at the centre of our thinking about 
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human sociability? What can we gain by considering the ways in which shame pervades and 
motivates the social body; what desires and ideals are given impetus and stamina by the 
pulsations of shame? We are used, perhaps, to considering shame in the formation and 
operation of female subjectivity, of non-white experience, of queerness. If we want to 
understand shame’s reach, it is also imperative that we consider its role in the formation of 
that most hegemonic of identity formations, the white, heterosexual, bourgeois man.  
 It was through the work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick that I first discovered Tomkins, and 
even then, it was what Sedgwick did with Tomkins’s work that excited me about shame. 
Sedgwick saw the value of applying affect to her studies of literary texts, among other critical 
objects such as the body and its illnesses, spirituality, and activism. One of the most sustained 
examples of her use of affect as a critical tool for what she called ‘nondualistic thought’ is the 
monograph Touching Feeling (2003). It is Sedgwick who reminds us of Tomkins’s assertion that 
the affects are distinct from Freudian drives; the latter have constraints imposed both by time 
and aim; affects, while weaker, are more promiscuous in their objects and therefore live 
longer. One can live, side by side, with shame for an entire lifetime. Hunger, on the other 
hand, is satisfied by the next meal. ‘Thus, one can be excited by anger, disgusted by shame, or 
surprised by joy’, Sedgwick points out, helping us to see that affects have no problem plugging 
into other affects. I could extend this, as I’m sure Sedgwick wants us to, by saying it is also 
possible to be excited, angered, surprised or joyful over shame, just as one could be ashamed 
by any of these affects too. She also points out that affects can help direct the courses our lives 
follow: ‘my pleasure in hearing a piece of music can make me want to hear it repeatedly, listen 
to other music, or study to become a composer myself’ (19). This leads me to state another 
strand of my argument in this thesis: that shame, rather than being simply isolating or 
stultifying, can actually be a catalyst for flourishing. We see this in the repeated social and self-
reflexive labours of James Boswell and Olaudah Equiano.  
 It may be useful at this juncture to consider the ways in which shame, as I have 
outlined it above, can be seen to act in dialogue with gender in a polite text from the period. 
For this, I have chosen the works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury. His 
philosophy is key to the crystallisation of the polite ideal which I interrogate throughout the 
thesis, something that Lawrence Klein’s work has done so much to highlight. Shaftesbury’s 
collected works, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, along with The Spectator, 
helped to theorise and consolidate ideas which proved to have huge influence on social 
intercourse and ideas of the self. Through a brief analysis of his work here, I hope to set up 
some of the debates I will carry out over the chapters that follow.  
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Shaftesbury: the unbearable politeness of being 
Towards the end of The Moralists, his philosophical dialogue published as part of his 
collected Characteristics (1711), the third earl of Shaftesbury has his philosopher Theocles say 
the following: 
Is manly liberty, generosity, magnanimity not a good? May we not esteem as 
happiness that self-enjoyment which arises from a consistency of life and manners, a 
harmony of affections, a freedom from the reproach of shame or guilt and a 
consciousness of worth and merit with all mankind, our society, country and friends, 
all which is founded in virtue only? A mind subordinate to reason, a temper humanized 
and fitted to all natural affections, an exercise of friendship uninterrupted, a thorough 
candour, benignity and good nature, with constant security, tranquillity, equanimity, if 
I may use such philosophical terms – are not these ever and at all seasons good? … Or, 
to say more yet, can these ever be taken from us or can we ever be hindered in the 
enjoyment of them unless by ourselves? (334-5) 
Packaged within this series of rhetorical questions are several aspects of a moral and ethical 
position that, Shaftesbury seems to be suggesting, must be countenanced by the eighteenth-
century subject in order to live a ‘good’ life. I use the basic word ‘good’ here, because most of 
its synonyms – true, virtuous, moral, ethical – carry much greater semantic loads, and in the 
eighteenth century, this is especially the case. The passage from Shaftesbury above is littered 
with these loaded terms: ‘consistency’, ‘harmony’, ‘worth’, ‘merit’, ‘reason’ and, crucially, 
‘natural’ are but a few. These terms, each representing qualities and ideals linked to, but 
occupying different adjacencies with, the word ‘good’ are fundamental building blocks of 
politeness, that mode of living in and interacting with the world that both enabled and 
reflected an early capitalist society such as Shaftesbury’s.  
As has been acknowledged by critics such as Lawrence Klein (1994), Shaftesbury 
himself acts as ‘the philosopher of politeness’ (2). Much theorising about society in the 
eighteenth century engages with similar ideals as those set out by Shaftesbury above. A good 
life, therefore is a polite one, and as the opening phrase of this quotation suggests, the 
building blocks of that good life were gendered. Shame makes an appearance in Shaftesbury’s 
declaration, defined here as something that the truly happy (and polite) man eradicates from 
his experience. Lack of shame is presented as ‘freedom’; the link here to independence, 
perhaps of the kind Matthew McCormack and others are referring to, is strongly implied. 
Shame, then, belongs to the weak, the dependent, the man who is unable to attain the kind of 
freedom and esteem Theocles rhapsodises over here. By concluding that the positive 
attributes and experiences he has listed cannot be taken by others but can only be given away 
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by ourselves, Shaftesbury’s warning is clear: if you allow yourself to be degraded, you only 
have yourself to blame. To allow oneself to fail is to know shame. 
  Shaftesbury was sensitive to the problem posed by lived experience in his writings 
about politeness. Often in the Characteristics, he makes reference to virtue and morality being 
in dialogue with the society within which the individual exists: 
We have found that, to deserve the name of good or virtuous, a creature must have all 
his inclinations and affections, his dispositions of mind and temper, suitable and 
agreeing with the good of his kind or of that system in which he is included and of 
which he constitutes a part. To stand thus well affected and to have one’s own 
affections right and entire not only in respect of oneself but of society and the public: 
this is rectitude, integrity or virtue. And to be wanting in any of these, or to have their 
contraries, is depravity, corruption or vice. (192) 
This extract is from the early text, Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, first published in 1699. 
Although it differs sharply in its formally philosophical style from the later, more politely 
conversational works in Characteristics such as The Moralists or the Soliloquy, the Inquiry still 
has virtue and its link to sociability at the heart of its concerns. Written as a rebuttal of the 
pessimistic conceptualisation of humanity espoused by Hobbes and those post-Civil War 
thinkers who could only conceive of man as ‘aggressive loner, homo lupo lupus’ in Roy Porter’s 
summation (2003, 132), the Inquiry tries to posit man as inherently gregarious. For 
Shaftesbury, man could not survive alone; dependent on others for his understanding of 
himself as human, it was only right that interpersonal relations be carried out in a way that 
furthered the virtuous potential of both the individual and society. Ultimately, the way to 
ensure this potential was realised was for the individual to work on himself – the macro 
depended on the micro. Throughout the Inquiry, Shaftesbury uses vocabulary familiar to 
anyone reading Addison or, later, the moral philosophy of Smith:  
It will be acknowledged that a creature such as man, who from several degrees of 
reflection has risen to that capacity which we call reason and understanding, must in 
the very use of this his reasoning faculty be forced to receive reflections back into his 
mind of what passes in itself as well as in the affections or will – in short, of 
whatsoever relates to his character, conduct or behaviour amid his fellow creatures 
and in society. (1999, 208) 
This capacity to reflect on the self is key to politeness. After all, a man who cannot conceive of 
himself in relation to those around him can never be truly sociable. It is through improvement 
of the self, ultimately, that society as a whole is improved. Shame is present in self-reflection: 
steering the individual away from unsociable action; encouraging the individual to behave in 
accordance with social values; punishing him for his previous transgressions or poor shows of 
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character. Shame, although not acknowledged openly by Shaftesbury here, is a key factor in 
the improvement of society.   
We see this hinted at in The Moralists, when Theocles expounds on men of particular 
types, one man ‘affecting the hero’, while another is ‘indefatigable in advancing himself to the 
character of a man of business’. Yet another ‘would always be in a debauch’, while another still 
‘looks upon all expense to be madness and thinks only wealth itself to be good’. The extensive 
list covers all manner of types, from the wit to the court sycophant to the country bumpkin 
(333). Theocles concludes that the net effect of valuing one type of thing highly above all 
others is ‘to be a slave and consequently miserable’ (334). The right way, he tells Philocles, is 
to follow nature: 
But finding you so sensible, as I do, of this unhappy state and its inward sores 
(whatever may be its outward looks), how is it possible but you must find the 
happiness of that other contrary state? Can you not call to mind what we resolved 
concerning nature? Can anything be more desirable than to follow her? Or is it not by 
this freedom from our passions and low interests that we are reconciled to the goodly 
order of the universe, that we harmonize with nature and live in friendship both with 
God and man? 
Lack of particularity is commended as ‘natural’, in other words, the state of being that nature 
intended us to inhabit. To Shaftesbury, and commentators following Shaftesbury, much of 
human identification with particular causes or interests were the result of poor socialisation, of 
fad and fashion and the desire for admiration. The true achievement of the polite gentleman 
was to spurn the allure of fashion, and instead to follow nature. This must be done through an 
almost ascetic process of rejecting ‘passions and low interests’, in order that man can be 
‘reconciled’, not only to the natural order but also God and wider society. No wonder the ideal 
of polite masculinity caused such a deal of difficulty and humiliation for men in the eighteenth 
century. Aware that they must ceaselessly examine themselves, they also knew that to 
become too concerned with the particularities of the self was in itself a form of indulgent 
exhibitionism. Polite masculinity works best, perhaps, when even the signification of naming 
was called into question – witness Shaftesbury’s habit, and not his alone, of referring to those 
he admires using epithets rather than their given names. For example, Socrates becomes ‘the 
philosophical hero’ (87), while Xenophon, ‘another noble disciple, whose genius was towards 
action and who proved afterward the greatest hero of his time’ (114). The emphasis on action 
here, rather than what the individual thought of himself or what cause or interest he attached 
himself to, is a common feature of Shaftesburian politeness. 
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 Shaftesbury’s pronouncements on politeness, however, were not as self-assured as 
they seemed. They were the result, in fact, of intense self-reflection and personal struggle. In 
1698, Shaftesbury, then an MP, withdrew from parliament and retired from public life, moving 
to the Netherlands for a period of the kind of self-reflection he later advocated in his writings. 
His unpublished notebooks, explored and discussed by Lawrence Klein (1994), give us a 
fascinating understanding of the ways in which shame, guilt, and negative affect in general lay 
at the very heart of the project of politeness: ‘Wch is most shamefull [sic]? to think of 
Providence as those who do count themselves Naturalists; or thinking of Providence as thou 
dost, to be no otherwise affected as thou art?’ Questions like this are frequent in the 
notebooks, and they are not merely rhetorical. They are, instead, evidence of a direct and 
serious soliloquy engaged in by Shaftesbury in order to reconcile his beliefs with the realities of 
his existence. ‘Wch of the two is most absurd?’ he continues, ‘to have the faith of Epicurus and 
beleive in Atomes; or, being Conscious of Deity, to be no otherwise mov’d by his presence, 
than if He were not, or had no Inspection of our Thought or Action?’ (71). Caught between 
faith and philosophy, Shaftesbury finds that, in Klein’s words ‘his life was not proving as 
tractable as the argumentation in the Inquiry…[the notebooks are] a dramatic encounter 
between those views and the existential reality of an individual’ (71). This is one of the major 
battlegrounds of the self for the polite man – the intellectual ideal versus the lived reality. It 
provides some of the major impetus to this study of shame, as the texts discussed in the 
subsequent chapters are all, in one way or another, dealing with the shame of trying and 
failing to live the ideal.  
 Particularly troubling for Shaftesbury is the conundrum of sociability, that facet of 
politeness so key to The Moralists as well as The Soliloquy. The internal conflicts he attempts 
to resolve, here in messy privacy, and subsequently in seemingly reconciled public prose, are 
both the unslayable chimeras and the necessary engines of polite masculinity. These conflicts 
repeatedly prevent individual men from attaining their social ideal as well as compel them 
towards it. It should come as no surprise, then, that the writings of the men covered in this 
thesis resort repeatedly to ghostly regulatory male figures such as Mr Spectator and 
Shaftesbury’s own Theocles. These figures, external to the self, nonetheless speak directly to 
the self. Smith, in Theory of Moral Sentiments, moves this figure into the body and mind, 
transferring the dialogue inside. Shaftesbury’s notebooks, along with those of figures such as 
Boswell, transcribe this internal dialogue, inevitably dramatising and narrativising it.  
As Klein points out, Shaftesbury attempted to use the notebooks as ‘a sphere of 
control, in which the shaping influences of the outside world could be stilled, examined and 
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appraised’ (83). ‘How long is it that thou will continue thus to act two different parts, & be two 
different Persons?’ Shaftesbury demands in the notebooks: ‘Call to mind what thou 
art…recollect thy Self wholly within thy Self. be One intire & self same man: and wander not 
abroad, so as to loose sight of the End, but keep that constantly in view’ (quoted in Klein, 83). 
The notebooks, then, demonstrate the incessant work involved in polite masculinity. They also 
indicate how central shame was to polite masculinity. Many of Shaftesbury’s word choices 
here are telling, from the performative paranoia of ‘act two different parts’, to the emphasis 
on singularity and integrity of the phrases ‘recollect thy Self wholly within thy Self’, and ‘intire 
& self same man’. The tone itself is one of shame, the shame of not being up to the task. The 
polite man, then, is engaged in a project of unity, but also a ruthless battle to eradicate those 
parts of himself which do not fit the schema. This hollow, monolithic ideal of masculine 
selfhood is a key concern of chapter 3, whilst its opposite, the radically porous body, is a focus 
of both chapter 2 and chapter 4. Both, ultimately, are kept in balance by shame; the shame of 
being too much of one, and not enough of the other.  
 Shame features prominently in a moment of climax towards the end of The Moralists. 
The narrator, Philocles, restages his philosophical conversations with his friend, Theocles, 
which take place during various walks in pastoral landscapes. During their final walk, Philocles, 
who is being inducted into polite thinking by his friend, asks how to completely convince 
himself of the truth of what Theocles has been so seductively outlining. Theocles responds that 
the key is courage in one’s own tenacity and manly integrity. ‘It is cowardice alone betrays us’, 
he says. Closely linked to cowardice is shame: 
For whence can false shame be except from cowardice? To be ashamed of what one is 
sure can never be shameful must needs be from the want of resolution. We seek the 
right and wrong in things; we examine what is honourable, what shameful; and, having 
at last determined, we dare not stand to our own judgment and are ashamed to own 
that there really is a shameful and an honourable. (327) 
In other words, Theocles seems to be suggesting that as long as one has the strength to see 
through the implications of one’s reflective practices, then one has nothing to fear from the 
changing world of opinion. Opinion, Shaftesbury suggests through the words of Theocles, does 
not have ‘any rule beside mere chance, which varies it as custom varies and makes now this, 
now that, to be thought worthy, according to the reign of fashion and the ascendant power of 
education’ (328). In short, the polite man must be prepared to broach the negative regard of 
fashionable opinion and understand that any shame he may experience as a result can be 
dismissed as ‘false shame’. Opinion will suggest that nothing can be shameful or ridiculous as 
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these are mere constructs, rather than springing from self-evident truths. Having denounced 
men of fashion for their changefulness, Theocles then considers shame and its power: 
How then shall we apply the notion [that there is indeed a shameful and a ridiculous]? 
For this being wrong applied cannot itself but be ridiculous. Or will he who cries shame 
refuse to acknowledge any in his turn? Does he not blush nor seem discountenanced 
on any occasion? If he does, the case is very distinct from mere grief or fear. The 
disorder he feels is from a sense of what is shameful and odious in itself, not of what is 
hurtful or dangerous in its consequences. For the greatest danger in the world can 
never breed shame, nor can the opinion of all the world compel us to it, where our 
own opinion is not a party. (328) 
For Shaftesbury, shame can only truly derive from the betrayal of self. He suggests that it is 
possible – in fact necessary – to reject shame externally applied by the fashionable opinion of 
others. To accept this shame is to internalise the caprices of opinion, and thereby morally 
compromise the masculine self, which must, as we have seen, remain ultimately impregnable 
to attack and largely unknowable to others.  
Each of the six chapters which make up this thesis focuses on a different text or set of 
texts. My intention in the thesis is to consider the role affect played in gender and subject 
formation. I am also keen to contribute to the study of hegemonic masculinity more generally, 
if for no other reason than that neglecting to bring it to the fore allows it to slink behind the 
mask of universalism. Enlightenment gender ideals contributed greatly to our modern notions 
of masculinity, and in my deliberate attempts to particularise hegemonic Western masculinity, 
I am trying to remind readers that there is nothing universal about what is, in the end, a highly 
specific gender formation that is simply well placed to present itself as the standard in relation 
to which all others must be conceived.  
With this in mind, Part One of the thesis, containing chapters one to three, considers 
ideas of the masculine and shame’s role in developing them. Chapter One focuses on The 
Spectator and the work done by the text to theorise a polite masculinity through a popular 
format, the periodical. I explore how and where shame is mentioned and where it lurks in the 
context of what Addison, Steele or one of their contributors is saying. I also examine the figure 
of Mr. Spectator, the spectral embodiment of polite masculinity, whose voice erases the 
particularities of each of the periodical’s writers, although not completely successfully. I 
suggest that he is used by Addison and Steele as both a prosthesis and a shield, to carry out 
the work of enacting politeness at a safe remove from their own vulnerable bodies. Chapter 
Two looks at what happens when polite masculinity supposedly fails. I use the figure of the 
fop, and literature written about him, as a case study. Through works like Abel Boyer’s English 
Theophrastus, Etherege’s play The Man of Mode, and other texts, I discuss how shame and 
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anxiety experienced by so-called polite men is displaced onto the fop. I also point out how 
these texts cannot help but betray their own anxieties, and how the fop is set up as a sort of 
bogeyman, always with the potential to disseminate negative affect and effeminacy through a 
kind of contagion. The third chapter is a reconsideration of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, extending the idea of affect as contagion, and considering what this means for 
social cohesion. I also identify the figure of the impartial spectator as a necessary shame 
figure, linking him back to Mr. Spectator, through ideas of surveillance.  
The second section, chapters four to six, turns to more particular ideas of masculinity 
and their affective make-up. I explore three texts which narrativise the experiences of one man 
as he interacts with the world around him. One, Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling, is a 
novel, while the other two, Olaudah Equiano’s Interesting Narrative, and James Boswell’s 
London Journal relate the authors’ lived experiences, albeit via literary formats. The aim of the 
section as a whole is to highlight the ways in which men grappled with the consequences of 
hegemonic masculinity, and how shame is a central component in their experiences. Harley, 
the hero of Mackenzie’s novel, is the focus of Chapter Four, in which I examine how his 
responses to those he meets mark him out as a man who fails to live in the world, instead 
turning away from it towards his own annihilation. This makes him a romantic but unsuitable 
role model for a polite man, as making his way into life is the one thing he must do. I analyse a 
significant reader-response to The Man of Feeling – Robert Burns’s – in order to demonstrate 
the ways in which this makes Harley a figure around whom shame coalesces. I trace in 
Mackenzie’s relationship to his novel, and in his later career as a periodical editor, a swerve 
away from Harley’s shameful example toward a more self-preserving politeness.  
In the fifth chapter, I discuss Boswell’s London Journal, a text so filled with shame that 
it is sometimes hard to know where to start. I have focused my discussion principally in areas 
of deep shame for Boswell; his Scottish heritage, and as an extension of that, his fractious 
relationship with his father. Here we see Boswell making direct comparisons between himself 
and his father, and through them, the painful ways in which nationality and selfhood, the 
public and private, are dealt with through feelings of shame. Like Harley, Boswell displays a 
deep romanticism for a lost past which prevents him from making his way in the world. The 
relationship of shame to masculinity is brought to the foreground by Equiano in unexpected 
ways, as I suggest in Chapter Six. Equiano’s ability to learn the tenets of Enlightenment society 
– and its gender norms – brings into focus the performative and constructed nature of polite 
masculinity. It is the polite masculinity he demonstrates in his Narrative, both in what it 
describes and in the quality of its writing and structure, which enables him to present himself 
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as an equal to his white reader, giving the reader the gift of shame. This gift of shame, I argue, 
is the recognition of the white man’s failure to see Equiano (and perhaps through him, other 
slaves) as the equal of himself. Equiano’s Narrative was written not just as support to the 
abolitionist movement but also as an unambiguous statement of selfhood, and in that sense is 
unique among the texts I discuss here.  
Throughout the thesis, I keep a number of questions in mind. What roles does shame 
have to play in the consolidation of polite masculinity in the eighteenth century? In what ways 
does it threaten or undermine this consolidation? How can affect theory enable us to 
particularise hegemonic masculinity and question its position at the centre of both public and 
private power relations? I hope to demonstrate that shame offers vital new ways of describing 
and assessing polite masculinity in eighteenth-century British literature and culture.  
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PART ONE 
 
Chapter One:  
 
Mr. Spectator: Shame, Politeness and the Disappearing Man 
 
 
 
On Wednesday, 11th July 1711, Richard Steele published an issue of The Spectator with 
the motto Paupertatis pudor et fuga: ‘the shame and dread of being poor’. In this issue, he 
describes – through the eyes of Mr. Spectator, his fictional protagonist – a social gathering 
peopled by well-to-do men. It is a lively, warm and open-hearted affair for all except one man 
in whom Mr. Spectator takes a particular interest: ‘Among others I observed a Person of a 
tolerable good Aspect, who seemed to be more greedy of Liquor than any of the Company, 
and yet, methought, he did not taste it with Delight’ (no. 114). His enquiries about the man 
lead him to discover that he is one who lives extravagantly in order to keep up appearances, 
but is in actual fact far sunk in debt. Mr. Spectator observes that those who wear borrowed 
robes can never wear them well: ‘Thus he endures the Torment of Poverty, to avoid the Name 
of being less rich. If you go to his House you see great Plenty; but served in a Manner that 
shews it is all unnatural, and that the Master’s Mind is not at home’ (no. 114). 
 
Should we take it that home here represents the house full of unnatural Plenty, or 
does it in fact mean the Master’s Mind has wandered from its proper place – the confines of 
his body, or indeed the warmth and security of privacy, a privacy that can only be found within 
his own walls, although it is not reliant on them, nor protected by them? The more we wrestle 
with the phrase, the more we begin to realise that while the meanings are multitudinous, the 
message is univocal. The man who does not live as he should, is not living at all – his wine gives 
him no delight, his displays of wealth are merely displays, and his ‘true’ self is condemned 
forever to walk outside the walls – to be ‘not at home’.  
 
Mr. Spectator grows to his point by moving from the anecdotal to the general: ‘Yet if 
we look round us in any County of Great-Britain, we shall see many in this fatal Errour, if that 
may be call’d by so soft a Name, which proceeds from a false Shame of appearing what they 
really are…’ (no.114). The phrase suggests to us a shame that does not need to be felt, a 
shame that is bound up with misplaced social aspiration and with a performance, an 
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appearance, of politeness, rather than a sincere belief in it. The Master of whom Steele writes 
should certainly feel shame, but not for his true identity. The ‘fatal Errour’ of which Steele 
speaks is brought about by the Master’s choice to adopt a persona, rather than be himself. 
Shame here is not to be found in veracity, but deception. Not only does Steele – through the 
voice of Mr. Spectator – make it clear that appearances are lethally deceptive, but also that 
shame can be equally mercurial – if there is a false shame, there must also be a true shame, 
and if so, what do these complex emotions do to men as individuals, and how do they work 
across society? 
 
In my study of shame in The Spectator, I will employ two approaches. One will be to 
explore specific instances and mentions of shame in The Spectator in an attempt to piece 
together what shame meant and what it does in this period. In doing this, I of course assume 
that The Spectator is a useful and important document to help with this task. J.G.A. Pocock’s 
work, which I explore below, has helped cement the status of this periodical and its sister 
journals as shapers and indicators of polite values, as I explore below. I also want to see in 
what ways shame in the early eighteenth century corresponds to, and differs from, the 
understanding of shame we receive from Silvan Tomkins and from the writings of Eve 
Sedgwick. The other approach I will use is more subtle. By examining the voice of Mr. 
Spectator himself, and how the periodical form is used to refine the voice, I hope to establish 
the ways in which shame comes to be vital to the wider ideologies of politeness. In this way, I 
will also link Addison and Steele’s project to evolving concepts of masculinity – what does the 
polite gentleman look like, how does he think and importantly, how does he feel? Working out 
how an eighteenth-century polite man might have felt about the world can be harder than one 
might imagine. With the concept of writing becoming increasingly public through print culture 
and dissemination through arenas such as the coffee house, writing could not be relied upon 
to remain private and neither could it always be imagined to be private in the first place, as I 
shall explore in later chapters. The periodical form is always intended as public, of course, but 
that does not mean that it is not consumed in private, whether that be at a man’s breakfast 
table, or within his own mind whilst hearing it read out at his coffee house or club.  
 
The closest we can get to his thoughts here is with the aid of both empathetic critical 
thinking and help from work done on identity and conceptions of the self at this time carried 
out by Dror Wahrman. Wahrman’s point, that the self was a perpetually shifting concept in the 
eighteenth century, and that identity was not considered the core of selfhood it later became, 
is helpful with this. Shifting implies doubt, in that any moveable or changeable concept must 
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retain space for doubt over its authenticity in order for it to develop or alter further. Shame, 
then, becomes a space in which doubts about the nature of the self find a home. As in this 
chapter’s opening example from The Spectator, the self was prone to delusions thrust upon it 
from both the inside and outside, and like the gap between Mr. Spectator and his creators, 
there existed a space within oneself that allowed some room for manoeuvre. These doubts, 
sometimes felt as shameful feelings of incompetence or failure, cause the self to rattle and 
reshape within this crucial space. More sustained attention to the idea of shame as a spatial 
and embodied concept is paid in my considerations of Adam Smith in chapter 3. Here, I 
consider what Wahrman, quoting Sarah Knott, calls ‘the socially turned self’ – the idea that a 
person’s identity was malleable and could be ‘turned’ to attune itself to society (Wahrman, 
2004: 168), so here primarily directional as well as spatial. To return to the example with which 
I opened this chapter, we see Steele’s awareness of the ‘socially turned self’. In presenting us 
with a man whose shame lies both in his adoption of a false character, and in his inability to 
see the danger of this for himself and others, Steele asserts that one can turn too far, 
disintegrating entirely any sense of stability, of morality, and hence of sociability. That it is 
through shame that Steele makes us understand this highlights the importance of this affect to 
the project of making men polite.  
 
 The Spectator is an obvious starting point for discussions of sociability in the period, 
and it would be tempting to treat it as just that – a prologue or introduction. One can read it as 
the pre-eminent guardian of politeness, an exercise in ordering the Babel of voices in the new 
commercial society ‘devoted to demonstrating the pitfalls and possibilities of discourse in the 
modern Town…Within that polyphony, politeness as a norm and also goal of discourse 
promised order and direction in a way that cultural institutions might once have sought to do’ 
(Klein, 12). Klein’s analysis of The Spectator as a normalising and normative agent in early-
eighteenth century society helps to demonstrate how gender norms came to be conceived and 
developed. The status of politeness as a goal of discourse also indicates its elusiveness; 
although the text itself may have been readily available through both its wide distribution and 
the accessibility of its style and language, the ideals it espouses were difficult to attain 
nonetheless. I argue that a text which both encourages and disappoints its readers shames 
them through their inability to embody its values.  
 
Klein is not the only critic to think of The Spectator as a dynamic world-making 
sourcebook. For J.G.A. Pocock (1985), The Spectator arrived during a period of intense social 
and economic upheaval, and performed a specific task. Pocock says of the contemporary 
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response to the “monied interest”: ‘This was a momentous intellectual event: there had been 
a sudden and traumatic discovery of capital in the form of government stock and a sudden and 
traumatic discovery of historical transformation as something brought about by the advent of 
public credit’ (108). Pocock’s usage of ‘traumatic’ should give some indication of the affective 
repercussions of change on such a scale. Trauma can be understood as a disordering of the 
senses, a feeling of the world put out of line. To counteract this sense of disorder, a new type 
of order needed to be formulated. Pocock observes that in The Spectator, ‘politeness becomes 
an active civilizing agent’ (236). Addison and Steele’s project, then, performed a necessary 
social and political task, that of rationalising and tempering the emergent economic man. As 
Pocock points out, the man of commerce had not yet acquired the hyper-masculine qualities 
of the nineteenth-century captain of industry. Instead, he was ‘seen as on the whole a 
feminised, even an effeminate being, still wrestling with his own passions and hysterias and 
with interior and exterior forces let loose by his fantasies and appetites…’ (114). This unease 
about the effeminate man, always teetering on the verge of failure, will be picked up in 
chapter 2, as well as later in this chapter, where I consider one of Addison’s pieces imagining 
the body of the fop. Suffice to say now that The Spectator had an important role to play in 
setting the bounds for acceptable polite masculinity. Despite his recognition of the anxiety 
inherent in social uncertainty, however, Pocock’s concern with historicising the role of virtue in 
shaping commerce means that affective issues are generally an aside. This leaves the way clear 
for a closer inspection of shame and its role in the construction of polite masculinity. 
 
 Famously, for Jurgen Habermas, Addison and Steele’s text is the seminal work of the 
bourgeois public sphere; in reading and discussing The Spectator, ‘the public held up a mirror 
to itself’ (1989, 43). Habermas defines the public sphere as ‘private people coming together as 
public’ in order to ‘engage…in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the 
basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor’ (27). 
He outlines how those invested in the public sphere, especially through the medium of print, 
connected values and theories from the ‘collapsing’ old order of the aristocratic and royal 
courts, with the mores of the bourgeoisie (30). The Spectator had an important role to play in 
this, and as Habermas suggests above, this included mirroring the society for which it was 
helping to set the terms. Habermas sees texts like The Spectator as more complicated than this 
in terms of the self: in his words, ‘the public…did not yet come to a self-understanding through 
the detour of a reflection on works of philosophy and literature, art and science, but through 
entering itself into “literature” as an object’(43). Habermas suggests here that the eighteenth-
century public attempted to understand itself via a process of fictionalisation. By creating 
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fictional versions of themselves, individuals were able to place these eidolons in imagined 
situations in order to try out different possibilities. Mr. Spectator is the prime example of this 
process, and we can perhaps understand The Spectator as a collection of experiments on the 
eighteenth-century self, carried out through the mode of periodical writing. Habermas 
highlights here the importance of putting the self centre-stage, in order to understand and 
critique it. This is developed, as he goes on to say, in the domestic novel later in the century, 
and amongst the forms of writing which are examined in the second half of this thesis such as 
the journal and autobiography. The self becomes a literary object in the eighteenth century, in 
a way which enables more strictly reflexive contemplations of the self to be carried out 
through the ‘detours’ that Habermas refers to above. Considerations of selfhood in regards to 
the public sphere will form a crucial part of my consideration of shame’s role in constructing 
polite masculinity. 
 
Dror Wahrman’s influential work on eighteenth-century selfhood, The Making of the 
Modern Self (2004), puts forward the thesis that concepts of the self in this period were 
formulated in response to both the retreat of religion and the advance of commercialism. 
Growth of cities, trades and the middle classes allowed people to ‘don and doff identities with 
impunity’ (203). He suggests that it would be inaccurate to think that distinctions in social 
organisation disappeared, but that developments were felt, on a societal and individual level, 
as ‘undermining the integrity and reliability of familiar categories of social distinction – a 
danger that was compounded by a rising sense of jitteriness’ (205). What is clear from 
Wahrman’s assessment here is that these changes caused a sense of anxiety. It is important, 
therefore, that we consider the vital importance of affect in shaping a perception of the lived 
reality of the times.  
 
This sense of anxiety and unease transposes onto conceptions of the self. Quoting 
Pocock, Wahrman explains: ‘”Once property” – and with it everything else – “was seen to have 
a symbolic value, expressed in coin or credit, the foundations of personality themselves 
appeared imaginary or at best consensual: the individual could exist, even in his own sight, 
only at the fluctuating value imposed upon him by his fellows”’ (208). It is this idea which is 
one of the most central to my thesis. The anxiety of having the value of oneself imposed by 
external others, incapable of knowing one fully and thereby being judged only on what was 
available to external assessment, is a truly overwhelming affective experience. We see this in 
Spectator 114, cited at the beginning of this chapter, in the anxiety and shame experienced by 
the man living beyond his means in order to maintain a false impression of himself in the sight 
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of others. It was these anxieties that The Spectator addressed. Shame, when used as a tool for 
shaping, delimiting and valuing, is valuable in such a project, and it is this use that shame is put 
to in The Spectator.  
 
Klein, Pocock and Habermas all offer keen historicist readings of The Spectator’s role in 
formulating politeness, but to leave it there is to do a disservice to a dynamic example of early 
eighteenth-century literature. Approaching the periodical from a different critical angle reveals 
a challenging and idiosyncratic text. It is easy to underestimate the ways in which The 
Spectator relies upon, and uses, affect in order to carry out the regulatory role critics such as 
those referred to above have demonstrated it plays. Wahrman’s analysis of selfhood helps us 
to see that shame in particular is essential to this role. For Addison and Steele, shame provides 
both a warning to those who might stray from the safe ground of politeness, and a path back 
to restoration for those who already have. It reinforces the structures necessary to an 
emerging commercial society by limiting ambition and discouraging idleness, almost like a 
series of checks and balances. It encourages a man to be reflective and mindful of morality, 
and it keeps him constantly linked to his peers through the bonds of empathy. I intend to 
demonstrate how Addison and Steele go about this in the remainder of this chapter.  
 
Mr Spectator, shame and the male authorial voice 
 
In the opening issue of The Spectator, Addison introduces us to Mr. Spectator, from 
the very outset speaking through him. Mr. Spectator gives us an account of his background and 
past, as ‘I have observed, that a Reader seldom peruses a Book with Pleasure ‘till he knows 
whether the Writer of it be a black or a fair Man, of a mild or choleric Disposition, Married or a 
Batchelor, with other Particulars of the like nature’ (no.1, I: 1). In the very opening line, 
Addison hints at the trick he and Steele are playing. Acknowledging that human curiosity is 
always piqued with regards to identity, he has constructed a knowingly false history in order to 
satisfy his readers. The very fact that the history is false, however, hints at contradictions 
within the project of politeness. The true histories of Addison and Steele lie behind the fiction 
of identity that is the constructed narrative of Mr. Spectator’s life, while through him they 
constantly reiterate the vital importance of being one’s true self. This is illustrated in the 
example I gave from Steele at the beginning of this chapter, where he warns readers against ‘a 
false Shame of appearing what they really are’. How, then, do we reconcile these 
contradictions without resorting to a charge of hypocrisy aimed at the authors? Addison and 
Steele’s retreat behind the figure of Mr. Spectator, covering themselves with him like a 
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blanket, is structurally similar to shame in that the instinctive response to shameful feelings is 
to cover the face, hiding oneself from surveillance. Politeness, then, involves fictions of 
identity that require a covering of the self, or at least those aspects of the self deemed 
inappropriate to polite interactions with others. It seems that the false shame identified by 
Steele in the opening anecdote is at times also a necessary shame – hiding your ‘true’ self can 
invoke and be motivated by different experiences of shame. 
 
For Anthony Pollock, Mr. Spectator’s reluctance to involve himself in the toil of the 
world sets an example to readers. His spectatorial mode becomes the ideal; it in fact becomes 
a form of politeness in praxis. Pollock states: ‘As readers' surrogate participants in the 
disorderly public sphere, Addison and Steele's personae characteristically do not intervene, 
they withdraw. Mr. Spectator repeatedly removes himself from urban scenes that threaten to 
overwhelm him’ (2007: 708). Fears of being overwhelmed, of being smothered and invaded 
against one’s will, is the ultimate experience of loss of sovereignty. Withdrawal, then, helps to 
maintain the integrity of the self. This is underscored for us from the beginning, where Mr. 
Spectator asserts: ‘I live in the World, rather as a Spectator of Mankind, than as one of the 
Species…’ (no.1, I: 4). Mr. Spectator’s presentation of himself as an alien, rather ‘than as one of 
the Species’ both sets himself apart from his readers and allows for his ascent as an exemplary 
man of politeness. His status as exemplar lends a certain cache to his creators, whilst 
simultaneously protecting them from being overwhelmed. He is a shield against shame, 
because if one cannot be seen, one cannot be shamed. It is for this reason that the body’s 
instinctive response to feelings of shame is to cover or shield the face, to prevent any further 
contact with the world whence the shame has arrived. Of course, this is not effective, as the 
ultimate spectator lies within, as I explore particularly in Chapter 3. However, leaving aside the 
many ways in which it can be consumed and internalised privately, we can say that the 
periodical essay, of which The Spectator is largely composed, addresses itself to the public 
sphere and so it is with external surveillance that Addison and Steele are largely concerned 
with regards their own authorship.  
 
Print culture, and the periodical essay form, enables the writer to ‘speak’ 
uninterrupted and unchallenged. For Addison and Steele, then, print provides the ideal 
environment in which to both discuss and enact politeness. It is a space of withdrawal, from 
where one can be engaged with but not implicated in (and therefore overwhelmed by) the 
hurly-burly. It also usefully lionises the growing and still young technology of mass print 
culture. Scott Black observes that the essay form which composes the majority of entries in 
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The Spectator ‘assumes a relationship between reader and writer structured by an ethos of 
friendship, but this does not necessarily require the event of friendship. Politeness is an 
abstraction of the dynamic of friendship, a way to treat strangers as friends...’ (1999, 30). Here, 
again, we find abstraction, this time from friendship as opposed to the authors’ vulnerable 
bodies. If we understand friendships as affective relationships between bodies, however, then 
the two abstractions can be placed beside each other to enable us to see the difficulties 
politeness was intended to overcome. Where bodies and affective relations are messy and 
unpredictable, politeness posited a method of social engagement that did not rely too heavily 
on the volatile dynamics of empathetic entanglement with one’s fellow man. Politeness, then, 
is a method of sanitising affect, ensuring it remains useful but attempting to redirect its 
considerable power into regulating social relations. It is also a further abstraction from 
immediate affective involvement, meaning that the very act of being polite mitigates against 
exposure to affect and its traumas, including shame. Conducting oneself in a social context via 
the consensual rules and sanctioned behaviours of that context reduces the chances of 
experiencing affect, and if one does, then it at least provides a method of regulating its impact 
and lessening its visibility to anyone watching. This social regulation also serves to facilitate 
capitalist activities such as trade and business more generally – not, I would suggest, a by-
product of this process but in fact vital to commercialism’s success, as the work of Adam Smith 
demonstrates.  
 
If Addison and Steele are so intent on covering their own bodies, then what should we 
make of the body of Mr. Spectator? His is a body that is clearly ‘present’ in his world – he is 
named, given friends and a personal history, albeit one framed around his own non-
participation. However, readers of The Spectator cannot see him or touch him, neither can we 
hear him, and he alludes frequently to his silence in company and his disinclination to be 
looked at by strangers, as though in some vital way he is, or wishes to be, untouchable even in 
the world in which he does exist. Manushag N. Powell (2012) suggests that this is a strategic 
decision on the part of his creators: ‘[this] might appear as a move toward neutral passivity, 
but it was also a power play, for Mr. Spectator refuses the reciprocity of the gaze with his 
readers…’ (257). The mechanisms of print allow Mr. Spectator to communicate without being a 
subject of his own practices of observation. Powell claims that: ‘this avoidance is presented as 
a choice made by a sensible, physically normal individual…’ (258). She conceives of gazing in 
the terms of the eighteenth-century periodical as both synesthetic and penetrative: ‘to be 
heard is to make vibrate; to be seen reciprocally is to be touched, penetrated…or 
even…cannibalized’ (Powell, 2012: 260). Pointing us to an issue of The Spectator in which 
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Addison discusses sight, Powell notes that: ‘his brand of “neutral” spectation is a position that 
brings its own rewards, and even intimacies’ (260). The issue in question, no 411 (21st June 
1712), considers sight as ‘a more delicate and diffusive Kind of Touch, that spreads it self over 
an infinite Multitude of Bodies’ (III: 435-6).  There is something languid and even sensual about 
Addison’s conception of sight here that suggests the act of gazing is fraught with desire, 
spreading itself over and overwhelming ‘Multitudes’ of bodies promiscuously. The invocation 
of a form of touch that we cannot feel is redolent of both unwanted invasion and excited 
curiosity. No wonder the gaze was a threat to the sovereignty Addison and Steele attempt to 
shore up by using Mr. Spectator; no wonder Mr. Spectator himself is so unwilling to be looked 
at.  
 
Gazing is an act of possession and domination, a form of desiring, and desire walks 
hand-in-hand with shame. Think of the common reaction to being gazed upon; we feel acutely 
self-conscious and wonder what about our particularity has drawn the spectatorial gaze of 
another. Are we being judged, desired, loathed? Time and again we are reminded that in being 
seen, in the many different ways in which that can occur, we open ourselves up to doubt and 
to shame. To avoid becoming an object, and therefore prone to the shame of being seen, the 
authors of The Spectator choose to retreat behind the gauzy cover of an eidolon – a spirit-
image of a person. Powell refers to Spectator 12, where the eidolon watches young women 
reading ghost stories aloud: ‘He longs to be a ghost, but only a friendly, even a holy one. To be 
not-quite-alive is, for him, to engage positively with “Society”’ (2012: 261). The ghost is 
inviolable as he cannot be seen or shamed. This reveals in turn the contemporary male 
reader’s own susceptibility to being shamed, as his body is undeniably material. Mr. Spectator 
performs an act that the man reading his missives – the contemporary reader of The Spectator 
- cannot follow, and in disappearing he points to the melancholy truth of politeness: that it is 
only truly attainable if one can write oneself out of existence, much like Harley, the hero of The 
Man of Feeling, and a focus of Chapter Four. 
 
Engaging positively using a negative, or non-corporeal, body is what makes the project 
of politeness as enacted in The Spectator so effective. Two men with bodies retreat behind an 
eidolon which has no material body in the world of his creators. These actions set them at 
several degrees of removal from their readers, meaning that when the voice in The Spectator 
speaks, it appears to come from everywhere and nowhere. It is this non-directional origin that 
makes the male authorial voice of Addison/Steele/Mr. Spectator authoritative. The sound 
which fills all space without emanating from a locatable source is an aspect of hegemony. By 
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the time The Spectator completed its run, it had helped to consolidate and even make 
hegemonic a set of behavioural and identity practices that provided both a framework and a 
site of struggle for men across the eighteenth century.  
 
If Mr. Spectator is a prophylaxis against shame for his creators, then what is his 
function for his contemporary readers? The repercussions of this text can be measured when 
you consider what came after in terms of how eighteenth-century literature attempted to 
construct ideas of the self. Mr. Spectator – an observer and commentator – functions for 
Addison and Steele as what both Powell and Pollock have referred to as an eidolon. The 
eidolon is a figure from Greek mythology that can be thought of as a double or spirit, often 
closely resembling a mortal, living or dead. It is an idealised form often used to promote or 
embody particular values; in Mr. Spectator’s case, this is politeness. For Powell, the periodical 
eidolon as he appears in texts such as The Spectator foreshadows the ‘middle class authorial 
“I”’ of the eighteenth-century novel. What is really helpful is her insistence on the eidolon’s 
spectatorial powers, and in the idea that spectatorship is never merely visual but thoroughly 
embodied:  
 
…to observe empirically, even to do so from the position of a satirizing authorial 
spectator, involves some acknowledgment of the human body’s chaotic multisensory 
experience, and the need to acknowledge the body as materially gendered. Periodical 
writing can inscribe empirical observation as a peculiarly sensual affair. (255-6)  
 
This reminds us that our acts of observation draw upon and affect our whole range of 
experiences, and inescapably draw attention to our own particularity, for instance our gender.  
If we understand shame as an emotion which responds physically to spectatorship (and surely 
the blush is an example of this), then it becomes clear why this particular affect is so well-
suited to spectatorial writing. The spectre is a spectator, and in situating Mr. Spectator at the 
intersection of public and private, Addison and Steele make him an eidolon uniquely able to 
remain untouchable whilst simultaneously touching his readers to the quick.  
 
Making use of this idea of  Mr Spectator as an eidolon it is possible to trace the 
idiosyncrasies in his character that I believe draw attention to the constructed nature of the 
authorial ‘I’ he represents, and ultimately make the link to the ways in which shame and 
politeness operate within the text itself.  
 The Spectator is a voluble and loquacious work, but it is also, of course, a silence. 
Whilst the men behind Mr. Spectator speak through him, there is also a gap, a space through 
31 
 
which their voices must pass in order to do this. In travelling across that space, the voices 
mutate; they lose some of the markers that designate them as Addison’s or Steele’s, the hints 
that these words originated in the gendered bodies of men of flesh and blood. The distorting 
space is not a by-product of the periodical style, however. It is both deliberate and essential to 
the success of the project, and is a trick used to great effect. The gap is, crucially, where shame 
lives. The space between writer and speaker is one that allows Powell’s (male) authorial ‘I’ to 
form and develop; this voice is a powerful weapon and its tones and accents become familiar 
to its audience as a schoolmaster’s. The male authorial ‘I’ is the voice which cinches together 
the authorial and authoritative and the voice is at once male and genderless; male insofar as 
maleness is read as synonymous with patriarchy and genderless in that patriarchy and, as a 
corollary, maleness, is read so often as universal. In fact, it is easy to read The Spectator as 
universal, and entirely overlook that it is written by men, using a male eidolon as its 
protagonist. The body, however, is inescapably gendered, and where it is prone to desire and 
decay, the authorial voice is seemingly impervious to both, because it is abstracted from the 
body.  
 
In successfully employing the male authorial voice, however, Addison and Steele 
inevitably tie up their own tongues, sacrificing the timbre and texture of their particularised 
male voices for the abstracted authority of ‘the universal voice’. While an evacuation of 
particularity gives this voice an indefinability which renders it less easy to question (this is, of 
course, exactly how privilege works), it should also be noted that this very same move towards 
universalism cannot be made without sacrifices. What we learn from this is that the male 
(read: universal) authorial voice, like patriarchy, can erase subjectivity as it imbues the voice 
with power. As I have already suggested, avoiding the particular is a strategy that can help 
avoid shame, but this carries the risk of lessening shame’s beneficial impact; the ability to 
empathise and reform one’s character are key aspects of a successfully polite man, but in 
order to feel empathy one needs a recourse to painful affect, including shame. It seems of 
great importance, then, to retain elements of particularity in order to be truly polite, and for 
that, one cannot in practice enact the forms of retirement that we see in both Mr. Spectator 
and his creators.  
 
The invention of Mr. Spectator is a key element of the project: as an eidolon, he at 
once removes the egoistic link to his creators, while also allowing the readers a body in which 
to invest and interact. Mr. Spectator’s body allows the voices of Addison and Steele to become 
abstracted. It allows a polite form of liberty, a liberal distancing or stepping-back, what 
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Michael Warner (1992), borrowing from Lauren Berlant, calls a ‘prosthetic character’ (381). 
Warner argues that without the anonymity made possible by a prosthesis, appearing in the 
medium of print, The Spectator would not have been conceivable, and the power it came to 
wield would have been decidedly weaker. ‘The ambiguous relation between Spectator and 
writer, Steele says, liberates him’ (380-1), Warner observes. This concept is similar to that of 
Powell and Pollock’s eidolon, but while the eidolon image emphasises the erasure of masculine 
particularity, here the term borrowed from Berlant highlights the utility of Mr. Spectator. To 
talk about The Spectator is to constantly talk about two men – the character and his author – 
speaking and writing and spectating in tandem with each other. It is to try to describe and 
understand a relationship that is formed of two bodies conjoined in print, one corporeal, and 
the other constructed, with the former using the prosthesis as a shield from shame.  
 
In ‘The Mass Public and the Mass Subject’, Michael Warner describes a moment in 
which we, as individuals, ‘adopt the attitude of the public subject, marking to ourselves its 
nonidentity with ourselves’ (1992: 377). Simultaneously, we are both subjective individuals as 
well as the subjective public. Adopting the attitude of the public subject involves an affective 
shift. We are, in this moment, absorbed into an imagined body known as ‘the public’ we are 
thus in intimate contact with unidentifiable, indefinably numerous others. The community of 
consumption that mass print culture allowed for meant that even if one spent the majority of 
one’s time behind a shield of one’s own making – as of course Mr. Spectator does – one was 
still strongly aware of the ideas and opinions of others. This was a virtual community with very 
real effects on its members. It became increasingly important to individuals at this time what 
those they had never met thought and felt about given topics.  
 
According to Eve Sedgwick, this contact between bodies allows for the transmission of 
affect: as she describes it, ‘shame is both peculiarly contagious and peculiarly individuating’ 
(2003: 36). This contact is a breeding ground for shame, because when individuals touch in 
some way affect negotiates the notional divides of separate subjectivities. As we have already 
seen, Addison at least was keenly aware of the close relationship between touch and the 
spectatorial gaze. Warner identifies this awareness as coming via ‘an understanding of print’ 
(379). Addison and Steele developed a ‘structuring metalanguage’ (380) as Warner calls it, 
which encouraged private individuals to recognise themselves as public subjects, as members 
of the public via their involvement in print culture.  
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Print, then, enables us to traverse the gaps between public and private. It is no wonder 
that shame becomes so crucial to the refinement of politeness. Hiding as it does in the liminal 
spaces between self and other, shame helps to both define identity and to deconstruct it; it is 
as Sedgwick says both ‘contagious’ and ‘individuating’. In exploiting this, the writers made 
their voices both authorial and authoritative. The results of this abstraction can be seen in the 
figure of Mr. Spectator. As Steele states through his prosthesis: ‘It is much more difficult to 
converse with the World in a real than a personated Character. That might pass for Humour, in 
the Spectator, which would look like Arrogance in a Writer who sets his Name to his Work’ (no. 
555, IV: 491). As Warner observes, the very invention of Mr. Spectator means that the author 
and the speaker are ‘no longer self-identical’ (381). This allows for ‘an identification with a 
disembodied public subject that he [the reader] can imagine as parallel to his private person’ 
(381). As Warner says of Steele: ‘it allows him to think of his public discourse as a routine form 
of self-abstraction…’ (Warner, 1992: 381). This self-abstraction enables Addison and Steele to 
say things they could never say were they communicating with their own individual, nameable 
bodies.   
 
It is with the threat of the authors’ bodies becoming visible that we return to shame. 
The rhetoric of the public relies on the fallacy that all have equal stake in it, but as Michael 
Warner reminds us: ‘the subject who could master this rhetoric in the bourgeois public sphere 
was implicitly, even explicitly, white, male, literate and propertied’ (382). This unspoken truth 
becomes undeniable when one considers the exclusionary practices that exist in The Spectator 
despite its apparent inclusivity. The poor are barely considered, let alone addressed, and while 
women do merit instances of direct address, they are more often spoken about rather than to. 
Therefore, Addison and Steele, marked as white, male, literate and propertied bodies, are 
jarring reminders of this double standard. Meanwhile, the shadow of the feminine is 
considerable in much male-authored literature of the period, especially given the criticism 
levelled by detractors of politeness, who considered the process of making a man polite almost 
synonymous with making him effeminate, as I shall consider in the next chapter.  
 
The privilege of The Spectator’s male authorial voice is its abstraction from a gendered 
– and therefore marked – body. As with any privilege, it is jealously protected, and as Warner 
says, ‘to acknowledge their own positivity would be to surrender their privilege, as for example 
to acknowledge the objectivity of the male body would be feminizing’ (384). The very creation 
of Mr. Spectator is an attempt not just to distance bodies from voices, but also to cover up the 
shame this act implies. Warner states that ‘Self-abstraction from male bodies confirms 
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masculinity’ (383). However, he also points out that these same privileged subjects thence 
‘…found themselves in a relation of bad faith to their own positivity’ (384). This is the ultimate 
trap of universalising identity, and one peculiarly suited to the privileged male subject; in 
giving up so much of his own positivity, he remains permanently cut off from it. Mr. Spectator 
seems to reassert the symbolic significance of the universal, the male authorial “I” in polite 
culture, and yet because of his ghostliness, he cannot help but confirm the loss. It is in this 
sense that we can see Mr Spectator as representative of the simultaneous success and failure 
of polite masculinity.  
 
Shame in Practice: Addison and Steele’s uses of affect in The Spectator 
 
 What are the ways in which shame acts explicitly in The Spectator, however? How do 
Addison and Steele go about defining and using it in the project of politeness? A starting point 
is an early issue of the periodical that highlights both the values of the polite gentleman and 
what the consequences are for those who stray. The Spectator of Thursday, 23rd August 1711 is 
one written by Steele. It takes as its subject Men of Wit and Pleasure. The piece is a meditation 
on the affective consequences of ‘Wenching, Liveliness and Vice’. Steele’s argument is made 
not from a censorious angle of emotional correction carried out by others, but from a nuanced 
and intuitive analysis of personal, private shame. Starting with general comments on how Men 
of Wit and Pleasure both shock reason and tickle the imagination, and how these men are ‘in 
every Body’s Mouth that spends any Time in Conversation’ (no. 151, II: 93), his writing then 
takes a different turn: 
 
Pleasure, when it is a Man’s chief Purpose, disappoints it self; and the constant 
Application to it palls the Faculty of enjoying it, tho’ it leaves the Sense of our Inability 
for that we wish, with a Disrelish of every thing else. Thus the intermediate Seasons of 
the Man of Pleasure are more heavy than one would impose upon the vilest Criminal. 
(94)  
 
What is instantly striking about this passage is the level of empathy. Far from condemning the 
Man of Pleasure, Steele uses the self-proclaimed non-partisan voice of Mr. Spectator to place 
his reader adjacent to the suffering coxcomb. This sensation of walking side-by-side with a 
man one is supposed to condemn is heightened as we are presented with the sight of him at 
his darkest: 
 
Take him when he is awaked too soon after a Debauch, or disappointed in following a 
worthless Woman without Truth, and there is no Man living whose Being is such a 
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Weight or Vexation as his is. He is an utter Stranger to the pleasing Reflections in the 
Evening of a well-spent Day, or the Gladness of Heart or Quickness of Spirit in the 
Morning after profound Sleep or indolent Slumbers. He is not to be at Ease any longer 
than he can keep Reason and good Sense without his Curtains; otherwise he will be 
haunted with the Reflection, that he could not believe such a one the Woman that 
upon Trial he found her. What has he got by his Conquest, but to think meanly of her 
for whom a Day or two before he had the highest Honour? and of himself for, perhaps, 
wronging the Man whom of all Men living he himself would least willingly have 
injured? (94) 
 
The affective proximity we feel here to the man supposedly being decried is striking. We are 
with him at his most vulnerable moment, when he awakes beleaguered by a hangover and 
regretting last night’s behaviour. Steele seems to be appealing here to the experiences of his 
contemporary readers, urban men of polite society. Steele’s prose leaves open the possibility 
that his reader may well see himself in the description, and feel shame as he begins to wonder 
whether or not the piece condemns him.  
 
It is here that we see the transmission of affect occurring within the virtual community 
of print culture; the moment at which Michael Warner’s public subject comes sharply into 
view. The reader is invited to identify with the text, and in doing so is brought within touching 
distance of him, via whichever channel the individual reader can best access. As with almost all 
prose in The Spectator, the phrasing here allows space for readers to orientate themselves 
along a multitude of axes; never telling its reader what to think, nor condemning in any crude 
or simplistic way. We are not given the opportunity to feel superior to the Man of Pleasure. 
The chosen method is to place the reader close enough to touch him, ensuring we cannot 
become too prurient, nor imagine ourselves to be above reproach. This textual affective 
contact facilitates the transmission of a very private shame that nonetheless makes us feel 
connected with others. In fact, the effect is very much that of novelistic fiction. Mr. Spectator, 
in his capacity as eidolon and authorial prosthesis, is a forerunner of the subjective, first 
person narratives that would come to dominate published creative works as the century wore 
on. Steele, through Mr. Spectator, appeals here directly via affect. From shame and its 
interaction with social expectations, a social identity is born: that of the polite man, as I 
outlined above.  
 
 Of course, there is also mocking humour in the passage above. This is especially 
notable in the echo we hear of the Man of Pleasure’s voice in the line ‘…he could not believe 
such a one the Woman that upon Trial he found her’. Steele underscores this comedy, 
however, by reiterating the tone of pathos; drawing attention back to the self-harm the Man 
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has inflicted when he meditates on how he has ‘…wrong[ed] the Man whom of all living he 
himself would least willingly have injured’. Comedy and pathos are subsequently joined by 
allegory, when Steele introduces the figure of Pleasure as a seductive and malignant female, 
‘He looks at Pleasure as she approaches, and comes to him with the Recommendation of warm 
Wishes, gay Looks, and graceful Motion; but he does not observe how she leaves his Presence 
with Disorder, Impotence, down-cast Shame, and conscious Imperfection’ (94).  The 
implication of a sexual relationship between the Man of Pleasure, and Pleasure herself, is 
implied by the gap left between her coming and going. Endeavouring to keep his writing polite, 
Steele omits details of the debaucheries he refers obliquely to earlier on. This gap is a crucial 
technique, allowing the reader space to fill it with his own imagination – and potentially feel 
shame at his having done so. However, in this brotherhood of shame lies the means to restore 
oneself to politeness. The characterization of the most libertine member of The Spectator 
Club, Will Honeycomb, shows that the Man of Pleasure is not an outcast or unwelcome 
member of society; indeed, Honeycomb’s eventual rehabilitation is proof that all one needs to 
do is reflect on one’s failings and experience shame at the thought of them, in order to start 
the process of becoming truly polite. Shame can in fact be the very beginning of politeness. 
This rehabilitation is the overarching project of The Spectator.  
 
As I have suggested, however, this does not mean that the voice of Mr. Spectator is 
consistent throughout. When we turn to Addison, his method of censuring the Man of 
Pleasure involves satire rather than empathy. The purpose of this is not to evoke shame as a 
consequence of ill-planned action, but rather the inevitable results of a lack of shame – 
shamelessness. On Tuesday, 15th January 1712, he produced an issue in which Mr. Spectator 
recounts a dream, during which he observes the dissection of a beau’s head. Dreams and 
allegory are vital to Addison in particular; although common in the Augustan literary period, 
they become of particular use to Addison here because they are yet another distancing tactic. 
This example relies on the suggestion that dreams are not controlled by their dreamer, but 
instead reveal the incontrovertible truth of a matter otherwise complicated by custom or habit 
in the waking world. Mr. Spectator finds himself gazing upon a brain ‘stuffed with invisible 
Billetdoux, Love-Letters, pricked Dances and other Trumpery of the same Nature’ (no. 275, II: 
571). The organ is filled entirely with the symbols of excess, including snuff and sonnets. The 
parts of the beau’s brain are partly composed of liquids such as quicksilver for venereal 
disease, orange water as scent and ‘Froth’. In abundance, however, we find fabric and textiles, 
including ‘Ribbons, Lace and Embroidery, wrought together in a most curious Piece of 
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Network’ (571). A spongy substance meanwhile, is discovered to be composed of ‘Nonsense’ 
(572).  
 
Addison’s piece is fascinating for several reasons. Firstly, its appropriation of the 
language of science brings into sharp relief the inadequacies of the beau. Mr. Spectator and his 
fellows are men of science; they inspect, probe and discover truth. Meanwhile the beau is not 
just led astray by excess; by nightmarish mutation, he is composed of it. Becoming an object of 
inspection and invasion by other men denaturalizes – or even unmans - him even further; he is 
displayed, sliced open, poked at, sniffed at and preserved by a team of men who clearly 
believe themselves to be his moral superiors. This is highlighted by Addison’s reference to the 
unused ‘Elevator’ muscle, apparently needed to ‘turn the Eye towards Heaven’ (572-3).  
 
The piece is also interesting because of the sense of touch, of contact, implied in 
Steele’s piece and made literal in Addison’s, which engages the reader. Here we see the kind of 
thinking that allows Silvan Tomkins, over two hundred years later, to link emotion to the 
material body through the concept of affect. For Steele, the suggestion of being adjacent to 
the Man of Pleasure allows us to empathise and learn by his example. Addison takes proximity 
to disturbing extremes – we are not just touching the Man of Pleasure, we are inside him. The 
shame of this is immediately apparent. The male body, which is so vehemently denied by the 
abstracted male authorial voice, returns here to haunt the reader, to haunt Mr. Spectator, and 
to haunt Addison himself. Addison’s choice of satire to describe this dream cannot elide 
entirely its nightmarish qualities. Most unsettling of all is the assertion that at first glance, the 
head ‘appeared like the Head of another Man’ (570) – one cannot always tell the Man of 
Pleasure from the Man of Sense. It is only on closer inspection that Mr. Spectator observes 
clues to outward signs of the beau’s dearth of politeness: 
 
The Skins of the Forehead were extremely tough and thick, and, what very much 
surprized us, had not in them any single Blood-Vessel that we were able to discover, 
either with or without our Glasses; from whence we concluded, that the Party when 
alive must have been entirely deprived of the Faculty of Blushing. (572) 
 
Here we come to the heart of the problem for Addison. The skin covering the face, deprived as 
it is of blood supply, is a dead mask. The beau cannot expect to become polite because he 
does not have the capacity. Blushing was a key indicator of morality for eighteenth-century 
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writers1. The ability to blush – for men and women – was almost synonymous with the 
capability of reflecting on one’s moral conduct and acknowledging it. Blushing was the emblem 
of shame fuelled by modesty, written across the face where others could see it and approve of 
it. For Addison’s beau, this is a biological impossibility. He is shameless, and therefore cannot 
be expected to enter polite society with a true understanding of what the polite gentleman 
does. Whether the abnormalities of the beau’s anatomy are supposed to be innate or 
acquired, Addison does not tell us. Ultimately, that is of little importance. His main weapon 
here is the threat of unforgivable impoliteness.  
 
By depicting a man whose shamelessness and lack of humanity has changed him 
irreparably, Addison insinuates that it is possible to be damned in and by society. The beau’s 
inability to feel shame makes him in some way inhuman; therefore he cannot be said to have 
any agency or identity: truly a horror story to any subject, but especially for an eighteenth-
century man, as I explore in the next chapter. While Steele uses shame as a carrot, Addison 
turns the consequences of shamelessness into a stick. This should not be taken to mean, 
however, that Addison does not believe in the redemptive powers of politeness. On the 
contrary, his satires and allegories are more often than not warnings, attempts to save 
wayward men before they go beyond the capacity for redemption. As he states elsewhere: ‘A 
Man who lives in a State of Vice and Impenitence, can have no Title to that Evenness and 
Tranquillity of Mind which is the Health of the Soul, and the natural effect of Virtue and 
Innocence’ (no. 381, III: 431, my emphasis).  
  
 There is no doubt that both Addison and Steele perceive shame to be a social 
corrective, even if they do approach the theme somewhat differently. In a collaborative piece 
between Steele and the Irish poet Thomas Parnell, Steele makes use of the latter’s allegorical 
poem ‘The Palace of Vanity’ to attempt to alert those who would be polite to their own 
failings. ‘Our Defects and Follies are too often unknown to us; nay, they are so far from being 
known to us that they pass for Demonstrations of our Worth’ (no. 460, IV: 121), he states as he 
introduces the ‘Vision’ which follows. In Parnell’s allegory, the speaker arrives on a hill, ‘green, 
flowery, and of an easy Ascent’ to discover ‘squint-ey’d Errour and popular Opinion with many 
Heads’ (121). Opinion in particular is able to fill up the heart with not just pride but longing: 
‘She seem’d to have a Tongue for every one; every one thought he heard of something that 
                                                          
1 The Spectator references blushing in relation to modesty fairly frequently, with a useful discussion of it 
in issue 45 (vol I, pp. 193-4). The practice of using the blush to gain attention was decried by Addison in 
issue 377 (vol III, p. 418) and by Steele in issue 66 (vol I, p. 282).  
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was valuable in himself, and expected a Paradise which she promis’d as the Reward of his 
Merit’ (121). When they arrive at the Palace of Vanity, they meet other allegorical figures chief 
of whom is Vanity herself, enthroned and ‘deck’d in the Peacock’s Feathers’ (122). Having 
driven away Plain Dealing, the throne room and its inhabitants are then attacked by ‘a 
numerous Train of Harpies crowding in upon us’ 
 
Folly and Broken Credit were seen in the House before they enter’d, Trouble, Shame, 
Infamy, Scorn and Poverty brought up the Rear. Vanity, with her Cupid and Graces, 
disappear’d; her Subjects ran into Holes and Corners; but many of them were found 
and carry’d off…either to Prisons or Cellars, Solitude or little Company, the mean Arts 
or the viler Crafts of Life. (123-4) 
 
Whilst the ‘Shame’ referred to here is more than likely shamed reputation, that is, the result of 
the spectatorial gaze of society, shame must be internalized as affect in order to have any 
effect. The figuring of Shame as a harpy alludes to its role as not just a punisher but also a key 
affect in reform. From the list of harpies in the quotation above, we can note that shame is the 
only affect mentioned; all the others are worldly consequences of a lack of plain dealing. Even 
scorn is not included by Silvan Tomkins in his schema of affects; scorn operates outside of the 
self in public words and actions, and so cannot be called an affect. It is shame alone which can 
be used both to great effect as a way of castigating the self or others, and in setting an 
example for those already on the wrong path.  
 
In leaving the Palace, the speaker overtakes wrongdoers who ‘were now terrified to 
good purpose by the Example of others’ (124). A last obstacle stands in their way – the Palace 
hangs above the ground and they are trapped. Once again, shame comes to the rescue, this 
time not figured allegorically as a harpy, but simply shame from within:  
 
But as they began to sink lower in their own Minds, methought the Palace sunk along 
with us, till they were arriv’d at the due Point of Esteem which they ought to have for 
themselves; then the Part of the Building in which they stood touched the Earth, and 
we departing out, it retir’d from our Eyes (124).  
 
Shame here acts as the great leveller, bringing people quite literally down to earth, restoring 
social order and affirming the hierarchies that keep society from toppling. As the visitors to the 
Palace of Vanity ‘sink lower in their own Minds’, their negative affect returns them to earth 
and to themselves. It cannot be ignored here that the message of the vision seems to enforce 
the idea of hierarchy as natural. Whether or not we take this to mean a hierarchy based on 
birth, or one of meritocracy – the two were never entirely inextricable even in the most liberal 
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of early eighteenth-century thought – there is a sense of the ‘fitness’ of things; shame helps us 
not only to restore that order but understand ourselves as fitting into that hierarchy.  
 
The mention of Esteem in Steele and Parnell’s piece stands in for modesty, another 
marker of politeness for writers like Addison and Steele. In discourses of politeness, modesty 
and shame go hand in hand, as in Addison’s contribution to The Spectator of Saturday, 24th 
November 1711. Here Addison has Mr. Spectator think deeply about the nature of modesty, 
saying it has ‘so great an influence over our Actions, and is in many cases so impregnable a 
fence to Vertue’ However, it can be undermined by ‘that Politeness which reigns among the 
unthinking part of Mankind, and treats as unfashionable the most ingenuous part of our 
Behaviour; which recommends Impudence as Good-Breeding, and keeps a Man always in 
Countenance, not because he is Innocent, but because he is Shameless’ (no. 231, II: 400). 
Addison’s acknowledgement that there is more than one species of politeness – true and false 
– highlights the moral imperative behind the Spectator project. As Lawrence Klein (1994) 
points out in Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness, ‘Politeness concerned sociability but 
was not identical with it: while human sociability was a primal and original stuff requiring 
work, “politeness” was a refined sociability, bringing aesthetic concerns into close contiguity 
with ethical ones’ (1994: 3).  
 
The Spectator’s emphasis on the self ensured that politeness became private and 
public simultaneously. It ensured a perception of identity as being necessarily a work in 
progress, a project that needed constant altering and subtle improvement in order to remain 
fit for purpose. As we have seen, shame had an important role to play in this, helping readers 
to insert themselves into its anecdotes and moral musings like protagonists, enabling them to 
feel the presence of unknown others even when apparently alone.  Men, as public subjects, 
needed to be aware of this to an even greater extent than women, for whom roles in public 
were still relatively symbolic. Through a multiplicity of strategies, Addison and Steele were able 
to use affect to refine and direct the progress of politeness, pointing the way for their fellow 
men of sense. To shield themselves from their own gaze being reflected back at them, they 
interposed a body formed from labour and productivity – the eidolon, Mr. Spectator. Ghostly 
and distorting, his presence acted as a gauze curtain behind which Addison and Steele 
continue to flit about, barely discernible. He is the embodiment – if that word can be used 
here as more than merely a standard referent – of the shelter true politeness offered its 
adherents. Protected against the busy world they wrote about, Addison and Steele are left 
enclosed and intimate with their own shame – the shame of being seen, of becoming visible, 
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definable marked bodies. The male authorial voice, as embodied in Mr. Spectator, actually 
represents an escape from the body – from the inevitable shame that clothes the corporeal 
and cannot be unseen when gazing upon the gendered form. The very fact that Addison and 
Steele felt that they needed to escape their bodies – and in this they were by no means alone – 
says much about the shame inherent in appearing before the spectatorial gaze of public 
discourse as one’s own particularized self. In the next chapter, I will explore the fop as the 
highly visible shameful body that warned against, and ultimately symbolized, the failure of 
politeness.  
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Chapter Two  
“His Pretty Self”: Bodies, shame and the fop 
This chapter will explore the ways in which shame could manifest itself for eighteenth-
century men through the marginalisation of other men. As its focal point, it will engage with 
the figure of the fop. I will argue here that the fop is the pre-eminent shame carrier for 
eighteenth-century discourses around masculinity. His hypervisibility and corporeality are both 
problematic and convenient for other men, those who consider themselves ‘men of sense’. I 
will deal mainly with how the fop is ‘othered’ through writing, in particular periodical literature 
and popular theatre.  Fop literature, the profusion of printed discourse that decried foppery, 
conceived of the flamboyance and display associated with fops as a threat to masculinity. But 
masculinity is a nebulous concept at this (and arguably any) point in history, and whilst the fop 
was threatening, he also offered something convenient for the polite man to define himself 
against.  
This chapter will concentrate mainly on early-century considerations of the fop, some 
preceding The Spectator, some a little later. Through this, I hope to demonstrate the ways in 
which shame could be bound up with ideas around masculine corporeality and acceptable 
social practices for men. Crucial to this exposure will be my belief that the fop operates at this 
time as a necessary cultural myth, a sort of bogeyman of politeness. The corollary of any 
mythic construction, of course, is doubt over its actual existence. I argue that in order for the 
cautionary force of fop literature to retain its impact, it is in fact vital for the fop to constantly 
evade capture and quarantine. He must remain a sort of pathogen waiting to invade the 
otherwise stoical and abstracted bodies of men of sense, the kind exemplified by The 
Spectator, as we saw in the last chapter.  
In an echo of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s homosexual panic in Epistemology of the Closet, 
I propose a culture of effeminacy panic, for which the fop is the target, and in which the most 
thorough discourse is found in fop literature. I am using the term ‘effeminacy’ in its 
eighteenth-century sense, which because of its expansive capacity for shades of meaning - and 
from a modern perspective, its apparent contradictory implications - allows for a more pliable 
and sensitive discussion of the concerns over masculinity I tease out. Michèle Cohen (1996) 
defines contemporary ideas regarding effeminacy thus: ‘The term effeminate could refer 
either to a man who resembled women, or one who desired women. Effeminacy encompassed 
what appears to us now at the same time a blurring of gender boundaries and an affirmation 
of sexual difference’ (7). It is this shifting nature of effeminacy which interests me, because it 
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can therefore become instrumental in articulating a variety of social concerns and paranoias. 
Cohen indicates this when she says: ‘Often either conflated with luxury or held to be its 
inevitable consequence, the effects of effeminacy, like those of luxury, ranged from the 
individual to the nation, from “an index of human sinfulness” to “sapping a nation’s economic 
and military strength”’ (5). For this reason, I do not consider it hyperbole to name my concept 
a ‘panic’, as the term helpfully articulates the intensity of negative affect expressed through 
writing concerning fops. These affects include disgust, contempt, fear, anger and, of course, 
shame. At their most intense, these texts have a note of hysteria, especially where they do not 
mediate their panic through the stylization of generic modes like satire, but instead take the 
form of straightforward observational critique as exemplified by Abel Boyer, as I discuss below.  
It is useful to contextualise critical work on the fop in recent decades. Randolph 
Trumbach, in his essay ‘The Birth of the Queen’ (1989), claimed that the fop became closely 
associated in the eighteenth-century mind with the ‘emerging role of the exclusive adult male 
sodomite – known in the ordinary language of his day as a molly, and later as a queen.’ (134). 
Trumbach locates this association from the end of the seventeenth century (135). More 
recently, Philip Carter (1997, 2001) has challenged this thesis by emphasising instead the 
greater wealth of evidence to suggest that effeminacy in the eighteenth-century imagination 
was more closely linked to a failure to enact masculine norms due to an over-investment in 
luxury and polite culture. This, he argues, threatens not just the integrity of individual 
manhood but of the nation state: ‘attachment to the fashionable world denoted an 
unacceptable dependence in individual men who collectively as citizens sacrificed their 
nation’s political independence to absolutism’ (1997: 433). For me, Carter’s thesis better 
explains the vehemence of fop literature as it makes a strong case for the critical interplay 
between individual, collective and national masculinities.  
Miles Ogborn’s essay ‘Locating the Macaroni’ (1997) focuses on a later eighteenth-
century manifestation of the effeminate male, the macaroni, and uses a similar lens through 
which to analyse the antipathy towards the figure: ‘Through the codes of cultural nationalism 
and the polemical debates over luxury they were presented as unpatriotic, undemocratic and 
un-English; offering a dangerous relationship between masculinity, empire and global 
commodity consumption’ (450). These historical analyses are invaluable as a guide to my own 
thinking, but I am more concerned with the linguistic construction of the fop and how his 
presentation in literature of the period may suggest something less systematic, and in fact 
more personally destabilising for the polite man of sense. Carter himself points to this when he 
says: ‘Keeping men on the correct side of excess demanded the setting up of boundaries, 
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beyond which deviant behaviour was located…it was the insincere, delicate and tiresome fop 
which indicated this point to the careful reader’ (1997: 437). Of course, these boundaries were 
worryingly permeable, and the fear of contagion powers much fop literature.  
My emphasis on contagion comes in part from the close alignment I perceive, 
described in the course of this chapter, between the fop and shame. Eve Sedgwick provides 
the link here between shame and contagion. In her book Touching Feeling (2003), she details 
the forces that make shame contagious:  
Shame interests me politically, then, because it generates and legitimates the place of 
identity – the question of identity – at the origin of the impulse to the performative, 
but does so without giving that identity space the standing of an essence. It constitutes 
it as to-be-constituted, which is also to say, as already there for the (necessary, 
productive) misconstrual and misrecognition. Shame – living, as it does, on and in the 
muscles and capillaries of the face – seems to be uniquely contagious from one person 
to another. And the contagiousness of shame is only facilitated by its anamorphic, 
protean susceptibility to new expressive grammars. (64) 
Shame denies access to identity as essence, meaning that in this case, eighteenth-century 
concepts of polite masculinity are never not threatened by the potential for subversion that 
shame offers. The ‘to-be-constituted’ of polite masculinity is what allows it to be productively 
misrecognised, ostensibly by the fop but more importantly (and more accurately) by the 
putative man of sense. Whether or not critics of foppery are aware of this, they are strikingly 
alert to the ability of foppery to make ‘new expressive grammars’ out of the materials of 
politeness. In order to fight against this, they turn their attentions (and faces) towards the fop, 
and begin passing on the shame they find there, and this is what I mean by effeminacy panic.  
This effeminacy panic is exemplified perfectly by Richard Steele, writing as Mr. 
Spectator in issue 38 of The Spectator, Friday April 13th, 1711: ‘When you see a Man of Sense 
look about for Applause, and discover an itching Inclination to be commended…Who is safe 
against this Weakness? or who knows whether he is guilty of it or not?’ (vol. 1, no. 38: 161). 
My argument is expressed in Steele’s words. The act of watching someone (specifically, a man 
of sense) temporarily forget himself in the pursuit of praise evokes humiliation and shame. 
Being seen, as we discussed in the previous chapter, leaves one open to judgement by others, 
and forgetting oneself is a ready conduit for this judgement. The pursuit of praise leaves a man 
restless, ‘itching’ to be ‘commended’, as though he has contracted a disease which makes the 
skin crawl. ‘Who is safe against this Weakness?’ Steele asks rhetorically, a hint of disquiet in his 
tone. For ‘safe’, we could substitute ‘immune’, thereby allowing us to see in greater detail the 
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most unsettling thing about the forgetting of one’s polite self – that it is contagious, that it may 
have infected you before you know it, that you may in fact already be infected.  
Steele’s question brings together two different, though closely related discourses: the 
medical (itching) and the judicial (guilty). Moral culpability and its relationship to the material 
is a concern of this thesis in its entirety, but here in contemporary discussions of the fop, this 
connection is particularly vivid. It seems that Steele cannot decide whether the failing he 
points to – that of the mania for self-display – is a bodily or moral one. In this chapter, I argue, 
through examination of The Spectator, Abel Boyer’s The English Theophrastus (1702) and the 
earlier Restoration comedy, George Etherege’s The Man of Mode (1676) that the difficulty to 
name and effectively shame the fop throughout the early eighteenth century results in a 
persistent effeminacy panic that both contributes to and destabilises an emerging discourse of 
(hegemonic) polite masculinity. In addition, I will attempt to elucidate how developing ideas 
around spectatorship, discussed in the last chapter, were brought to bear on the problem of 
effeminacy panic. Ideas of spectatorial mastery, and the positioning of the spectator as the 
privileged point of power in the visual field, were used to some success in the allaying of fears 
around the fop’s contagious transgressive potential. If one could observe and criticise a fop, 
one could also close oneself off from him by constructing a space of separation similar to that 
created by Addison and Steele in their practice of mediating thoughts through an eidolon, Mr. 
Spectator. Whereas Mr. Spectator was intended to maintain the illusion of abstraction, fop 
literature instead aimed to separate the polite man from the fop. However, the spectatorial 
gaze cannot hold off the effects – and affects – of foppery entirely. Fop literature itself is 
tellingly explicit about the permeability of politeness, and how it could become poisoned by 
understandable desires such as a quest for approval, or otherwise commendable ones such as 
ambition.  
The very idea of the subject, and not the object, as the privileged point in the visual 
field was a relatively new concept at this time, as Thomas A. King (2002) shows. Prior to this 
period, early modern visual theory had privileged the object, or as King calls it, the ‘spectacular 
body’ figured as bodies that held power, the monarch and aristocrat in particular (27). This was 
due to the still extant system of patronage that began to lose its efficacy as the bourgeoisie 
gained prominence. However, work by thinkers such as George Berkeley re-theorised vision 
from being an expansive, sensory process (one which left bodies endlessly open to sensory 
contact with other bodies), to one that is rooted in the eye and the attendant cognitive 
processes in the brain: ‘Ocular sensations were made meaningful by the mediation of the mind 
as it existed in society; the mind…learned to coordinate essentially different sets of 
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information to generate complex image-concepts’ (34). This, King goes on to argue, ‘points to 
the loss of anxiety about the male body open to other male and female bodies; this loss of 
anxiety was itself enabled by the redescription of “natural” male sensation as private and 
subjective’ (34).  
I am suggesting here that this loss of one anxiety inevitably enforces another entirely 
new one – how to maintain this privacy and subjectivity? The linking of the privileged (male) 
gaze to the ‘rational’ mind and its cognitive processes means that in order for the privilege to 
be maintained, the mind must remain rational. ‘To proliferate a satisfactorily sensate body was 
permissible, even desirable,’ King tells us, ‘so long as the foreclosure of residual masculinities 
such as foppishness (their displacement beyond the pursuit and fulfilment of pleasures) could 
be maintained’ (34). Residue which cannot be assimilated must be rejected and displaced in a 
‘beyond’ that was to be conceived of as out of reach. King suggests that this displacement is 
achieved by ‘the redescription of ocular sensation as a linguistic phenomenon enabling the 
display and exchange of privatized consciousness among the members of a public sphere’ (34).  
In Chapter One, we saw this occurring in The Spectator whereby spectatorship is a way 
of circulating ideas and information amongst readers via a linguistically-constructed eidolon. 
King’s analysis describes this move as largely democratic, at least for those in the emerging 
bourgeoisie. He is aware, however, that ‘to see was to appear to others, to gaze was to make 
oneself transparent’ (40). Inevitably, this complicates the struggle to regulate how much can 
be seen by the spectatorial gaze. This struggle is hedged by shame – the shame of failing to 
maintain privilege and instead dissolving one’s subjectivity in affect. Shame, an affect, is co-
opted to foreclose attacks from both the affective and the shadow of the past, represented by 
the spectacular body and its orbit of other open, desiring bodies. This past, insofar as it is 
associated with aristocratic display and effeminacy, is just one of the many fears and 
antipathies shifted to the fop under the regime of effeminacy panic. King alludes to this in his 
reading of The Spectator, where he notes:  
The Spectator’s incessant vigilance of men and women who failed to enact this 
reciprocity of affect within the domestic space (the virago and the effeminate, the 
coquette and the fribble) worked not so much to mandate specific gender 
performances as to provide a limit to the normative oscillation within gendered 
reciprocity. (37) 
The Spectator attempts to establish a form of normativity in terms of gender and its 
functioning within both private and, especially, public spaces. Whilst recognising and 
welcoming the changes Habermas and others have described occurring at this time (social and 
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psychological, as well as economic and political), The Spectator also tries to prevent chaos, 
deciding that the virago and the effeminate take the liberal public sphere too far. Going too far 
is a sign of either wilfulness or blindness; both are destructive of sociability and must therefore 
be controlled and manipulated via discursive prohibitions placed upon them. It is the very 
politeness of Addison and Steele’s prose that makes their work so effective at doing this; the 
transgressive (or potentially transgressive) reader is made to feel the force of their 
wrongdoing, and via the subsequent feelings of shame, reverse their course.  
To see how this happens, let us consider the fop more closely. Samuel Johnson defined 
the fop in 1755 as ‘a man of small understanding and much ostentation’ (quoted in Carter, 
1996: 41). Johnson’s definition highlights the spatial aberration the fop represents, as he is 
empty on the inside, and too full on the outside. As is hinted by the quotation from Steele at 
the beginning of this chapter, this ostentation and small understanding includes his 
interactions with others; his need for attention and praise are conceived of as evidence of 
weakness. The historian Philip Carter expands on both descriptions by saying that the fop was 
also ‘renowned for spending a large amount of time decorating his unimpressive physique with 
colourful and fashionable dress, an elaborate and meticulously groomed wig, cosmetics and 
perfumes’ (Carter, 1996: 41). The fop’s interior is constantly figured as a dangerously vacuous 
space in early-eighteenth century fop literature, and this is frequently contrasted with his 
fulsome and opulent exterior, as my exploration of Abel Boyer’s writing suggests below. The 
fop’s body became a site of shame just as it seemed to embody a kind of shamelessness. Fop 
literature constantly seems to suggest a fear of contagion in that even to look upon a fop could 
be enough to infect one with foppishness. To ensure that any unconscious desire for, or 
interest in him is averted, fop literature resorts to a disgusted ritual of shaming the fop.  
A crucial point to bear in mind throughout this exploration of the fop is that the shame 
with which he is so inextricably linked is not his own – it belongs to those who observe and 
disapprove of him, as I have already suggested through the notion of effeminacy panic. We can 
see this by examining an example of fop literature which ultimately fails to hide its own 
anxieties whilst attempting to shame the fop.  
Clothes make the man? Abel Boyer and the Spectator 
For the writer Abel Boyer, refinement was desirable but had to be carefully judged. 
The fop, or beau, was a useful example of what happened when one became too seduced by 
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it, and he devotes several pages of The English Theophrastus, his observational work on English 
society of 1702, to vociferous denigration of the type2:  
A Beau is a Creature who under the appearance of a Man, has all the Folly, Vanity and 
Levity of a Woman; he has more Learning in his Heels than his Head, which is better 
cover’d than fill’d; nay he knows not what a Man’s Head is good for, but to hang his 
Hat or his Perriwig on; and if it were put to his Choice, he would as soon lose that, as 
any other Part about him: He thinks the chief end of Man is to Dress well, and that 
Death it self is not so ghastly as a Dishabille… (51) 
 
Boyer outlines all that the man of sense might find unsettling about his foppish counterpart. 
Much of it focuses around his lack of interiority – his use of his head as merely an object upon 
which to hang a hat or periwig indicates that learning and reason is unimportant to him. The 
fop is presented as a person who is careless with the most important part of his body – in fact, 
the only part of the male anatomy that is truly significant to the man of sense. Instead, he has 
‘more Learning in his Heels than his Head’. The fop inverts what is right – rather than 
privileging reason he is an expert on vanity. Boyer’s choice of ‘heels’ to pair with ‘head’ is more 
than simply alliterative. The heel is the back of the foot; whilst the toes at least point forward 
and suggest progress, the heel is good for little but dancing and clicking together. Placed as 
they are at the lowest part of the back of the body, the heels are posterior, the ultimate 
antipodean body part. To be learned in the heels is to be both perverse and subversive.  
With its links to dancing and gaiety, the heel also links back to Boyer’s comment 
equating the fop with the ‘Folly, Vanity and Levity’ of women. Prior to this comment, Boyer has 
tried to pre-empt any undue criticism of women with a passage praising the utility of women 
in the process of making a man polite (50). However, as Michèle Cohen has pointed out: 
‘women, in polishing men out of rude nature, did not necessarily make them more manly’ 
(Cohen, 1996: 4). In fact, for the fop it has done something much more destabilising. It has left 
his masculinity entirely in doubt, as can be seen in Boyer’s phrase ‘under the Appearance of a 
Man’. It is as though the fop has crossed the gender boundary to construct some transgressive 
third sex.  
We see this anxiety over the gender ambiguities of the fop in an issue of The 
Spectator. In an issue authored by Richard Steele, but containing a letter attributed to another 
                                                          
2 Boyer was a prolific writer of French birth; The English Theophrastus is one of his less well-known 
works and has received little critical attention. He was better known for his French-English Royal 
Dictionary (1699), as well as various annals which recorded the political transactions of Queen Anne’s 
reign.   
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hand, the subject of female masculinity is discussed. This masculinity is theorised as a wilful act 
of trickery on the part of the woman, as it involves her cloaking her gendered body in mannish 
apparel. The letter is fascinating as an almost unconscious reveal concerning contemporary 
notions of gender transitivity, and as with much fop literature (for example Boyer’s description 
of a fop dressing, discussed below) relies on a sort of uneasy scopophilic contact with the 
object.  
The male narrator describes seeing a party of horsemen whilst out walking, ‘my whole 
attention was fix’d on a very fair Youth who rode in the Midst of them, and seemed to have 
been dress’d by some description in a Romance. His Features, Complexion, and Habit had a 
remarkable Effeminacy, and a certain languishing Vanity appear’d in his Air’ (Spectator, vol. 1, 
no. 104: 434). The object’s proximity to a mythic or supernatural being are clearly emphasised 
here. The echoes of traditional storytelling on the subject of fairy processions (and the implied 
seductive brand of danger they posed to the viewer) can be felt here, as can the suggestion of 
a sort of cruel beauty evident in the words ‘languishing Vanity’. Even the jarring note struck by 
the word ‘Effeminacy’ – jarring not just because of its clearly negative connotations but also 
because of its contemporary feel – is not quite enough to dispel the erotic texture of this 
sentence. The eroticism here is of a firmly homoerotic nature; the (male) viewer is confident at 
this point that the object he contemplates is also male.  
After an exhaustive description of clothing, the viewer states that,  
As I was pitying the Luxury of this young Person, who appear’d to me to have been 
educated only as an Object of Sight, I perceiv’d on my nearer Approach, and I turned 
my Eyes downward, a Part of the Equipage I had not observ’d before, which was a 
Petticoat of the same with the Coat and Waistcoat. After this Discovery, I look’d again 
on the Face of the fair Amazon who had thus deceiv’d me, and thought those Features 
which had before offended me by their Softness, were now strengthen’d into as 
improper a Boldness; and tho’ her Eyes, Nose and Mouth seem’d to be form’d with 
perfect Symmetry, I am not certain whether she, who in Appearance was a very 
handsome Youth, may not be in Reality a very indifferent Woman. (vol. 1, no. 104: 
434-5) 
The moment of discovery, as it were, provides the fulcrum of this text. The fair Youth’s 
transformation into a fair Amazon reads like a parody of the Cinderella myth; here, however, 
the transformed object proves disturbing for the viewer. The viewer initially professes pity for 
what he takes to be a foppish youth, and his words imply that this damage has somehow been 
done to him: ‘educated only as an Object of Sight’. Who is to blame for this damage is left 
unsaid; it may be that the viewer regards an effeminate ‘Society’ to be the perpetrator. Philip 
Carter (2001) reminds us that ‘It was a common argument in civic assessments that the 
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refinements required for modern polite society were incompatible with, and indeed 
destructive of, established male values’ (130). Steele suggests here that the ‘youth’ has not 
only acquired these doubtful refinements celebrated by a misguided society, but that in doing 
so, his male values, and indeed his value as a male, have been put in extreme jeopardy.  
The viewer’s eyes then follow the body of the youth down in an almost comically 
formulaic interpretation of the erotic reveal, and where he expects to find a penis he finds 
instead a vagina. Of course, this information is deduced from fabrics alone – there is no clear 
evidence in the text that this is not in fact a man in a dress. Still, it is enough to induce the 
feeling of deception, and the viewer blames this on the woman, the ‘fair Amazon’ who has 
apparently set out to trick him. Pity is reserved for the misguided youth, anger for the wilfully 
deceptive girl – a tale of misogynistic panic too often rehearsed to need exposition here. 
However, even pity is hastily reconstructed here as contempt; the viewer would like us to 
understand that the youth’s features had ‘offended me by their Softness’. Up until this point 
(after the discovery of his susceptibility to being fooled), the viewer has said nothing that is 
openly derogatory about the youth; despite his noted effeminacy, there is no evidence of 
effeminacy panic here. It is not until the masculine woman inserts herself into this narrative of 
homoerotic scopophilia that the viewer is alerted to the potentially sodomitical thrust (as it 
were) of his text. Whatever the uncomfortable realisation, the final swipe is reserved for the 
Amazon, who is dismissed as ‘a very indifferent Woman’.  
My point here, however, is not just to highlight the ways in which women’s gender 
transitivity was a target of criticism for (usually male) commentators. It is to demonstrate the 
unresolved tension between desire and disgust that centres on the androgynous pull of a 
foppish male body. On more than one occasion, as will become clear, language in fop literature 
is itself made vague and unwieldy when trying to crystallise the profoundly complex notions of 
masculinity and politeness that exist in troubled relation with the fop. It is this intolerable 
burden placed on the discourse of masculine politeness that is productive of shame – a shame 
composed of the failure to control and dominate these renegade desires. It is not just that the 
fop’s effeminate appearance complicates heterosexual desire, but also that this complexity 
puts pressure on the discourse of polite masculinity to abstract itself from physicality and 
particularity. The fop threatens to reveal that men are as particularised by their sexed bodies 
as women. 
So why is the fop transgressive? Contemporary writings about him constantly link him 
to the feminine, whether as a passing male, potentially female transvestite, as above, or more 
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commonly as effeminate: a feminised (and hence overly refined) cis male, as we will see in the 
examples which follow. In order to defend their own evolving polite masculinity from 
becoming fragmented, the men of sense must distance themselves from the fop and 
quarantine him in another space. For Boyer above, this includes framing the fop as a failed 
gender performance. As Judith Butler reminds us, normative gender conceptions assume that 
‘one is one’s gender to the extent that one is not the other gender, a formulation that 
presupposes and enforces the restriction of gender within that binary pair’ (2006: 30).  
Boyer claims to see through the fop’s gender performance because he seems sure of 
the essential nature of his own. Or is he? His comments on refinement come very close to an 
admission that gender is a construction – his agreement with the commonly held idea that the 
process of becoming polite is a cross-gendered one indicates that polite masculinity is not 
innate and must be performed in order to be effective. It not only owes its accurate 
performance to virtues learned from the opposite sex, but also to careful and assiduous 
practice. As we saw in the last chapter, writers could construct this ideal of polite masculinity 
through writing, and readers could ingest and repeat these lessons through the acts of reading 
and discussion. ‘In this sense’, says Butler, ‘gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a 
subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed’ (34).  
The fop, then, is a subject who does the deed wrong, at least by the standards of 
conservative commentators like Boyer. What he may do, in actual fact, is to perform in a way 
that successfully exposes polite masculinity itself as a performance. The flamboyant, self-
regarding body and empty platitudes he excels in are ways of marking out the supposedly 
unmarked: the universal, abstracted nature of masculinity, even if only as the obverse.  In 
doing so, he turns the public gaze not just upon himself but also back upon the men who gaze 
upon him. The gaze, and spectatorial conduct in general, has been recognised by many critics 
as being crucial to the formulation of ideas of the self in the eighteenth century, as I explore 
below and in the next chapter on Adam Smith’s moral philosophy. In the artificiality and 
surface sheen of the fop, then, it is possible that the man of sense sees the fragility of his own 
construction of self. He sees, in fact, the irony of positing polite masculinity as natural when it 
is clearly anything but. The fop is, then, a gender traitor; his performance deftly highlights the 
construction of masculinity in an age where so much that pertains to gender normativity is in 
flux.  
Surface, both as it pertains to the superficial and to the outer shell of material objects, 
constitutes the fop in his entirety. His predilection for fine and opulent fabrics is said to rule 
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him far more than common sense or reason. As Boyer says of his fop, Sir John Foppington: ‘his 
Valet, his Taylor, his Barber, and his Sempstress, are his Cabinet Council, to whom he is more 
beholden for what he is, than to his Maker’ (51-2). This idea of the foppish body being literally 
constructed by the hands of tradespeople links back to Addison’s satirical take on the beau’s 
head, and consolidates the idea of the fop as a creature born of the times. It also implies a 
hollowness; a luxurious casing unfilled by any useful object; a jewelled and gaudy scabbard 
that holds no sword. He travels in pursuit not of knowledge but fashion: ‘[he] is one that has 
Travel’d to see Fashions, and brought over with him the nicest cut Suit, and the prettiest 
Fancied Ribbands for Sword-Knots’ (52). Essentially, Boyer conceives the fop to be wholly 
unnatural – not just in his effeminacy but also in his very being. He does not just wear the 
fancied ribbands, but as synecdoche, they come to stand for him, more significant perhaps in 
their aesthetic power than the brain’s functionality.  The fact that he owes more of his being to 
those who make his clothes than to God suggests not only that he is an aberration, but also 
that he is born of refinement and fashion. The fop truly is a child of the contemporary 
explosion of commercial potential. In the previous chapter where Addison describes the 
dissection of a beau’s head, we find the ultimate form of ‘othering’ – underlining the fop’s 
essential difference from men of sense by asserting a biological dissimilarity between the two.  
It is through the gaze that this difference is ultimately expressed. As ever, The 
Spectator provides a useful introduction to Enlightenment concepts of the gaze. In his series of 
pieces on the pleasures of the imagination, Addison uses Mr. Spectator to express ideas about 
the importance of the visual in creating the cerebral. His initial ruminations, as already 
discussed in the previous chapter, are highly affective in tone: ‘Our Sight…may be considered 
as a more delicate and diffusive kind of Touch, that spreads it self over an infinite Multitude of 
Bodies, comprehends the largest Figures, and brings into our reach some of the most remote 
Parts of the Universe’ (vol. 3, no. 411: 536). The sense of sight as a form of bodily contact 
immediately highlights the connection between looking and shame – if the gaze can be 
imagined as a form of cutaneous contact, and a way of bringing distant objects closer to 
oneself, as implied by the phrase ‘brings into our reach’, then the contagious nature of affect 
in general, and shame in particular, becomes clear.  
To gaze upon the fop is to touch him, and touch troubles the concept of separation. 
One cannot be entirely separated from something one has touched, and affective touch is 
arguably more intimate than cutaneous contact. Sight communicates information and feeling 
directly to the brain, to the inside of the body, bypassing the skin’s shield and penetrating 
instead to the delicate interior. It is here, in the closely-guarded interiority of the man of sense, 
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that affective contact with the fop does its damage. In a later issue regarding imagination, 
Addison extrapolates on Cartesian ideas of memory with regards to sense (here meant to 
mean something akin to affect) and the imagination. He argues that pleasurable sights create 
‘Pleasure Traces’ in the mind, which connect them with past experiences and consequently 
heighten them: 
…when, therefore, any one of these Ideas arises in the Imagination, and consequently 
dispatches a flow of Animal Spirits to its proper Trace, these Spirits, in the violence of 
their Motion, run not only into the Trace, to which they were more particularly 
directed, but into several of those that lie about it: By this means they awaken other 
Ideas of the same Sett, which immediately determine a new Dispatch of Spirits, that in 
the same manner open other Neighbouring Traces, till at last the whole Sett of them is 
blown up, and the whole Prospect or Garden flourishes in the Imagination. (Spectator, 
vol. 3, no. 417: 563) 
Whilst the final outcome of this process is apparently felicitous, the latent imagery in Addison’s 
description of this process is that of exquisite pain. The pleasure traces seem to behave much 
like veins, blood vessels overloaded with clots of sensation that ultimately expand and swell 
until blockage forces the torrent into other neighbouring pathways. The animal spirits raging 
around these traces disregard propriety and spill out from their ‘proper Trace’.  
If pleasurable emotion can wrack its host body with such disregard, then what about 
other affects given access through the eyes? Addison, apparently following Descartes, sees 
disagreeable traces as more liable to being shut down through lack of use: ‘they were quickly 
stopt up, and rendered incapable of receiving any Animal Spirits, and consequently of exciting 
any unpleasant ideas in the memory’ (563).3 If the agreeable is unruly, then, why is the 
disagreeable so content to be banished to dusty byways, rarely if ever to be recalled? Could 
the fop, then, be representative of a sight that repeatedly troubles the gaze, and prevents the 
disagreeable traces from being shut down, a sort of recurring pathogen circulating within the 
body of its host? This would support the notion of effeminacy panic as a reading of fop 
literature.  
 The control of this panic was linked closely to control of the object of the gaze, and 
here the concept of the spectator as master of all he surveys is crucial. Addison states that: ‘A 
                                                          
3 Donald F. Bond, the editor of The Spectator, suggests that these ideas came from Descartes’s The 
Passions of the Soul (n.2, pp. 562-3). In his text, Descartes states that imaginings ‘arise simply from the 
fact that the spirits, being agitated in various different ways and coming upon the traces of various 
impressions which have preceded them in the brain, make their way by chance through certain pores 
rather than others. Such are the illusions of our dreams and also the day-dreams we often have when we 
are awake and our mind wanders idly without applying itself to anything of its own accord’ (The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1 trans. John Cottingham et al, Cambridge University Press, 
1985, p. 336).  
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Man of a Polite Imagination, is let into a great many Pleasures that the Vulgar are not capable 
of receiving…It gives him, indeed, a kind of Property in everything he sees, and makes the most 
rude uncultivated Parts of Nature administer to his Pleasures’ (Spectator, vol. 3, no. 411: 538). 
As Kristina Straub explains in her exploration of eighteenth-century theatre: ‘the spectacle…is 
what the spectator is not; “effeminate” stage entertainments, ropedancing, puppet shows, the 
sexually ambiguous castrati singers all serve as visible foils for the rational, critical and all-but-
invisible observer’ (1992: 3). The observer as described by Straub here fits closely the 
description of the man of sense, imagined as the central figure in the production of 
eighteenth-century cultural hegemony.  Boyer’s description of the fop is intensely visual, as is 
Addison’s, implying that spectatorship is a right belonging to men who position themselves as 
influential through their writing.  
In describing a day in the life of Sir John Foppington, for example, Boyer begins with 
his morning routine. This is a long passage full of detail: close-ups on certain crucial parts of 
the body such as the lips, cheeks and the ‘lovely Eyebrow’. Also of note is the abundance of 
verbs describing effeminate actions: ‘he…plays the Narcissus with his own Shadow, and makes 
his Court with a thousand Grimaces to his pretty Self’ (52). This is then followed by such 
actions as licking the lips, ‘counterfeiting’ the aforementioned lovely eyebrow, ‘careening’ his 
wig and ‘tiffing’ the curls. ‘How Comical it is to see this Fop strutting up and down his 
Chamber, Surveying himself from Head to Foot, first turning one Shoulder, then t’other’ (53) 
laughs Boyer. As Straub observes: ‘this awareness of a power relationship between observer 
and observed implicitly informs the split between self and other; the self-love of the spectator 
creates pity for others’ misfortunes or in the case of viewing ridiculous or contemptible things, 
a self-congratulatory sense of personal exemption from the cause of ridicule’ (6).  
However, there is more going on here than just the laughter of contempt. Contempt is 
detached, cold and self-assured: as Straub suggests, we feel contempt for those who pose no 
threat towards us. To see this, we need only compare Boyer’s next target in The English 
Theophrastus, the country squire. Here, Boyer utilises the growing indifference to heredity and 
stereotypes of the aristocratic country bumpkin to paint the squire as a fool:  
…[he] has such a contemptible Notion of his past Education, that he thinks the Roman 
Poets good for nothing but for Boys to Cap Verses. These Prudent Sentiments being 
fix’d in his Mind, his Conversation for some Years succeeding, is wholly taken up by his 
Horses, Dogs, and Hawks, and the more senseless Animals that tend ‘em. (59) 
Boyer emphasises the lack of politeness in evidence in the conduct of a country squire – not 
only is he fixated upon lesser beasts as a topic of conversation; the topic is both incessant and 
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conspicuous in its being the only topic the squire has any extensive knowledge of. There is no 
sense here of a figure which poses a threat to polite masculinity. The section on the squire 
opens with the comment: ‘A Country Squire is one whose Ancestors have been Wise and 
Provident, and raised an Estate by their Ingenuity and Industry, and given their Posterity after 
‘em Means and leasure to be Fools’ (58). Boyer evokes an outdated form of transmission in 
order to satirize it effectively. His comment about the senselessness of the country servant as 
being greater than that of the animals they attend is witty, dry and observant. There is a 
critical distance here maintained by contempt – Boyer (as representative of polite masculinity) 
has nothing to fear from the increasingly inconsequential squire, who ‘shews Wisdom best by 
his Silence, and serves his Country most in his Absence’ (60).  
Fop literature, however, gains its force from a fear of becoming what one seeks to 
denounce. Whilst the squire is becoming an insignificant representative of a dying old order, 
the fop, constructed as he is by fashion, consumption and commercialism, has a futurity which 
means he is far harder to evade – even possessing a form of attractiveness in his urgent 
relevancy. Paranoia over the consequences of refinement finds a point around which to 
coalesce. Once coalesced, it can transform into something more specific: disgust. Disgust is the 
affective mode through which Boyer communicates in the passage describing the fop, allowing 
him to seize hold of his readers’ fears. As Sianne Ngai eloquently expresses it: ‘there is a sense 
in which it [disgust] seeks to include or draw others into its exclusion of its object, enabling a 
strange kind of sociability’ (2005: 335-6). Boyer’s affectively-charged tirade against fops is an 
attempt to create something communal; a collective disgust for and rejection of the fop would 
ensure the cementing of desirable masculinity, that of the polite man or man of sense.  
The shrillness of the attack gives Boyer away, however. As already observed, the 
language of fop literature has a tendency to unbalance itself when its affective weight cannot 
be sustained by the artfulness of style and form. The polite writing style is a guarded mode of 
self-effacement which hides some of the uncertainty which lies behind this linguistic shield. 
The fop exposes the presence of style and therefore threatens to derail both polite masculinity 
and its style. Unlike Addison, whose own criticism of fops examined in the last chapter is 
moderated through literary technique (satire and mock-scientific vocabulary), Boyer’s is a less 
guarded endeavour. The obsessive detail, particularly over sensual bodily parts like the fop’s 
licked lips and lovely eyebrows, creates an uncomfortably erotic tone. Ngai notes that ‘the 
disgusting seems to say, “You want me,” imposing itself on the subject as something to be 
mingled with and perhaps even enjoyed…Disgust both includes and attacks the very opposition 
between itself and desire…’ (335).  
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The very strength of Boyer’s disgust seems bound up with the fop’s corporeality. It is 
his visibility that encourages disgust, just as it is his visibility that draws the eye in the first 
place. Boyer may use adjectives such as ‘lovely’ and ‘pretty’ facetiously, but he does not deny 
that they are the appropriate adjectives. The fop is at least apparently male, and his 
appropriation of ‘feminine’ ideals of physical display only serves to emphasise the sexual 
potential of the male body. His effeminate, strutting, colourful form reminds men that despite 
their ideal of abstraction, they are still rooted ultimately in their gendered bodies, just as 
women are. The fop’s message is what Addison and Steele try to escape in creating the eidolon 
Mr. Spectator. With his unavoidable corporeality as a reminder, the fop shows abstraction to 
be an illusion, and shames his observer for putting such faith in an illusion. Resistance to 
illusion was a mark of the polite man, so to realise the central paradox of polite masculinity 
should therefore open up the supposedly immune man to shame.  
We can think further about Boyer’s presentation of the fop through the abject. Julia 
Kristeva, in Powers of Horror, conceives of disgust as an expression of rejection of the abject. 
‘When I am beset by abjection,’ she notes, ‘the twisted braid of affects and thoughts I call by 
such a name does not have, properly speaking, a definable object…The abject has only one 
quality of the object – that of being opposed to I’ (1982: 1). The fop is an object of disgust, but 
he himself is not abject. Abjection is found in the ideas the fop points to, in the apparent 
inability of men to recognize the male body as their body. He is an embodiment of commercial 
society and therefore forces men of sense to see their own understanding of their world as 
flawed, personal and temporal. In some ways a cipher of progress, the fop must instead be 
read as an angel of decay in order for his observers to shift the stench of the corpse (which is 
to say, the abject) from themselves (to whom it truly belongs)  to this readily definable, 
quantifiable space represented by the body of the fop.  As Kristeva says, ‘…refuse and corpses 
show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live’ (3).  
The material body of the fop becomes usefully visible as a way of attempting to locate 
and confine the abject – it is in this way that the fop can be both a dangerously contagious 
instigator of shameful feelings and a convenient site of quarantine for those very same 
shameful feelings at the same time. His constant state of decay – wig shedding powder, snuff 
staining his clothes, endless changes in fashions and his very gestures, which in their 
flamboyancy give away his body to the gaze of others, are agents of contamination and must 
be guarded against. Without his outer skin of clothing and make-up he is figured as empty and 
signifies nothing – a corpse in the Kristevan sense. However, the project of othering and 
guarding against contagion (and therefore shame, as contagion is a method of transmitting 
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shame) is doomed to fail. This is because it depends on the mythic properties of the fop I have 
just discussed, and he does not exist in the way he is imagined to. He is not an identity self-
appropriated, unlike the ‘desirable’ persona of the man of sense. Instead, his is an identity 
shaped for him and projected onto him by other men. He says everything about his detractors 
but nothing of himself. It is here that Boyer’s affectively-charged diatribe against the fop is 
most easy to understand, and to deconstruct: ‘The writer is a phobic who succeeds in 
metaphorizing in order to keep from being frightened to death…’ says Kristeva, ‘Nevertheless, 
does not fear hide an aggression, a violence that returns to its source, its sign having been 
inverted?’ (38). Boyer’s weak attempts at comedy hide very little of the fear he feels at 
encountering his own sense of abjection.  The will to do violence to this truth revealed by his 
own sense of disgust is merely another tactic to ‘permanently thrust aside’ his own abjection. 
Ultimately, what Boyer is trying to deny is his own complicity in the myth of polite masculinity 
– a complicity which, if acknowledged, must produce shame at one’s foolish investment in an 
illusory selfhood.   
What are the specific ways in which shame pertains to foppery? As I have already 
stated, although shame is located in the fop, the fop himself does not own that shame, he 
does not feel it as his. For both Boyer and, as we shall see, Dorimant in The Man of Mode, 
disgust levelled at the proximity and corporeality of the fop is constantly productive of shame 
within the viewer’s own body. That shame is then projected onto the fop, at least nominally 
allowing the viewer to believe that it has ceased to exist within his own body. The 
displacement of this shame is rationalised by assertions that the fop is unnatural, and he lacks 
the interiority of the man of sense. In Boyer’s words: ‘These superficial Gentlemen wear their 
Understandings like their Cloaths, always set and formal, and would no more Talk than Dress 
out of Fashion’ (Boyer, 1702: 58). So-called ‘men of sense’ use the new technology of mass 
publication to criticise those who are unable to form their own characters and instead merely 
reproduce a false facsimile of fashionable ideals. Through this technology, these criticisms 
reach a wide audience, enabling a kind of polarising of opinion against the fop; transforming 
him from a mild annoyance into a threatening presence, a contagion able to infect the 
masculine, polite body.  
Whilst this may well be thought of as shaming the fop, the project is hindered by its 
inability to stick. As critics such as Robert B. Heilman have shown, the term fop was a catch-all 
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term for fool from the Middle Ages4. It is only from the Restoration period onwards that the 
term begins to take on the more specific meaning. It seems unlikely any man would have 
adopted the term to describe himself, and so while the fop is posited as a very real threat to 
the man of sense, he is in actual fact a somewhat nebulous, linguistically-constructed being. It 
is rare for any historical individual to be named as a fop in fop literature, although gossip 
abounded about personalities such as the effeminate Lord Hervey. Instead, many sources 
refer, as does Addison, to ‘the fop’ or ‘the beau’, whilst others like Boyer invent names in the 
manner of Restoration theatre, such as Sir John Foppington. We never hear the voice of a self-
proclaimed fop, and if we understand the term to have always been an insult, why would we? I 
turn now to a text which exemplifies this, and can reveal much about the ways in which the 
fop figures as both a threat to and a consolidating factor in concepts of polite masculinity.  
Fop as other: The Man of Mode 
The Man of Mode, or Sir Fopling Flutter was one of the most popular and successful 
comedies of the Restoration period, mainly for its title character. Flutter, the archetypal fop, is 
such a richly drawn character that he outshines his opposite number Dorimant, the putative 
‘hero’ of George Etherege’s play. The Man of Mode is a problematic play in terms of its 
examination of masculinity because rather than assert male authority by fixing its gaze firmly 
upon the bodies of its female characters, the dialogue continually invites us to gaze upon the 
bodies of men.5 It features its hero, Dorimant, in states of undress twice, and discussions often 
centre on male characters’ clothing and what shape it gives to their bodies. The play must 
therefore perform a delicate balancing act, attempting to maintain some male bodies as 
authoritative, and others as effeminate. This, as we have begun to see, is a strategy of 
protection against the fop; by presenting foppish masculinity as unappealing, fop literature 
shames both the fop and the man of sense out of becoming a fop. Etherege presents us with a 
binary of men: on the one hand Dorimant, who is not just physically attractive but also 
                                                          
4 Heilman’s essay ‘Some Fops and Some Versions of Foppery’ appears in ELH, vol. 49, no. 2 (Summer 
1982), pp. 363-95. In it, he asserts that ‘virtually anybody…could be called fop or coxcomb’ (364). 
However, he then goes on to assert that it was the Restoration court of Charles II that ensured the term 
came to refer mostly to ‘the new foppery of hyperbolic stylishness’ (366).  
5 Critical work on gender and its representation in The Man of Mode includes Paul C. Davies, ‘The State 
of Nature and the State of War: A Reconsideration of The Man of Mode’ in University of Toronto 
Quarterly, 39, (1969): 53-62, and Derek Hughes, ‘Play and Passion in The Man of Mode’ in Comparative 
Drama, 15 (1981): 231-57. Two essays that think lucidly about the gender presentation of Dorimant 
include John Barnard’s ‘Point of View in The Man of Mode’ in Essays in Criticism, 34 (1984): 285-308, 
which examines how the play aligns its audience with Dorimant; also interesting is Harold Weber’s 
‘Charles II, George Pines and Mr. Dorimant: The Politics of Sexual Power in Restoration England’ in 
Criticism 32.2 (Spring 1990): 193-219, which sets the play within the context of contemporary concerns 
around Charles II’s foppishness and promiscuity.  
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possesses wit and a reasoning mind, and on the other hand Sir Fopling Flutter, a man given to 
display but who has no interiority.  
Dorimant appears on stage at the very beginning of The Man of Mode, dressed in his 
nightclothes and carrying a letter he has just written to his occasional mistress, Mrs. Loveit. 
Meanwhile, he is reciting verses. His reception of the orange-woman, his gossipmonger, and 
then his friend Medley shows that he is not afraid to appear in what Sir Fopling later refers to 
as ‘dishabille’, a state not just of undress but also of unpreparedness for scrutiny. His 
carelessness is a sign of libertinism perhaps, but not of foppery – he may be undressed but he 
is not unmanned, as his control of the situation, the conversations and action he engages in, is 
never in doubt. His Machiavellian manipulations of Mrs. Loveit, and the verbal wit he displays 
in conversation, are signs of a sharp mind. Fops, by contrast, were assumed to have a mind 
almost empty of any wit or intelligence.  
Dorimant’s actions in the play, in particular his treatment of women such as Mrs. 
Loveit and another mistress, Bellinda, are somewhat unpalatable to modern audiences, 
suggesting as they do a form of misogyny. Sir Fopling, by contrast, maintains a far less 
threatening relationship with women, as exemplified by his bumbling compliments delivered 
to Emilia, whom he has overlooked in order to embrace Dorimant when Sir Fopling first 
appears onstage in Act III, Scene ii:  
SIR F: A thousand pardons, madam. Some civility’s due of course upon the meeting a 
long absent friend. The éclat of so much beauty, I confess, ought to have charmed me 
sooner. 
EMILIA: The brillant of so much good language, sir, has much more power than the 
little beauty I can boast. 
SIR F: I never saw anything prettier than this high work on your point d’Espaigne. (ll. 
162-8) 
 
Sir Fopling’s overuse of French bons mots, here subtly mocked by Emilia, and his 
squeamishness in discussing Emilia’s physical beauty marks him out instantly as a fop. Many in 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Britain saw France as a source of effeminacy 
and delicacy, in contrast to an enduring self-perception by the British of themselves as 
educated but stoical and governed by reason. As Michèle Cohen (1996) reminds us: ‘the fear 
was that such “intimacy” with French would debilitate and “enervate” the masculine English 
tongue…’ (7). In other words, the British gentleman should preserve the body but prize the 
mind and Sir Fopling’s greatest mistake is to be all body, and a debilitated one at that.  
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Unlike Dorimant, however, whose gaze rests almost exclusively on women – Mrs. 
Loveit, Bellinda, Harriet – Sir Fopling’s gaze is turned repeatedly on himself, drawing attention 
to his own body. Soon after his compliments directed at Emilia’s clothing, he directs 
conversation towards his own: ‘A slight suit I made to appear in at my first arrival – not worthy 
your consideration, ladies.’ (ll. 190-1). Sir Fopling’s transparent demand for attention – 
highlighted here by his use of the verb ‘appear’, which underlines the spectatorial nature of 
this scene – is indulged by the others, with comments paying particular homage to the effect 
of the clothing on his physical form: 
DORIMANT: The pantaloon is very well mounted. 
SIR FOPLING: The tassels are new and pretty. 
MEDLEY: I never saw a coat better cut. 
SIR FOPLING: It makes me show long-waisted, and I think slender. 
DORIMANT: That’s the shape our ladies dote on. 
MEDLEY: Your breech, though, is a handful too high, in my eye, Sir Fopling. 
SIR FOPLING: Peace, Medley, I have wished it lower a thousand times; but a pox on’t, 
‘twill not be! (ll. 192-200) 
 
The compliments in this exchange revolve around Sir Fopling’s body, with the clothes being 
‘well mounted’ and well cut. Sir Fopling is concerned to appear ‘long-waisted’ and ‘slender’, to 
which Dorimant responds with a phrase which marks out the ambiguity of the fop’s gender 
presentation: ‘That’s the shape our ladies dote on’. He leaves it unclear whether he means 
that they dote on this shape where it appears in men, or that they desire to have this shape 
themselves. Sir Fopling’s vanity induces him to see only the first meaning, while Medley seems 
to pick up on the second, suggesting Sir Fopling is displaying himself too much: ‘Your breech…is 
a handful too high’. The fop’s excuse, that he has ‘wished it lower a thousand times’ 
underscores not just his vanity but also his reliance on his clothing for a sense of self; ‘wishing’ 
suggesting that, like his gendered body, he has very little power over it. After his departure, 
Dorimant and Medley highlight his faults, labelling him ‘a fine-mettled coxcomb’, ‘brisk and 
insipid’, and ‘pert and dull’ (ll. 242-3). These comments highlight the mixed response to the 
fop, that he is both colourful and colourless at the same time suggests the capacity of the fop 
to trouble linguistic certainties, rendering the masculine control of the gaze uncertain.  
This shaming of Sir Fopling occurs not to his face, but after his performance is over; at 
no point in the play, in fact, is the fop shamed in a way that would allow him to defend himself. 
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This is because, of course, the satire of The Man of Mode relies on the fop’s ignorance of his 
foppishness. Throughout Restoration and early eighteenth-century literature, there is little 
indication of a self-aware fop. It seems that foppery is an identity placed upon a transgressive 
male body, rather than one adopted by the body itself, as in the case of the libertine or dandy. 
These latter men are identifiable most clearly through their love of display and can be labelled 
as effeminate, but they also convey a sense of interiority through their adherence to an 
aesthetic praxis. Fops, meanwhile, only exist through ignorance, through an absence of a self-
defining identity. Caught up in the manic novelty of fashion, they become visible only through 
a series of embarrassing performances that rely on exteriors – their bodies and the ways in 
which they clothe and perform with them, as discussed above, are sites of spectatorial 
consensus-building between ‘men of sense’. Sir Fopling’s conversation with Mrs. Loveit in the 
Mall in Act III, Scene iii, both aligns him with her own flawed, wanton femininity and severs 
him from the men he thinks are his equals, for example Dorimant.  
Whilst Dorimant succeeds in The Man of Mode by reading minds and anticipating 
people’s motivations, Sir Fopling can only read surfaces and so his talk is all of bodies and 
exteriors. He cannot recognize, therefore, when he is being mocked, and neither can he see 
the shame which resides in his own body. Mostly, as I have already suggested, that is because 
the shame does not belong to him – it is placed there by others, by almost all in fact who gaze 
upon him in The Man of Mode. Sir Fopling, in other words, does not exist as a desiring agent in 
the way that Dorimant or even Mrs. Loveit do. Instead, he becomes a useful site for projecting 
shame from more self-conscious bodies. Dorimant in particular others Sir Fopling, constructing 
in the foppish body a displaced and therefore contained image of his own shame. This 
becomes clearer only in flashes – for example, when Emilia points out in Act III, Scene ii that: 
‘However you despise him, gentlemen, I’ll lay my life he passes for a wit with many’ (ll. 245-6). 
Dorimant seems to deflect this challenge to his othering of Sir Fopling fairly easily, retorting, 
‘That may very well be. Nature has her cheats, stums a brain, and puts sophisticate dullness 
often on the tasteless multitude for true wit and good humor. – Medley, come’ (ll. 247-9). 
However, in responding like this, Dorimant’s usual verbal wit breaks down into a parroting of 
conventional moralizing on the dangers of the fop, and his sudden urge to leave, ‘Medley, 
come’, gives further indication of his frustration at having Sir Fopling suddenly brought closer 
to him by being labelled – however ironically – a wit.  
This comes back with a vengeance in the scene at the Mall, where Dorimant’s plot to 
shame Mrs. Loveit by making her the object of Sir Fopling’s advances backfires because Mrs. 
Loveit anticipates him and pretends to enjoy the fop’s company, shutting Dorimant out 
62 
 
entirely. For the first and only time in the play, Dorimant finds himself without the upper hand, 
and can only resort to angry denial: ‘I know she hates Fopling and only makes use of him in 
hope to work me on again. Had it not been for some powerful considerations which will be 
removed tomorrow morning, I had made her pluck off this mask and show the passion that lies 
panting under’ (ll. 306-10). The violent and emotional imagery of Dorimant’s assertion mark an 
affective shift; the fact that Dorimant is in fact right about Mrs. Loveit’s motivations is not 
important at this moment. Sir Fopling has operated as pawn in both their games, and to one 
participant at least, appears to have inadvertently gained the upper hand. He has, in other 
words, suddenly become horrifyingly visible to Dorimant in a way the latter never imagined he 
could be. This is a moment of abjection, in the sense in which Julia Kristeva uses it in Powers of 
Horror: ‘one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a threat that seems to 
emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the 
tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there quite close, but it cannot be assimilated’ (1983: 1). In 
other words, the great gulf between Dorimant and Sir Fopling may not be that great after all. 
The scene in the Mall is a humiliation – an acute shaming – of Dorimant’s feeling of security as 
a man of sense.  
In a text from a later period, particularly from the later eighteenth century, this 
experience of the abject would initiate a moral reformation in Dorimant. The experience of 
loss of control, of embarrassment, is an opportunity for reflection and development: in other 
words, it marks the entry point of shame, an identity-forming affect if ever there was one. If 
Dorimant can be replaced, however strategically, by Sir Fopling, then the differences between 
them are not absolute. If Sir Fopling can pass for a wit with some, then perhaps Dorimant can 
pass for a fop with others.6 The realisation of this, which Dorimant goes to great lengths to 
disavow, would bring him back to his awareness of his own particularity, making him self-
conscious. To be conscious of the self is to be conscious of the body, as the blushing and 
averting of the face that accompanies feelings of shame remind us.  
The body knows that we can be gazed upon as well as gaze, and this eruption of the 
body is a significant challenge to polite masculinity, which seeks to cloak the male body in 
universality, as the previous chapter explored. As Kristeva says: ‘a vortex of summons and 
repulsion places the one haunted by it literally beside himself’ (1983: 1). This displacement of 
self occurs for Dorimant at this very moment in the Mall, but as it is a Restoration comedy, the 
                                                          
6 Like Richard Steele, who described Dorimant as being ‘a direct Knave in his Designs, and a Clown in 
his Language’ (278-9) and ‘more of a Coxcomb than that of Foplin’ [sic] (280). Spectator, vol 1 no. 68.  
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experience of abjection must be immediately rehabilitated. This occurs through the ritualized 
humiliation in return of those who transgress, and we are presented with a series of set pieces 
in which Sir Fopling is reinstated as the object of shame. This should come as no surprise 
considering Restoration comedy, with its targeting of new-fangled beings such as fops, is 
fundamentally conservative at heart. We see this process happening notably at Lady Townley’s 
gathering, during which the fop arrives with his retinue of French retainers, all equipped in 
masquerade. The very purpose of masquerade, of course, is to obscure the identity of the 
participants, but this is not the case for Sir Fopling. Instantly recognized by the other 
partygoers, he marks himself out as a notorious body: 
MEDLEY: Make him own himself; a fool is very troublesome when he presumes he is incognito. 
(ll. 179-80)  
Sir Fopling’s misrecognition of his own body – believing it to be more malleable in its visibility 
than it is – marks out once again his inability to understand the implicit rules of politeness. No 
one else at the gathering is in masquerade dress; in fact the whole evening was meant to be a 
private affair and Sir Fopling has not been invited. The body of the fop causes trouble in the 
form of embarrassment not just because of its inappropriate attire but also because of its 
presence. It becomes clear at this point, if it hasn’t been clear all the way through, that there 
has in fact been no point in the play at which Sir Fopling has been welcome – he is tolerated 
only to receive the shame of others who gaze upon him. In the laughter we direct towards him 
as an audience, we hear the uncertain note of shame, as he becomes the body upon which we 
project our insecurities about a whole range of issues, from appearance to gender 
performance.  
Effeminacy in the modern age is often referred to by a similar related term, camp. 
Susan Sontag states that ‘the soundest starting point [for a history of camp] seems to be the 
late seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, because of that period’s extraordinary feeling 
for artifice, for surface, for symmetry’ (1999: 57). The Man of Mode is concerned with all of 
these issues, and offers its audience few moral platitudes with which to identify our heroes 
and our villains. Despite the obvious duplicity which abounds in the treatment of Sir Fopling by 
his fellows, the audience is not moved to sympathy for him. This is because he functions 
merely as a site of ridicule, of manipulation, of discomfort, for all those around him. Like many 
of the play’s female characters, the audience is seduced by Dorimant’s creativity and 
resourcefulness, whatever his moral inconsistency. Therefore it is easier to side with him over 
Sir Fopling, because the latter clearly has nothing more to offer than his effeminate 
corporeality. His body reveals nothing of its interior, it is instead mere surface. The audience 
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looks to Dorimant for action and agency; it looks at Sir Fopling to see all that is wrong with an 
effeminate culture. For this reason, Sir Fopling cannot be labelled camp, with all of the 
satisfyingly knowing artifice that offers. He is a product instead of the terrors of his times: an 
increasingly prosperous commercial nation unbridled by traditional hierarchies, where gender 
performance is increasingly in flux and participation in material culture is becoming more 
widely available. As a fop, Sir Fopling performs all of these paranoias in one body. He carries 
the shame of polite culture, so that his more polite peers can feel that they do not. It is 
unsurprising that The Man of Mode remained popular well into the middle of the eighteenth 
century, allowing audiences to laugh again and again at their own embodied fears.   
Concerns about foppery did not entirely die off as the eighteenth century progressed; 
as Philip Carter has shown, there were concerns about effeminacy in the military in the middle 
of the century, proof if any was needed that foppery had poisoned every corner of the British 
social milieu (2001: 130-1). However, the fact remains that fops were incredibly popular as 
sources and subjects of gossip, and in literature as characters that provided humour and 
diversion. Susan Staves goes further, however, and makes the case for fops as ‘the avant-garde 
of sex role change’ (1982: 420). ‘The so-called effeminacy of these old fops was an early if 
imperfect attempt at the refinement, civility and sensitivity most of us would now say are 
desirable masculine virtues’, she suggests (428). Fops are more than just a dry run for late-
century sentimentality of the Man of Feeling sort, however. In their decorated, effeminised 
bodies, they hold the key to unlocking – and deconstructing – what was rapidly becoming a 
hegemonic form of gender coding: polite masculinity. 
Fops called attention to the material benefits of commerce through their clothing, 
cosmetics and possessions, thereby highlighting the banality of commercial production. They 
were slaves to fashion, emphasising the weakness and susceptibility of society to empty 
passions. Their ceremonious performances in society exposed the artificially constructed 
nature of politeness itself. Perhaps most unsettlingly of all, their conscious displays of their 
own inescapably gendered forms reminded men that they were as corporeal as women; that 
none of them could imitate Mr. Spectator and disappear. Even more than this, as Brian Glover 
points out, the disapproval of ‘”Action, Show and Dress”’ encountered in works like The 
Spectator ‘speaks for a widely-remarked tendency in the eighteenth century to devalue object 
in favour of subject’ (2002: 529). The fop’s ultimate achievement is to renounce this 
devaluation, to allow the object in some way to talk back through performance and display. 
Men of sense tried to use disgust to alienate these performing bodies from their own, to purge 
them and make them abject: to turn them into Kristevan corpses. Like the living dead, 
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however, the fop continued to rise and walk again, a constant reminder to his detractors that 
the shame they aimed outwards would always return undiminished.  
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Chapter Three 
‘This great inmate’: Shame as the Impartial Spectator in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments 
The first two chapters have outlined shame as a technique through which to 
circumscribe masculine identity via a sometimes sophisticated, sometimes less so, discursive 
technique of externalisation. Addison and Steele’s eidolon Mr Spectator, and the fop figure 
created by effeminacy panic, are different, but both fulfil a need for deflection; a bouncing-
away of gendered markers that allow the abstract ideal of polite masculinity to remain intact.  
 In this chapter, by contrast, I use Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) to 
propose a different conceptualisation of shame, that of the necessary internalisation of affect 
and the moral imperatives which demand this. Whereas the masculine internal has appeared 
to be a space haunted by phobias of contagion and penetration in the texts I have discussed 
thus far, I now intend to trace how Smith’s investigations into morality, and his invocation of 
the impartial spectator, instead re-imagine the development of the masculine internal space as 
fundamental and fruitful for polite masculinity. In doing so, I will engage with eighteenth-
century conceptualisations of vision and touch, and the ways in which they connect with bodily 
affect. I will reach the conclusion that Smith’s theory of morality is also intended to be 
practice, through its basis in corporeal reality.  
Smith, like Addison and Steele, creates a sort of eidolon, an idealised figure which 
embodies his sense of the moral. The critic and editor of Smith’s works, D.D. Raphael, defines 
Smith’s eidolon thus: ‘The “supposed impartial spectator”, as Smith often called him, is not the 
actual bystander who may express approval or disapproval of my conduct. He is a creation of 
my imagination. He is indeed myself, though in the character of an imagined spectator, not in 
the character of an agent’ (Raphael, 2007: 35). Smith’s impartial spectator, the man within the 
breast, is a figure for the self to identify with in order to become a fully socialised individual in 
polite society. I argue here that we can enrich understandings of Smith’s ideas about social 
morality by examining his thesis through the lens of affect theory, and in particular by 
privileging the role of shame within the process by which the impartial spectator develops. 
Shame helps create the impartial spectator and as a result remains vital in preventing 
transgressions; the socialised self fears transgression’s consequences because these include 
being returned to feelings of shame.  
The body of critical work in general on The Theory of Moral Sentiments is vast. One 
strand of the debates around Smith’s moral philosophy – considerations of the impartial 
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spectator – is helpful to briefly look at in order to set my own argument in relation to those of 
others. The philosopher Eugene Heath (1995) observes that ‘Smith’s theory offers a complex 
and intriguing account of how norms can emerge through a process of social interaction’, 
seeing this as mirroring ‘the features of what are now called “invisible hand” explanations’ 
(449). He summarises the impartial spectator via T.D. Campbell as: ‘”an average standard 
which emerges from the interplay of the reactions of ordinary spectators and agents; he 
personifies the results of a process of interaction whereby an agreed set of moral principles 
are evolved”’ (450). Here Heath is highlighting the discursive construction of the model of 
sociability that Smith outlines. His question is whether this can then explain ‘whether or how a 
uniform set of normative judgments…could emerge out of individual interaction’ (451).  
In her discussion of the impartial spectator, Ildiko Csengei (2012) sees this as the 
wrong question to ask: ‘Rather, the question arises whether Smith’s other-regarding principle, 
even when it does emerge, can ever be more than self-regarding, and whether sympathy is 
not, as it were, an “uncanny” concept, with a meaning riven by internal contradictions’ (53). 
Csengei’s argument, which looks at the inherent solipsism in sympathy and sentiment, invokes 
the way in which shame isolates an individual from sociability at the same time as binding 
them to society in ways which are difficult to parse, because feelings of shame always bring 
external experience back upon the self in ways that reinforce the primacy of the self. Although 
her thesis is more interested in eighteenth-century notions of how sympathy operated, and 
less interested in affect as I discuss it here, I find this questioning of the efficacy of ‘other-
regarding feelings’ in creating social consensus and order intriguing.  
It is my argument in this chapter that shame, with its oscillating movements between 
spectator and spectacle, can go some way towards resolving the difficulties alluded to by 
Csengei and Heath. It is Csengei’s contention, for example, that sympathy has ‘limit-cases’, 
situations in which ‘our fellow-feeling has indeed no legitimate source in the other’. One of her 
examples here is blushing at the impropriety of another’s behaviour, a scene of shame that I 
explore below (58). She writes that this illegitimate fellow-feeling ‘arises from an impossible 
situation created from the point of view of a split subject, who is at once spectator and object 
of viewing’ (59). In order to reconcile this split, a movement is necessary whereby the other is 
‘drawn into the core of the self’, and for Csengei, this is the impartial spectator. ‘In order to 
sympathise’, she writes, ‘we empty out the other’s emotions and fill the empty space with our 
own narratives and feelings’ (61). This emptying out and refilling process I discuss below in 
relation to Hogarth’s concepts of spectation and the object in art.  
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Another analytical angle is offered by David Marshall (1986), who examines the 
theatricality of Smith’s theory, emphasising the uncomfortably mirrored experience of both 
spectator and object. At the heart of Marshall’s reading of Smith is the insurmountable 
problem of distance implied in theatricality: ‘the actor and spectator into which one divides 
oneself can never completely identify with each other or be made identical. Identity is itself 
undermined by the theatrical model which pictures the self as an actor who stands beside 
himself and represents the characters of both spectator and spectacle’ (176). He points out 
that in order for Smith’s theory to work effectively, a ‘certain instability of self’ is assumed. The 
self must be eradicable enough for an individual to leave ‘oneself behind and [try] to take 
someone else’s part’ (177). Marshall suggests that The Theory of Moral Sentiments ‘must 
describe what it is like to want to believe in the fiction of sympathy, and what it is like to live in 
a world where sympathy is perhaps impossible’ (181). This becomes pertinent in my fourth 
chapter, on The Man of Feeling, but it is interesting that a similar wistfulness can be traced in 
Smith.  
Repeatedly, Marshall observes that the ‘spectre’ haunting Smith’s text is the spectator 
who refuses sympathy (182, 191). It seems clear to me that this frightening apparition is a 
prime motivator in the endeavour to get sociability ‘right’; the refusal of sympathy would be 
evidence not only of getting social connection ‘wrong’, but of somehow being ‘wrong’ in one’s 
own self. This feeling is a key symptom of shame; far from severing us from others, however, 
these very same feelings compel us to return time and again to the scene of shame in order to 
address or rectify where and how we became ‘wrong’. The requirement for stoical (and 
typically, masculine) self-reflection is a central conceit of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and 
it is by considering shame’s role within this that we can gain a more profound understanding 
of this text. Shame simultaneously draws distinctions between the self and others, and yet 
leaves one permanently open to invasion, contagion and intercourse, both pleasurable and 
painful, with the outside world. If this sounds much like the impartial spectator, that should be 
no surprise; shame is the impartial spectator’s active ingredient. 
 
 
How to get inside: Hogarth’s shell-like object 
 This idea of the permeable body was not alien to contemporary eighteenth-century 
thought. Smith himself, in one of his early essays, characterises sight and touch as linked and 
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co-dependant. In fact, Smith seems to suggest that man must possess both in order to have a 
fully synthesised understanding of reality: ‘that of seeing could never alone suggest to him the 
idea of Solidity, or enable him to form any notion of the external and resisting substance…the 
objects of Sight and those of Touch constitute two worlds, which, though they have a most 
important correspondence and connection with one another, bear no sort of resemblance to 
one another’ (Smith, ‘Of the External Senses’, 1980: 150). Those two worlds, different as they 
may be, are crucial in allowing a solid grasp of the phenomena around one, which is otherwise, 
as Smith says of visible objects, ‘mere shadows or pictures, which seem to float, as it were, 
before the organs of Sight’ (152). It requires a convergence of sight and touch in order to 
ascertain distance and situation: ‘Upon the knowledge of this distance and situation depends 
the whole conduct of human life, in the most trifling as well as in the most important 
transactions’ (Smith, 1980: 156). Distance has featured prominently in my previous chapters as 
a way of distancing oneself from a source of shame. Fop literature, I argued, was a way of 
placing effeminate masculinities at greater than arm’s length. I also pointed out, however, that 
this distancing project was one doomed to failure, because of the complex shame bonds which 
resulted in a painful intercourse between self and other. Sight and touch, I demonstrated 
there, are external senses but their impact is felt internally through affective responses to 
being touched and gazed upon, as well as in the varying forms of feedback the spectator or 
agent receives from looking at or touching the object. Hence, sight and touch make the body 
permeable.   
 One of the breakthrough moments in researching this chapter came with my reading 
William Hogarth’s introduction to his 1753 treatise on art, The Analysis of Beauty. Written just 
a few years before Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments was published, I place the two texts 
side by side as examples of a crucial element in eighteenth-century thought. This is the 
importance of the body, and ultimately bodily affect, to contemporary understandings of 
morality. Hogarth’s metaphor for the observed object deserves unpacking, and so I quote at 
length here: 
…let every object under our consideration, be imagined to have its inward contents 
scoop’d out so nicely, as to have nothing of it left but a thin shell, exactly 
corresponding both in its inner and outer surface, to the shape of the object itself: and 
let us likewise suppose this thin shell to be made up of very fine threads, closely 
connected together, and equally perceptible whether the eye is supposed to observe 
from without or within;  and we shall find the ideas of the two surfaces of this shell will 
naturally coincide. The very word, shell, makes us seem to see both surfaces alike.  
The use of this great conceit…will be seen to be very great, in the process of this work: 
and the oftner we think of objects in this shell-like manner, we shall facilitate and 
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strengthen our conception of any particular part of the surface of an object we are 
viewing, by acquiring thereby a more perfect knowledge of the whole, to which it 
belongs: because the imagination will naturally enter into the vacant space within this 
shell, and there at once, as from a center, view the whole form within, and mark the 
opposite corresponding parts so strongly, as to retain the idea of the whole, and make 
us masters of the meaning of every view of the object, as we walk round it, and view it 
from without. (Hogarth, 1753: 31-2) 
The materiality of Hogarth’s concept is clear. While the object referred to here could be 
anything, it is reasonable to think that Hogarth, with his endless fascination for the human 
condition (and human form), would be thinking primarily of a body. An object initially dense 
and fleshy is disembowelled to reveal a casing which has both the brittle qualities of the shell 
and the dense tactility of the threads, which imply textiles. Hogarth’s glossing over of the 
multimedia composition of his viewed object is refreshing, allowing as it does a body to be 
composed of one material that also happens to be another material at the same time. Here he 
is not only rejecting an Addisonian language of precision, clarity and plainness, but also tapping 
into a burgeoning discourse within the field of natural philosophy.  
As Hisao Ishizuka explains, natural philosophy had begun to move during the late 
seventeenth-century from a humour-based understanding of the human body toward one 
which hypothesised the thread, or fibre, as the root of the body’s composition and 
mechanisms. One prosthetic device which allowed this to occur was the microscope, the use of 
which grew in popularity throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century. The use of an 
ocular prosthesis which increased the reach (and, ergo, the touch capabilities) of human vision 
resulted in the discovery of a fibrous body, one composed of threads that, according to George 
Cheyne in 1733, ‘…are probably platted and twisted together…to make the larger sensible 
Fibres: and these again are either united in Bundles to form the Muscles, Tendons, Ligaments 
&c. or woven into a fine Web, like Cloth, to make the Membranes, the Coats of the Vessels, 
&c.’ (quoted in Ishizuka, 2006: 75). Hogarth’s odd conception of the observed object becomes 
much more conventional in this context.  
 What of the act of climbing inside the object one has just ‘scoop’d out so nicely’, 
however? The artist must sit inside in order to truly understand the object under observation. 
Once inside, he can see the reality of the object which, when viewed from without only, can 
always be suspected of hiding something. Indeed, Hogarth’s use of the phrase ‘masters of the 
meaning of every view of the object’ (evoking the Addison of ‘Pleasures of the Imagination’) 
strikes both a patriarchal and imperial note akin to the most vociferous of fop literature. It is 
certainly worth pausing here to consider the gendered implications of the term ‘masters’. As I 
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will show in relation to Smith, Hogarth’s seemingly general use of the term here invokes a 
masculine universal, as seen in the use of the masculine pronoun to stand in for the 
hypothetical individual or humanity at large. However, this also attaches the qualities alluded 
to in the act of adept observation to those readers and practitioners of art who present as 
biologically male.  
The paranoia of masterful spectatorship, of course, is that the gaze can also be turned 
on the self. Men gazing on other men is the central anxiety that I explored in both chapters 
one and two, and I outlined the differing ways – disappearing and deflecting – that ‘masterful’ 
men attempted to avoid this fate. One cannot help but wonder – although I am sure one is not 
supposed to – what happened to the substance which has been removed. What innards have 
been scooped out; what fleshy pulp has been disembowelled so thoroughly as to allow the 
object to become a vehicle for the artist? Given the absence of pulp from Hogarth’s text, one 
could understand that the innards are void of meaning. Certainly the emptying out of 
masculine particularity that we observed at work in Addison and Steele lends credence to the 
idea of pulp (the particular) being anathema to the project of polite or masterful masculinity. 
The absence of pulp merely allows for the enlightened eye of the painter to ‘enter into’ – a 
phrase crucial to Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments – the object which up until now has 
kept true mastery at bay.  
Hogarth’s point, however, is that to be a great artist one must supplement the world 
of the visible by ‘imagining’ oneself into a private interior. The imagination is crucial to cultural 
and moral politeness, as is made clear in Addison’s issues of The Spectator and most 
consistently in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is Smith, of course, who imagines the 
impartial spectator as ‘the man within the breast’, a Hogarthian figure looking around at one’s 
internal threads and fibres and seeing more clearly and masterfully than one can oneself. The 
idea of the little man inside was surprisingly widespread in Enlightenment theoretical writing, 
as Ishizuka highlights: ‘According to this theory of fibre psychology, each fibre connected a part 
of the body with a corresponding part of the brain. The aggregate of the corresponding fibres 
in the brain was even imagined to be a “Man in Miniature”’ (2006: 84). The naturalist Charles 
Bonnet believed that the body’s fibres were replicated in a man’s morality: ‘If all our ideas 
depend on fibres appropriated to them, prejudices must also have their fibres’ (quoted in 
Ishizuka, 2006: 84). Morality is imagined to be as malleable and textural as the body itself.  
 It should be clear that materiality and corporeality will be as crucial to this reading of 
shame as it has been to my readings in previous chapters. Visuality, too, will form a crucial 
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fulcrum on which my argument will swing. As Peter de Bolla comments: ‘one might say that 
vision figures Enlightenment thought’ (de Bolla, 1996: 65). De Bolla relates this visuality 
explicitly to spatial issues: ‘Consequently, visuality is both literally a topic under investigation 
during the Enlightenment and the name we might give to a figurative spacing that opens up, 
controls, or legislates the terrain upon which a large number of concepts are articulated’ (de 
Bolla, 1996: 65). In de Bolla’s very useful essay, ‘The Visibility of Visuality’, he considers what 
he describes as the eighteenth-century ‘society of spectacle’ (74) as a primary method of 
producing sympathy and self-reflexivity itself. He explores The Theory of Moral Sentiments as a 
prominent contemporary rationalisation of this ‘spectator sport’ (74). Key to this, for de Bolla, 
is the role of the impartial spectator: ‘this idealized position, the spectator who is never 
locatable within a specific individual, within a real person7, represents the best-case scenario: 
the spectator as the projection of every individual who aspires to the condition of the ethically 
sound’. He goes on to point out that a process of internalizing the impartial spectator is a 
crucial part of the process of moralising the subject: ‘this idealized person must be internalized 
within the breast of every man who would be judged according to the precepts he holds dear’ 
(76).  
De Bolla’s analysis of Smith’s text, however, does not consider the role of shame in 
either the society of spectacle or the process of internalizing idealized morals. This is strange 
considering one of his key critical angles on visuality comes via Lacan’s Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, from which comes this rumination, quoted by de Bolla and which I 
also quote for reference: 
A gaze surprises him in the function of the voyeur, disturbs him, overwhelms him and 
reduces him to a feeling of shame. The gaze in question is certainly the presence of 
others as such. But does this mean that originally it is in the relation of subject to 
subject, in the function of the existence of others as looking at me, that we apprehend 
what the gaze really is? Is it not clear that the gaze intervenes here only in as much as 
it is not the annihilating subject, correlative of the world of objectivity, who feels 
himself surprised, but the subject sustaining himself in a function of desire? (Lacan, 
quoted in de Bolla: 67)8 
What Lacan is drawing our attention to here is the affective dimension of vision; its capacity 
for entangling body and mind, desires and fears within the fraying threads of subjectivity and 
                                                          
7 It is worth noting here that this ‘idealization’ of the impartial spectator – in other words, that he is in a 
sense a necessary fiction – should be compared to my arguments in chapter 2 regarding the fop. He, too, 
is an idealization, albeit a negative one, in that he is a fictive construct used to shame men and keep them 
within ‘polite’ boundaries.  
8 This quotation comes from pages 84-85 of the translation by Alan Sheridan, published by Penguin in 
1977.  
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objectivity. This becomes clearer when you pick out vocabulary. Whilst bearing in mind that I 
am reading Lacan in translation here, I am still struck by how central the concept of surprise is 
to the arrival of shame; our subject is surprised by a gaze, but in fact Lacan stresses that the 
affect surprise is more crucial in this visual field than the gaze itself: ‘Is it not clear that the 
gaze intervenes here only in as much as it is not the annihilating subject…who feels himself 
surprised, but the subject sustaining himself in a function of desire?’ It is this struggling subject 
who experiences surprise in response to the gaze, and this surprise which ‘reduces him to a 
feeling of shame’.  
 The reason I am pulling out these single words is because of their significance in the 
work of Silvan Tomkins. As Tomkins repeatedly points out in his work, all affects can interact 
with, intensify or reduce any other. In Lacan’s formulation, surprise reduces a person to shame 
when they become aware of the vulnerability of their subjectivity. For Tomkins, shame itself is 
often the great reducer; it essentially reduces the capacity to experience and present all the 
other affects. One can be ashamed of literally anything: of an interest in someone or 
something; of one’s angry feelings; of being surprised by a realisation. For Tomkins, shame’s 
most powerful legacy is in its relationship to interest: how, as Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank 
explain it, shame can help define ‘so basic a function as the ability to be interested in the 
world’ (Sedgwick & Frank, 1995: 5). Tomkins himself clarifies:  
The innate activator of shame is the incomplete reduction of interest or joy…Such a 
barrier might be because one is suddenly looked at by one who is strange, or because 
one wishes to look at or commune with another person but suddenly cannot because 
he is strange, or one expected him to be familiar but he suddenly appears unfamiliar, 
or one started to smile but found one was smiling at a stranger. (Tomkins, 1995: 135) 
Here we find again the problematic gaze and the sense of surprise we found in Lacan’s 
rumination, as well as the compromised self unable to sustain its illusion of autonomy. Both 
Tomkins and Lacan seem keenly aware, at least in these texts, of the interplay between 
visuality and affect. To bring this back to de Bolla’s work on eighteenth-century visuality and 
moral development, we can see in the quotation from Tomkins echoes of de Bolla’s 
understanding of moral improvement in the eighteenth century as involving hope; the 
impartial spectator is ‘the projection of every individual who aspires to the condition of the 
ethically sound’. Aspiration is of course a form of interest, a yearning for a goal or state of 
being. An incomplete reduction in one’s aspirations is, as we so often learn, a source of shame. 
And what does shame have to do with Hogarth? By now, it should hopefully be clear how the 
disembowelled object may be feeling once its pulp has been scoop’d out so nicely, and its 
interiority so ruthlessly mastered.  
74 
 
How to get inside: Smith’s impartial spectator 
 We come to Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments with a set of tools which allows us to 
understand this philosophical treatise as an investigation into the connections between self 
and other when refracted through the prism of shame. On the opening page, Smith presents 
us with his understanding of sympathy, which is rooted in ‘some principles in [man’s] nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it but the pleasure of seeing it’ (Smith, 2009: 13). Interest, the 
very first affect mentioned in a text which fizzes with them, is cited here as fundamental to the 
existence of society. Crucial here is the necessity of seeing the happiness of others, and the 
enjoyment we gain from doing so. Here we have Tomkins’s positive affects, interest and 
enjoyment, made possible through a culture of visuality, the spectator sport of gazing upon 
others that de Bolla suggests is so crucial to eighteenth-century polite society.  
Smith then goes on to explain that most sympathy is achieved, not by actually feeling 
or experiencing what the other feels or experiences, but by using the imagination: ‘by the 
imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same 
torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person 
with him’ (13-14, my emphasis). The imaginative faculties of man allow him to travel into the 
body of another, much in the way that Hogarth’s painterly imagination travels inside the 
observed object. This culture of surveillance is here rendered not imperial but nurturing to a 
strengthening of the common bonds between men, and crucial to this is the imaginative 
exploration of the body of one’s fellow sufferer. It seems that the anxiety around 
spectatorship between men is here given another remedy, one more positive than those 
offered by Mr. Spectator or fop literature. Smith’s imaginative exploration of other bodies is a 
homosocial move aimed at dissipating rivalry (a refusal to sympathise expressed through 
highly theatrical methods such as duelling) and instead improving social cohesion.  
In Smith’s initial example, as with so many of the examples in the early pages of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, sympathy is elicited for a man whose suffering is less 
philosophical and more physical. Smith refers to our response to witnessing ‘our 
brother…upon the rack’ and comments that ‘our senses will never inform us of what he 
suffers…it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his 
sensations’ (13). Entering into the body of another through the ocular and creative capacities 
of the eyes and brain is therefore the feat we must perform repeatedly in order to vouchsafe 
the stability of civilised society. Our brother on the rack becomes the Hogarthian object we 
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must lovingly disembowel and climb inside in order to maintain and reproduce systems of 
affect necessary to our flourishing. We should pause here and consider why it is that so often 
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments imaginative sympathy is evoked through physical suffering. I 
have discussed earlier in this thesis my sense that a polite society necessarily reduces and 
devalues the need for, and prestige of, physical violence and suffering. By using theatrical set 
pieces such as the ‘brother on the rack’, and elsewhere the man who stoically endures the loss 
of his leg in cannon fire, Smith captures in language the physical performance of masculinity 
and dramatizes it further in his philosophical reasoning. At the same time, of course, its 
rendering in language valorises particular modes of physical suffering in a way that moves it 
out of the experience of the polite citizen, thereby reinforcing the almost wistful high regard 
that the suffering male body has been traditionally imbued with.  
 Peter de Bolla notes that crucially, this imaginative communion has another side effect 
which is of particular importance to me in my current reading of Smith’s text: 
Smith makes it clear that the spectator will never quite manage to reproduce at the 
same intensity those feelings of the other since sympathetic sentiment is, in the last 
analysis, “imaginary”. However, this difference leads the spectator to notice a tension 
within himself between the feelings he experiences in his own right and those he 
experiences through this imaginative projection onto the observed. It is this tension 
that leads the spectator to ponder not only what it might be like to be the afflicted 
person but also what it might be like to be spectated upon…In this sense subjectivity is 
precisely not positioned in the eye of the beholder but, rather, in the exchanges that 
occur in the phantasmic projection of what it might feel like to be constituted as a 
subject by looking on the onlookers of our selves. (de Bolla, 1996: 75) 
What de Bolla identifies here as a tension between what a person experiences ‘in his own 
right’ and what he experiences ‘through…imaginative projection’ is a tension between internal 
and external. In other words, where do my experiences end and those of others begin? Or to 
put it more simply, where do I end, and where does he/she/they begin? It is through 
observation of others that we begin to learn things about ourselves, and in this hiatus, an 
internal suspended temporality develops which allows identity to take on solidity.  
In Part III of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith ruminates on what it is that prevents us 
from putting our own interests ahead of those of others, even where the results of our self-
interest would benefit us more than it would hurt our fellow man. Smith avoids relying on 
benevolence or concepts of fraternal goodwill to explain this phenomenon:  
It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the 
great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so 
as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the 
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most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no 
respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully 
and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, 
and execration. (159) 
Smith embodies the abstract concepts of reason, principle and conscience in a second man 
that dwells within each of us. Specifically, Smith locates him within the breast, where the heart 
is found, in the seat of the soul. What Smith does with his man within both builds on 
contemporary ideas of spectatorship and stretches the boundaries of the self. The body for 
Smith is a permeable membrane, a shell composed of threads that enables flow between the 
public and the private. The man within the breast, or the impartial spectator as he is often 
known, is the Hogarthian artist, disembowelling, climbing inside and gaining mastery over the 
object he surveys, in this case: you.  
The impartial spectator does more than merely survey, however. He is a man of action, 
and his characteristic repeated action is one of intervention. Smith conceives of this action 
being made vocally, ‘with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our 
passions’. The intervention of the impartial spectator is intended to induce a hesitation in the 
agent, and the hesitation, if utilised correctly, induces a helpful liminal pause, the moment 
between pre-action and action. When the impartial spectator acts, he acts so that we, as 
agents, may be prevented from acting at least temporarily. In this moment of non-action, the 
gap is filled by affect. It is this window, this liminal pause, which should provide the moment of 
entry for the kinds of affects which place us within the threads and fibres of interrelation. 
What affect is better suited for the placing of an agent within the matrix of consequence than 
shame? It is shame, rushing in as it does at the critical moment, which reminds us, as Smith 
says, ‘that we are but one of the multitude’. In other words, shame returns us to a sense of 
ourselves, of our bodies caught mid-action, and of our place nestled into the fabric of society. 
We begin to understand the damage we may be about to inflict on this fabric.  
Shame returns us not just to our correct place9, but our correct shape and size. By 
denying shame, we become, as Smith remarks, ‘the proper objects of resentment, abhorrence, 
and execration’, in other words, objects that do not fit. Society moves to bind us ever tighter 
with threads of resentment, abhorrence and execration, in order to defend itself. These terms 
                                                          
9 We see this occurring in The Spectator, as I discussed in chapter 1. The allegory ‘The Palace of Vanity’, 
which appeared in no. 460, depicts the formerly vain visitors to the palace, which hangs in the air, being 
unable to return to ground level and escape until they have reached their ‘due point of Esteem which they 
ought to have for themselves’ (vol. 4, 124). Shame in eighteenth century texts often fulfils a conservative 
social function, suggesting that despite social upheaval and the rise of a nominally meritocratic society, 
everyone ultimately had their limits.  
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describe a process, and various tools within that process, to make an offender feel ashamed. 
Smith seems to say that it is far better to be shamed internally, by the impartial spectator, than 
externally, by other spectators. This buys in to the prevailing assumption implicit in influential 
texts like The Spectator, that a public shaming is an unbearable catastrophe. Better by far to be 
shamed by the man within, than the men without. The sign of a truly socialised man is that he 
can shame himself without society’s intervention.  
The ultimate relationship between agent and his man within should eventually be 
almost symbiotic, as demonstrated when Smith says: ‘The view of the impartial spectator 
becomes so perfectly habitual to him, that, without any effort, without any exertion, he never 
thinks of surveying his misfortune in any other view’ (Smith, 2009: 171). It should be noted 
here that in addition to vocabulary which utilises visual concepts (view, surveying), Smith also 
conceives of the affective gap narrowing, needing less space and less temporal drag, for the 
agent to reach the ideal moral conclusion. The agent in constant dialogue with his impartial 
spectator has attained the kind of mastery Hogarth predicts through a closely-related 
imaginative practice.  
Smith suggests that our emotional development is ongoing, much like the 
maintenance of polite masculinity. Smith gives the example of a weak man, a man of ‘a little 
more firmness’ and a man of ‘real constancy and firmness’ all in the same situation. Caught in 
a moment of intense personal distress, the test is how they respond to a visit from another. 
The weak man will be unable to conceal his distress, even from a stranger, for long. The man of 
more firmness will perform better, but may eventually give way. It is important to note that 
this is where Smith places the greater part of society, and that he does not necessarily 
condemn imperfection. The ideal state is that of the man of ‘real constancy and firmness’, a 
man who is in ceaseless communion with his inner guardian:  
He has never dared to forget for one moment the judgment which the impartial 
spectator would pass upon his sentiments and conduct.  He has never dared to suffer 
the man within the breast to be absent one minute from his attention. With the eyes 
of this great inmate he has always been accustomed to regard whatever relates to 
himself. This habit has become perfectly familiar to him. He has been in the constant 
practice, and, indeed, under the constant necessity, of modelling, of endeavouring to 
model, not only his outward conduct and behaviour, but, as much as he can, even his 
inward sentiments and feelings, according to those of this awful and respectable 
judge. He does not merely affect the sentiments of the impartial spectator. He really 
adopts them. He almost identifies himself with, he almost becomes himself that 
impartial spectator, and scarce even feels but as that great arbiter of his conduct 
directs him to feel. (169)  
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The ideal affective state is one of external stoicism, and internal communion with one’s 
impartial spectator.  
The range of names Smith gives to the impartial spectator underlines his importance 
to Smith’s thesis. The phrase ‘impartial spectator’ is itself used three times in the paragraph 
above, alongside ‘man within the breast’, ‘this great inmate’, ‘this awful and respectable judge’ 
and ‘that great arbiter of his conduct’. Such a proliferation of titles gives the impartial 
spectator added clout. This is Smith briefly abandoning his usually even style for something 
more urgent. The breathless tone is enhanced by the false start in sentence structure evident 
in the last sentence, ‘He almost identifies himself with, he almost becomes himself that 
impartial spectator, and scarce even feels but as that great arbiter of his conduct directs him to 
feel’. This syntactical glitch insists that the reader hesitate over the phrase, much like the 
spectator himself insists the agent hesitate so as to allow for self-reflection via shame.  
 And what of shame? Of all the affects, this is one Smith has strikingly little to say about 
explicitly, although he seemingly has much to say about the problems created by its absence. 
Shamelessness is a fault identified early in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and described in 
terms of its effect on others:  
We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be altogether 
incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our 
breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the reality. We blush for 
the impudence and rudeness of another, though he himself appears to have no sense 
of the impropriety of his own behaviour; because we cannot help feeling with what 
confusion we ourselves should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner. 
(16) 
Putting ourselves in his case, in this case, involves climbing into his case – the breast where 
Smith places his idealized conscience figure. What we have observed places us unnervingly 
within a body that is behaving absurdly, and yet showing no sign of recognising this. We are 
trapped, if only momentarily, in a vehicle we are not in control of. This causes us to blush, one 
of the external markers of shame, as identified by Silvan Tomkins: ‘Blushing of the face in 
shame is a consequence of, as well as a further cause for, heightened self- and face-
consciousness’ (1995: 136).  
 What of our reactions to our own shameless behaviour, then? I want to discuss 
remorse in greater depth later, but for now a few words can be said on visibility and personal 
feelings of shame and humiliation. In a section on our own ill-advised behaviour, Smith 
discusses ideas of orientation and visuality to elucidate our relationship to our own 
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reprehensible actions. Smith casts our perceptions of self as a cumulative process: ‘The 
opinion which we entertain of our own character depends entirely on our judgment 
concerning our past conduct’ (182). Smith reminds us here that, much like the relationship 
with the man within the breast, our relationships with ourselves are ongoing projects of 
learning; a kind of fragile auto-pedagogy. We approach ourselves with exquisite care and more 
than a hint of apprehension: ‘He is a bold surgeon, they say, whose hand does not tremble 
when he performs an operation upon his own person; and he is often equally bold who does 
not hesitate to pull off the mysterious veil of self-delusion, which covers from his view the 
deformities of his own conduct’ (182). Both the surgeon and the truth-seeker are described as 
bold; their boldness is demonstrated through action and these actions have equally grotesque, 
though necessary, elements. Both also involve penetrating membranes which keep the 
individual protected from the invasion of the threatening external. The more socially-
conditioned reaction is described by Smith thus: ‘It is so disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, 
that we often purposely turn away our view from those circumstances which might render 
that judgment unfavourable’ (182). This false orientation of our gazes results in perpetuating 
previous immoralities and persevering ‘in injustice, merely because we once were unjust, and 
because we are ashamed and afraid to see that we were so’ (182).  
 Partiality to our own actions leaves us blind to their propriety, so that ultimately we 
are left unable to view them ‘in the light in which any indifferent spectator would consider it’. 
A man more endowed with ‘a particular power of perception’ is able to pierce the mysterious 
veil, however, and distinguish ‘the beauty or deformity of passions and affections; as their own 
passions would be more immediately exposed to the view of this faculty, it would judge with 
more accuracy concerning them, than concerning those of other men, of which it had only a 
more distant prospect’ (182). The underlying metaphor here is one of landscape aesthetics. 
The ‘distant prospect’ of other people’s morality should be viewed as a composite and wild 
landscape, but not something one can entirely master, unlike Hogarth’s hollow object. 
Accuracy here relies on close-ups both visual and tactile, and mastery. Concentrating too much 
on the bigger picture means we lose sight of what happens beneath our noses. ‘This self-
deceit,’ says Smith, ‘this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of 
human life. If we saw ourselves in the light in which others see us, or in which they would see 
us if they knew all, a reformation would generally be unavoidable. We could not otherwise 
endure the sight’ (182). The sombre note struck here is due in part to the fear inherent in self-
deception. Smith adds fuel to the fire by insinuating that the average indifferent spectator may 
not, in fact, view our conduct particularly indifferently after all. The shame of this realisation, 
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he emphasises, would have such force as to bring about a ‘reformation’ in ourselves almost 
involuntarily. Otherwise we could not ‘endure the sight’, a powerful phrase bringing our 
attention back to the maddeningly visual potentialities of shame: the body out of control, the 
wagging tongue, the jealous, hateful or filthy mind, the blushing flesh.  
The blush is usually manifest in the face, the site of communication between self and 
others. It is confirmation of shame as one of the most actively corporeal of affects, and as one 
of the hardest to control. Try as we might, shame evades control and our bodies have 
developed ways to betray us into unwanted displays of vulnerability. Smith acknowledges this 
in the last line of the quotation above: ‘we cannot help feeling with what confusion we 
ourselves should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner’. Smith interestingly 
substitutes ‘confusion’ here for the more logical ‘shame’, and in doing so merges shame with 
surprise – an affect closely allied to confusion and one we have already identified via Lacan as 
being an initiator for others.  Furthermore, Smith’s choice of the adjective ‘covered’ to 
describe his shame/confusion is interesting both in its corporeal and verbal connotations. The 
root word for shame translates as ‘to cover’ and evokes the ways in which one can both hide in 
and be marked out by shame. Shame and clothing are inextricably linked, as we saw in the 
chapter on foppery. Surprise and confusion at the behaviour of others can lead to the 
experience of wearing vicarious shame on the skin, something that Smith suggests is painful 
but necessary.  
There is companionship in such visible affect, as Smith comments: ‘Man…conscious of 
his own weakness, and of the need which he has for the assistance of others, rejoices 
whenever he observes that they adopt his own passions, because he is then assured of that 
assistance’ (2009: 18-19). Even visible shame, when contracted through the shamelessness of 
others, can provide mutuality in a social setting, whether it be the shamelessness of a friend or 
of a national leader. The necessity of this vicarious shame is summarised by Silvan Tomkins 
thus: 
The vicarious experience of shame, together with the vicarious experience of distress, 
is at once a measure of civilization and a condition of civilization. Shame enlarges the 
spectrum of objects outside of himself which can engage man and concern him. After 
having experienced shame through sudden empathy, the individual will never again be 
able to be entirely unconcerned with the other. But if empathy is a necessary 
condition for the development of personality and civilization alike, it is also a necessary 
condition for the experience of shame. If there is insufficient interest in the other, 
shame through empathy is improbable. How much shame can be felt at remediable 
conditions is one critical measure of the stage of development of any civilization. 
(Tomkins, 1995: 162)  
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Here, Tomkins’s voice chimes in almost perfectly with that of Smith. Smith’s opening remarks 
on sympathy seem to lean more towards what we might now describe as empathy, for 
example: ‘As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea 
of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in 
the like situation’ (2009: 13). We might now argue that while sympathy is the mirroring of 
emotion displayed externally, empathy is the internalisation of another’s emotion by 
reminding ourselves how we have felt in similar situations. This deliberate conjuring up of 
memory and affect allows the self to move closer to the other, and form a bond. It is this that 
both Tomkins and Smith suggest forms a civilised society. The potential for empathic 
connection, as Tomkins makes clear, is hard to break once made, and can be fairly readily 
transferred from one body and situation to another.  
Smith’s example, in its excruciating unwelcome-ness, is proof of the ways in which ‘the 
individual will never again be able to be entirely unconcerned with the other’. It is entirely 
possible, of course, for these communities of the shamed to inhibit the social project of 
politeness, dragging society into a vortex of shared shame which stalls productivity and 
encourages us to turn away from one another. The vulnerability of individuals to their own 
sense of wrongdoing must therefore be mitigated by a discursive project which decides what 
forms of wrongdoing are truly shameful and must be punished publicly, and which are not. 
Composite emotions such as remorse, which can occur for Smith in particular in response to 
those behaviours defined on a societal level as dangerous and shameful, will be discussed in 
depth below.  
Tomkins’s pairing of empathy with shame is a truly remarkable insight here, and one 
that sheds light on Smith’s text. ‘If there is insufficient interest in the other, shame through 
empathy is improbable’, Tomkins reminds us. Without interest, there can be no shame or 
empathy, only contempt. Contempt, as I discussed in the last chapter, is only possible when 
the disconnection between subject and object is extreme enough to both render the object 
barely human in the eyes of the subject, and when the distance between subject and object is 
considered stable enough for the latter to pose no threat to the former. Shame and empathy, 
on the other hand, ensure that distances between subject and object are infinitely malleable, 
can be lengthened and shortened unexpectedly; they maintain that contact between these 
two bodies is possible in surprising ways. Contempt cannot lead to a civilisation developed 
enough to function for the full benefit of its members if contempt and self-regard are the 
primary motivations in interactions between citizens. Instead, Smith asserts later in The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments:  
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…hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our 
selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human 
nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and 
passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety. (31) 
It is this that Smith believes is the ultimate goal of communion with the impartial spectator. 
The man within helps us to understand that, far from rewarding selfishness, society ultimately 
operates most efficiently when our actions improve the lot of the many, rather than the few.  
The impartial spectator in action: shame and remorse 
Propriety, of both thought and behaviour, is a key concern of Smith’s and relates to 
both empathy and shame. In a chapter entitled ‘Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the 
consciousness of Merit’, in a section on reward and punishment, Smith asserts that ‘though it 
may be true…that every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all mankind, 
he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts according to this principle’ (100). 
The conflict between internal and external is palpable here. Smith accepts that self-regard is 
only natural, that ‘every man is…by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; 
and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and right that it 
should be so’ (100). No matter how fit and right it may be, however, this knowledge must be 
kept internally, like a secret. We must instead cultivate an illusion of ignorance towards the 
existence of this knowledge, in order for society (and ultimately, of course, our individual 
selves) to benefit. By acknowledging one’s selfishness openly, one exposes not only the illusion 
but also oneself as lacking in empathy and shame. For it is shame that keeps the illusion going; 
as Smith notes, the individual ‘dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts 
according to this principle’. 
 Acknowledgment of the knowledge of self-interest is an exposure, a laying bare of 
oneself as materialistic, manipulative and all too human. It is a result of disconnection from the 
man within, as Smith comments in a later section: ‘The propriety of our moral sentiments is 
never so apt to be corrupted, as when the indulgent and partial spectator is at hand, while the 
indifferent and impartial one is at a great distance’ (178). The internal and external in Smith’s 
assertion are figured by different parts of the body – the internal by the breast, the external by 
the face of mankind which the individual man ‘dare not’ speak to. This is a love that dare not 
speak its name par excellence, one could say. And why ‘dare not’? What is daring defined by? 
Daring to do something may be defined by the quality of courage; here, for Smith, it is instead 
defined by a shameless preference of the self above others. The act of daring here is 
addressing the face, the part of the body that most clearly places itself in the view of society. 
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Avowing one’s self-regard is to turn face-to-face, to look one’s interlocutor in the eye, and 
read the effect of one’s confession fed back to one in the muscles of the face and the quality of 
the gaze. Daring here is not the admirable quality found in the phrase, ‘a daring enterprise’ or 
the remark, ‘That was very daring of you!’ Instead, it is the kind of misplaced daring protested 
against in the phrase ‘how dare you!’, which could quite easily be replaced or followed by the 
rhetorical question, ‘have you no shame?’ or the exclamation ‘shame on you!’ Daring in this 
sense is a deliberate contravention of social rules, of placing one’s own satisfaction before that 
of the greater good.  
Contravention can and should result in remorse, an emotion Smith explicitly links with 
shame: 
The violator of the more sacred laws of justice can never reflect on the sentiments 
which mankind must entertain with regard to him, without feeling all the agonies of 
shame, and horror, and consternation. When his passion is gratified, and he begins 
coolly to reflect on his past conduct, he can enter into none of the motives which 
influenced it. They appear now as detestable to him as they always did to other 
people. (102) 
Remorse, for Smith a compound of affective elements, is felt bodily (‘agonies of shame’). This 
agony presumably follows a period of frenzied, almost orgiastic self-gratification. The leisurely 
period of repentance is imagined in gruesomely minute detail by Smith in the remainder of this 
long paragraph:  
By sympathizing with the hatred and abhorrence which other men must entertain for 
him, he becomes in some measure the object of his own hatred and abhorrence. The 
situation of the person who suffered by his injustice, now calls upon his pity. He is 
grieved at the thought of it; regrets the unhappy effects of his own conduct, and feels 
at the same time that they have rendered him the proper object of the resentment 
and indignation of mankind, and of what is the natural consequence of resentment, 
vengeance and punishment. (102) 
This repentance allows for a form of self-surveillance whereby the self falls under the harsh 
glare of mankind as imagined by the shamed man himself. He becomes ‘the object of his own 
hatred and abhorrence’, views himself as if from outside, and with eyes borrowed from other 
men.  
The shame he thus feels turns him into an object removed from himself but still too 
much himself to be jettisoned. He feels a sense of disgust with himself. Negative affect that 
cannot be jettisoned can only poison the subject. The remorseful, shame-ridden man Smith 
describes in such detail feels himself to be ‘the proper object of the resentment and 
indignation of mankind’, and ultimately ‘vengeance and punishment’. The man who dares to 
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contravene the most sacred laws must ultimately offer himself as a form of sacrificial 
scapegoat:  
The thought of this perpetually haunts him, and fills him with terror and amazement. 
He dares no longer look society in the face, but imagines himself as it were rejected, 
and thrown out from the affections of all mankind…Every thing seems hostile, and he 
would be glad to fly to some inhospitable desert, where he might never more behold 
the face of a human creature, nor read in the countenance of mankind the 
condemnation of his crimes.  (102) 
Again, the face is offered as a synecdoche for society, here because it begins to mirror the 
shame he feels. Ultimately, there is no escape in solitude or society from the feelings of 
wrongdoing, and he devolves into a pariah, whose ‘own thoughts can present him with 
nothing but what is black, unfortunate and disastrous’ (102). He is ‘drive[n]… back into 
society…astonished to appear before [mankind], loaded with shame and distracted with fear, 
in order to supplicate some little protection from the countenance of those judges, who he 
knows have already all unanimously condemned him’ (102-3). Smith sums up by defining 
remorse ‘of all the sentiments which can enter the human breast the most dreadful. It is made 
up of shame from the sense of the impropriety of past conduct; of grief for the effects of it; of 
pity for those who suffer by it; and of the dread and terror of punishment from the 
consciousness of the justly-provoked resentment of all rational creatures’ (103). Here, Smith 
links shame back to his comments on propriety earlier on.  
This is a particularly dark section of Smith’s book, which otherwise takes an optimistic, 
even romantic, view of the human condition. Here, however, shame, impropriety and 
resentment crowd the pages and we are treated to a highly descriptive, proto-Gothic example 
of the man who dares to behave shamelessly in the face of society. It is, in fact, one of the rare 
moments of high drama in an otherwise resolutely stoical text. In this section, we see how 
transgression, as I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, returns the socialised self to 
feelings of shame. The return of the criminal to society as described by Smith, in order to face 
the music as it were, mirrors the return to the self, because shame always draws the outside 
in. For David Marshall (1986), this drama seems to come from the dilemma that the example 
poses to Smith’s theory: ‘Smith can enter into his feelings and vividly imagine and represent his 
point of view. It is not that Smith feels any sympathy with the man’s crime; it is the man’s 
predicament after the murder that moves Smith’s fellow-feeling’ (182). Sympathy makes one 
take the part of the outcasts of humanity; in itself, this provides the spectator with a moment 
in which he must grapple with the shame of ‘entering into’, in the Hogarthian sense, the shell 
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of a man whose touch would send shivers down one’s spine. Ultimately, no one is entirely free 
from the shame of the transgressor.  
Smith’s message seems clear – shame helps society remain coherent and beneficial for 
its citizens; for those that seek to destroy the balance, shame will teach them a lesson. This 
duality of shame, which could be reductively described as ‘good shame’ and ‘bad shame’ in the 
same vein as the term ‘good cop, bad cop’, is also a matter of external and internal. Internal 
shame, in Smith’s philosophy at least, is shame that has been learned and rationalised by a 
subject. It is the kind of self-awareness and interest in others that Smith advocates throughout 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments. External shame, on the other hand, is the shame one must be 
taught as a consequence of behaviour witnessed and condemned by others; this shame has 
not yet been processed by the subject and cannot be put to use with the same finesse as 
internal shame. External shame is the lesson one must learn the hard way. The ideal outcome 
of this is that one’s internal shame becomes further refined, that the man within the breast 
grows more vigilant against selfishness, and more desirous to help and support others. The 
man within the breast is the apotheosis of internal shame.  
This is all meaningless unless the identification with the impartial spectator leads to 
virtuous action, however. Smith states that: ‘Man was made for action, and to promote by the 
exertion of his faculties such changes in the external circumstances both of himself and others, 
as may seem most favourable to the happiness of all’. He goes on to say, ‘He must not be 
satisfied with indolent benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of mankind, because in his 
heart he wishes well to the prosperity of the world’ (127). Smith makes the distinction 
between internal and external – although to truly understand someone, one must be capable 
of entering into the breast of that person, this is not enough. Ultimately, one must behave in a 
way that is mindful of virtue but is also productive and useful to society. Here, Smith stands in 
contrast to Addison and Steele’s Mr. Spectator, whose immunity from shame seems to come 
from his inactivity. Mr. Spectator’s ghostly, abstracted presence ensures that he never 
participates enough in the world to be dirtied by it. Similarly, the fop, although more corporeal 
than Mr. Spectator, offers equally as little because his presence is merely decorative at best, or 
offensive at worst. Smith advocates action which is mindful of affect as the ideal state:  
The man who has performed no single action of importance, but whose whole 
conversation and deportment express the justest, the noblest, and most generous 
sentiments, can be entitled to demand no very high reward, even though his inutility 
should be owing to nothing but the want of an opportunity to serve. We can still 
refuse it him without blame. We can still ask him, What have you done? What actual 
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service can you produce, to entitle you to so great a recompense? We esteem you, and 
love you; but we owe you nothing. (127)  
Smith reiterates the virtues of productivity and utility often promoted as part of his 
philosophy, but it would be short-sighted to ignore the acknowledgment of affect here. Smith 
recognises the propensity of humanity to be attracted to men of wit and perception, and does 
not dismiss it. He feels compelled to assert that we can question the standing of these men 
‘without blame’. Unlike many of the anti-fop writers, for instance, he does not regard the man 
of wit with outright suspicion. However, he does remind us that ultimately, virtue is in action, 
not thought, and in a commercial society, actions are measured in productivity and innovation. 
As E. J. Hundert observes, ‘The primary object of his theory of morals is to show how self-
interest, mitigated by sympathy and self-command, can result in prudent and sometimes 
beneficent actions, even…in the inescapably utility-maximizing exchange relationships of 
contemporary commercial societies’ (Hundert, 1994: 225).  
 Smith’s philosophy, then, is at all times informed by affect, and the complex 
interpersonal systems that affect initiates. What of the internal, however? How does shame 
work within Smith’s conception of the personal? A helpful section in the middle of The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments is part three, entitled, ‘Of the foundation of our judgments concerning 
our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty’. Smith suggests that one can only 
achieve the ideal of moral rectitude if one is able to extract one’s internal self from one’s 
external self, take on the perspective of an unnamed impartial other, and then reinsert oneself 
back into the hollowed-out shell that is the external self.  ‘Whatever judgment we can form 
concerning [our sentiments and motives], accordingly, must always bear some secret 
reference, either to what are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we 
imagine, ought to be the judgment of others’ (Smith, 2009: 133). Smith’s circuitous sentence, 
reflecting as it does the complexity of the process it describes, also highlights the uncertainty 
of relations between bodies and their affects. The use of qualifiers such as ‘would be’ or ‘ought 
to be’ highlights Smith’s recognition that being self-aware is a gymnastic feat which hinges on 
hypotheses and leaps of faith made with regards to the universal nature of individual 
experiences of reality. However, Smith asserts the necessity of other people to the making of 
the self:  
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary 
place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his 
own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the 
beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. 
(133-4) 
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It is society, then, according to Smith, which gives us our understandings of ourselves. In order 
to reach what Smith sees as the ideal moral state – that of the self-regulating citizen – we must 
integrate the public into the private. ‘Bring him into society’, Smith says of his feral man, ‘and 
he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before’ (134). Like Hogarth’s 
shell, which has been ‘scoop’d out so nicely’, we find that we must empty ourselves of our own 
motivations and affective imperatives, and climb back inside as a different person, as the 
impartial spectator. This is, as I have already argued, internalised shame. Our relationship to 
ourselves is a relationship whose terms have been defined by shame. Smith is keenly aware of 
the social nature of the formation of the individual subject; The Theory of Moral Sentiments is 
framed around this understanding. The use of affect theory as a critical tool with which to 
engage with Smith’s text allows us to see that shame, in its many shifting manifestations, is the 
mechanism that both creates the environment in which this process can occur, and remains 
the crucial motivator for maintaining the socially-turned self.  
 
Smith’s impartial spectator – the man who can 
 Finally, a note on how Smith’s concept of the impartial spectator relates to 
contemporary masculinity. Much of Smith’s text generalises about humanity, and the 
observations and recommendations to be found within it can mostly be applied to both men 
and women. This remains the case for a casual reading, or one which concerns itself more with 
the purely philosophical in its broadest sense. My task is, however, to be more alert to the 
gender dynamics in play, and with that in mind, The Theory of Moral Sentiments reads, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, as predominantly addressed to male readers. David Marshall (1986) 
defines the impartial spectator as male, an assumption he does not interrogate (167). He goes 
on later, however, to interrogate the problems of sympathy in terms of gender:  
The moral of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is that one should not display one’s 
sentiments unless one is sure of eliciting sympathy; indeed, it would be best not to 
display oneself at all, given the small likelihood of attaining fellow-feeling. This ethic of 
self-command (one might say self-concealment) helps explain the almost total absence 
of women from the world of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. One might expect Smith 
to have more to say about women in a treatise on moral sentiments written in an age 
that closely associated both sympathy and sentiment with “feminine” sensibilities. 
However, it is precisely these qualities that appear to exclude women from the book. 
(184) 
Marshall’s reading highlights both the homosociality of the text and its preoccupation with the 
preservation of ‘masculine’ virtues such as stoicism and resolve. Pertaining to those values is 
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the practice of hiding in plain sight, the very trick performed by Mr. Spectator. While Smith’s 
universalised theory of moral and social development is based around a recognition of affect, 
it is still unable to move beyond the shame of the particular that haunts Addison and Steele, 
and the literary construction of politeness in general. It is only, I would contend, with the 
development of literary sentimentalism that we see that partially destabilised. Marshall 
suggests that in some ways, Smith in fact furthers the process of depersonalising the masculine 
beyond even politeness’s earliest proponents: ‘Unlike Shaftesbury, Smith rarely uses the first-
person singular: his almost constant use of the first-person plural both screens himself and 
practically assumes that the reader shares his sentiments and point of view’ (188-9). Marshall 
invokes both language and spectatorship here to clarify the ways in which Smith obscures the 
male individual; for the purposes of this discussion, ‘point of view’ should remind us of 
Hogarth’s project to make the spectator ‘master of the meaning’ of any given object. 
Assumption of accordance with one’s view point is, of course, mastery in action.  
The effectiveness of Smith’s message is that it appeals in part to concerns around 
masculine productivity, and the man of action. In a sense, Smith’s project moves to reassure 
men concerned about their masculine integrity, by placing an emphasis on feeling that avoids 
effeminacy because it is always the prelude to polite action. As explored in previous chapters, 
as commercial society developed and became ever more polite, fears of effeminacy became 
more widespread. Traditionally active occupations such as hunting and fighting were 
simultaneously becoming more specialised and professionalised, but even here fears of 
effeminacy in the army, for example, were much discussed10. Smith acknowledges these fears 
when he says: ‘the coxcomb…is rewarded with a double share of contempt for his folly and 
presumption. Why should the man, whom nobody thinks it worth while to look at, be very 
anxious about the manner in which he holds up his head, or disposes of his arms while he 
walks through a room?’ (Smith, 2009: 68). These references are few and far between, 
however, and Smith generally conceives of his reader as being one to whom integrity and 
propriety are important.  
By casting moral rectitude as an ongoing fight against temptation and the mores of a 
wayward society, Smith allowed men to feel less insecure about the loss of the warrior status 
previously potentially available to all men in a more feudal society. ‘Virtue is excellence,’ says 
Smith in part I of Moral Sentiments, ‘something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises 
                                                          
10 See, for example, Philip Carter’s discussion of contemporary concerns over effeminacy in the military 
in Men and the Emergence of Polite Society, Britain 1660-1800, Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001: 130-
1.  
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far above what is vulgar and ordinary’ (Smith, 2009: 32). The man who wins the fight against 
moral corruption is elevated to a class of his own; hierarchy reasserts itself not through birth 
but through accomplishment, and for Smith’s purposes, the ultimate accomplishment here is 
one of virtuous action. There is no question that Smith prizes action above internal rectitude. 
We see this in his constant reference to what we do as being worthy of judgement, not what 
we think. As explored above, the man who thinks in the right way but does not act at all 
cannot be said to be as worthy of respect as a man who acts in the world, who gets his hands 
dirty, and yet still manages to retain his close links to the man within. The private man, so 
notable in the personage of Mr. Spectator in Addison and Steele’s work, makes few 
appearances in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith’s text claims to be fully and entirely of 
the world, even while it often discusses the self.  
The importance of the man of action to Smith’s text is highlighted in several of the 
examples he gives to illustrate his points. It has been observed already how corporeal many of 
Smith’s analogies are. From the beggar whose putrefying flesh is the harbinger of contagious 
affective communion, we see how explicitly Smith links bodily suffering to affect (14). The male 
body undergoes repeated assaults in order that Smith can make his points about morality, 
from torture on the rack (13-14) to imprisonment (174) to the memorable instance where 
Smith compares affect in in a man who has cut his finger to a man whose leg has been blown 
off by a cannon. Here Smith observes that: ‘The man who has lost his leg by a cannon shot, and 
who, the moment after, speaks and acts with his usual coolness and tranquillity, as he exerts a 
much higher degree of self-command, so he naturally feels a much higher degree of self-
approbation’ (169). Smith admits that most men ‘could attend to nothing, but their own pain 
and their own fear’ (169), but the high standard has already been set.  
The decimated male body, which nonetheless is overridden by the clear mind and 
displays a lack of demonstrative affect, fulfils Smith’s point about the strong admiration we 
feel for stoicism in the face of extreme danger. However, it also satisfies a longing in the male 
reader to imagine themselves into the resilient body of the warrior, an experience largely 
untasted for many. All who read it would naturally like to see themselves as the man of 
constancy and firmness, able to bear even horrific injury with stoicism. Still, Smith observes 
that ‘in such paroxysms of distress…the wisest and firmest man, in order to preserve his 
equanimity, is obliged, I imagine, to make a considerable, and even a painful exertion’ (170). 
Here the control of affect is imagined as being almost as painful as the injury itself. Again, this 
heightens the sense of affect control as active, as being a fight which is equivalent to that 
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conducted on the battlefield. Smith himself presents us with a battlefield of the mind when he 
writes: 
His sense of honour, his regard to his own dignity, directs him to fix his attention upon 
the one view. His natural, his untaught and undisciplined feelings, are continually 
calling it off to the other. He does not, in this case, perfectly identify himself with the 
ideal man within the breast, he does not become himself the impartial spectator of his 
own conduct. The different views of both characters exist in his mind separate and 
distinct from one another, and each directing him to a behaviour different from that to 
which the other directs him. (170). 
The sense of the battlefield, of two opposing sides warring over the afflicted man, can only be 
resolved, of course, by the intervention and decision of the man himself. By choosing honour 
and dignity, Smith suggests that ‘he enjoys his own complete self-approbation, and the 
applause of every candid and impartial spectator’ (170).  
It is worth noting here, too, that Smith’s writing in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
originated in lectures given at the University of Glasgow where he worked teaching Moral 
Philosophy. It is likely that many of his students were in their mid-teens, which indicates the 
reason behind the scholastic tones of the resultant work. To some extent, what became Moral 
Sentiments started life as an explicit programme of education for future men of politeness. 
When Smith charts the progress of the individual’s moral and affective development from 
childhood onwards, he is tracking the lives of his students so far, as well as indicating paths 
they could potentially take as they grow older. The ‘man of real constancy and firmness’ 
discussed above is the ideal; he is the specimen of commercial masculinity Smith is attempting 
to steer his students towards. Implicit in this steering, however, are the limitations of such a 
project. Smith always keeps in mind that the relationship between the man without and the 
man within is a dialogue between two intimately connected figures; it is not one that can be 
determined entirely (or even principally) by outside forces, least of all in the artificial setting of 
the classroom. Instead, the world is the classroom and each budding man of politeness must 
be his own teacher. This is a pedagogical mantra that persists largely intact into the period of 
British imperial masculinity: to know oneself, one must act in the world. Being a man acting in 
the world brought with it challenges implicit, but not fully realised, in Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. The fiction and autobiographical writing of the eighteenth century imagined and 
described these difficulties vividly, however, and it is to these forms that I turn my attention in 
the second half of this thesis. 
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PART TWO 
Chapter Four 
The Man of Feeling: Shame, sentiment and futile masculinity 
 
The second half of the thesis is made up of three chapters on three very different 
writers and their works – Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771), Olaudah Equiano’s 
The Interesting Narrative (1789) and James Boswell’s London Journal (1762-3). Separated as 
they are by form, style and subject, and by the inherent differences of their authors, all three 
texts engage with the problem that faced would-be polite men in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century: how to live up to the ideal constructed by writers examined in Part One, 
among others. I argue that while the sentimental masculinity that Mackenzie’s novel depicts 
encounters moral uncertainties, which leads to a melancholy account of contemporary 
manhood, Equiano uses his status as outsider to both comment on and circumvent these same 
pitfalls. Mackenzie, with an investment in and access to the mores of politeness, writes a novel 
in which his hero struggles to negotiate the demands of the modern world, choosing ultimately 
to turn his back on it. Equiano, starting from a position of abjection, provides a startling 
counterpoint to Mackenzie – and many of the other writers encountered in this study – in 
demonstrating a confident takeover of polite masculine virtues, in doing so undermining the 
exclusivity of them. For Boswell, a Scot caught between his overbearing provincial father and 
the pleasures of the English metropolis, the puzzle to be solved is where he belongs. Conflicted 
about his Scottish identity, and his identity as a polite man, Boswell’s meditations are evidence 
of the intensely spectatorial and reflective experiences outlined theoretically by Smith and The 
Spectator.  
 
My focus in this chapter, however, is Henry Mackenzie’s 1771 bestseller, The Man of 
Feeling. In it, I argue that the imperatives of politeness and moral sentiment in a commercial 
society can create feelings of shame and melancholy when they are felt as intolerable 
pressures. This leads to a refusal of progress and an abandonment of the world, embodied in 
Harley. It can also put strain on the ability of literature to explain the social and moral 
implications of polite commercial society, as we see with The Man of Feeling. I examine how 
others relate to the novel: its readers, and its author, Henry Mackenzie himself. Both are 
ambivalent about the text, both drawn to its vision of an affect-driven form of masculinity and 
unnerved by the self-sabotage which is its natural consequence. My argument in this chapter, 
then, is that these hesitancies and uncertainties are expressive of the compromises and 
complexities of polite masculinity that I outlined in the first half of this thesis. But The Man of 
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Feeling itself is not just a humiliating and humiliated text, but one that explores shame in ways 
that enable more fragile forms of masculinity to be imagined, if not lived. This includes ways of 
being a man that question the ideal of mastery that we saw described in the previous chapters, 
via The Spectator, and The Theory of Moral Sentiments. It makes a space, perhaps unwittingly, 
for the man who fails to be successful in the terms laid out by early capitalism; it even valorizes 
those who turn away from the future in favour of the past and its imagined communities.  
 
 It is important to note here that, of the three remaining chapters, the text discussed in 
this one is most obviously mediated through its relationship to genre. Although I consider 
genre in the works of both Equiano and Boswell, it is Mackenzie whose work is most facilitated 
and undermined by its genre. Sentimental literature’s generic complexity has come under 
scrutiny from many critics. Its huge contemporary popularity has been helpfully elucidated by 
John Mullan (1988) and Markman Ellis (1996), and discussions of Mackenzie’s work appear in 
many critical accounts. Part of the fascination that sentimental literature provides for those 
who study it can be found in its resistance to clarification, as Markman Ellis observes: ‘The 
recognition that sensibility is both “a fashion” and “was fashionable”, testifies to its cultural 
centrality, but also establishes it as essentially unstable’ (35). This instability is a result of 
sentiment’s uncanny mixture of ‘indefinable’ feeling and often formulaic deployment of 
generic features. It is also due to the intense pressure placed upon the sentimental mode to 
define and explain social relations. This ambiguity surrounding what feeling actually 
constitutes extends to those contemporaries who advocated the benefits of sentimentality, as 
Ellis outlines: ‘In the words of contemporaries, the sentimental is consistently defined 
negatively as the space between more extreme constructions, as a variety of weak thought 
that will not bear analysis, that escapes or evades discussion, that is not to be analysed by 
reason or rational debate’ (7).  
 
As we will see with Boswell, and here with the figure of Harley, there is a lack of 
worldliness, or even an otherworldliness, about the sentimental which gives it a weak power 
due to the very fact that it does not need to be defined or rationalized in terms accountable to 
reason. As John Mullan accurately observes: ‘”Reason” becomes wholly commanding of only 
limited and specialized projects such as those of mathematics; a description of a social and 
moral world must be a description of the movements of passions’ (24). In Mackenzie in 
particular, Mullan finds that the world is ‘impervious’, ‘the cause of every misery’ and 
‘imagined as non-society’ (122). I will explore how this notion in The Man of Feeling is redolent 
of shame and a sort of queer ‘backwardness’ later in this chapter, but for now it is worth 
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noting the ways in which sentiment seeks to describe the social world whilst refusing to be 
entirely of it. In figures like Harley, sentimental virtue is ‘utterly stylized, specialized beyond 
the possibility of application’ (Mullan 120).  
 
Modern critics usually position Mackenzie’s first novel as a prime example of the 
sentimental literature that became popular in the latter half of the eighteenth century. There 
has been some discussion over whether or not The Man of Feeling should be read as 
uncritically sentimental. Earlier critics such as Brian Vickers and R.F. Brissenden seem to, but in 
Barbara Benedict’s view, this is not necessarily the case (1994 232-3). The debate over how to 
read the novel of sentiment is ongoing. Undoubtedly, The Man of Feeling in particular is a text 
that is baffling. A modern reader might be baffled by its structural instability, by its set-piece 
narrative, and most often by its highly ‘performed’ emotion. Even with the twenty-first century 
reader’s supposedly sophisticated understanding of gender ‘fluidity’ and emotional expression, 
we can still find Harley and his narrative both frustrating and embarrassing. It could even be 
said that for us, both man and manuscript are shameful. As Ildiko Csengei (2012) reminds us, 
although the novel is much-studied by academics interested in sentiment, it is not widely read 
by the general reader (139). Laid before us, over and over, is a series of spectacles of 
sentiment. We are invited to gaze upon it; indeed we are compelled to do so by the text’s 
erasure of almost any other narrative events, and in doing so we become entangled with it. As 
we saw numerous times in the opening chapters, gazing upon the actions and emotions of 
others is a risky strategy. Far from placing the subject in the position of master, the gaze more 
often implicates the subject in whatever deed he gazes upon.  
 
Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, a text published twelve years prior to 
Mackenzie’s novel, demonstrates the capacity of the gaze to create communities of affect. 
These communities are often organized spectatorially, whether directly, as Smith 
demonstrates, or via the gazes found in texts, as my discussion of Maureen Harkin’s work on 
sentimental fiction indicates below. Smith, in various examples, places suffering bodies (often 
implicitly or explicitly male) in positions that allow us to see this suffering clearly. Beggars with 
sores, a ‘brother on the rack’, a friend afflicted by grief; all these suffering bodies reveal 
themselves to our gaze, and invite us to ‘enter into’, in Smith’s words, their predicaments 
(2009 13-14, 169). Smith suggests that polite society is predicated on near-stoical control of 
one’s emotions, but also the ability to have ‘sympathy’ with the feelings of others. Eve 
Sedgwick (2003), writing 250 years later, implies something similar when she gives the 
example of ‘an unwashed and half-insane man’ wandering into a lecture theatre – we (the 
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audience) feel embarrassment at his disruption of a formal situation, and we contract his own 
shame through looking at him (37). But even if we turn away our gaze, we are still spectators; 
we are unable to look away entirely. For Sedgwick, this identification is almost inevitable; we 
are ‘unable to stanch the hemorrhage of painful identification’ we feel with the suffering we 
witness, even when that suffering humiliates all present. The important point to note here is 
that even when sympathy involves taking on bad or painful feelings, we still feel compelled to 
relate. The gaze ensnares us in communities of affect. Smith’s example of the beggar covered 
in sores, and the spectator’s uncontrollable urge to ‘enter into’ his suffering, is yet another 
demonstration of this phenomenon. No wonder, then, that the reader of The Man of Feeling 
may react to Harley’s futile displays of emotion with embarrassment.  
 
 Mackenzie’s novel participates in the discourse of moral sentiment. Here, Harley 
enacts Smith’s imagined journeys through metropolitan streets, the dark recesses of Bedlam, 
and the dank garrets of fallen women, to experience and respond to all the shades of human 
suffering. In doing so, he gazes upon various bodies in crisis, and in response, his own body 
mirrors their suffering, usually through weeping. The notorious ‘index to tears’, which first 
appeared in the 1886 edition of the novel, highlights the frequency with which tears (usually 
Harley’s) are shed. The eyes that gaze are also the eyes that weep. Harley has no choice but to 
weep – his tears seem reflexive, indicating a high level of Smithian sympathy with the plight of 
others. Let us not forget, however, that Harley is not the only spectator in The Man of Feeling. 
The very title of the text, which names him under a sobriquet, indicates that Harley is the 
subject of intense spectatorial consideration. As true as this is with any novel featuring a 
prominent protagonist, in Mackenzie’s novel more than just the reader and his author gaze 
upon Harley. His tale reaches us through a manuscript written by a friend (‘The Ghost’), whose 
description of Harley’s exploits is told in close-up. The manuscript itself is nearly destroyed, 
only to be saved by an unnamed reader, who in reading Harley’s story gazes not just at the 
paper but also at Harley himself. Finally, this fictional reader allows us, as ‘real life’ readers to 
gaze at Harley through him. Harley is an object framed and mediated by a series of framing 
structures which present him as an object to gaze upon.  
 
Ildiko Csengei makes much of the importance of The Man of Feeling to sentimental 
reading practices at the time of, and after, its publication. ‘The novel demonstrates a belief in 
the ability of sentimental fiction intensively to form and reform the reading public; self-
consciously acting out how such an education in feeling is brought about’ (123), she argues. 
Csengei advocates for a reading of Mackenzie’s novel that envisions it as ideology-forming 
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(123); it helps to form ideas of morality through an individual’s emotional responses to a 
fictional text. Csengei’s contention is that, despite appearances, the text is less concerned with 
Harley than it is with bringing about ‘a shift in focus, turning both narrator and reader into 
men of feeling’ (123). Harley’s mind, in fact, serves as a mirror, which ‘turns us into a better 
person when we look into it’. She goes on to write: ‘Thus, the mirror of society is formative of 
the affective, moral self that it simultaneously inhabits’ (128). If the mirror helps us to 
(literally) reflect on ourselves, however, then this can just as logically lead to bad feeling 
(anxiety, paranoia, jealousy, guilt, shame) as it can the more socially productive improvement 
in morals. How much of this bad feeling can be put to use in the production of a morally ‘good’ 
self, and how much remains unincorporated? Is the man of feeling (whether Harley, his 
readers, or the phantasmatic idealized figure created by the interaction between reader and 
text) a product of socially-sanctioned morality, simultaneously strengthening this same 
morality in a feedback loop enabled by sentimental literary conventions? Or is the man of 
feeling something far less socially useful – is he, in fact, a vortex of bad feeling pulling both 
narrative and social cohesion apart; a kind of shadow figure to the accepted, Addisonian 
formation of the masculine social subject? 
 
I want to pause here, as many points have now been made that may seem disparate; I 
want to draw them together. I have discussed, in previous chapters, the theorization of polite 
masculinity in writers such as Addison and Smith as a balanced mixture of stoicism and 
sensitivity, outward-facing and sociable, whilst simultaneously erasing particularity of selfhood 
and privileging the universal. The man of politeness is also the man of commerce; he is self-
engineered for the expanding world of capital of the eighteenth century. In this chapter I have 
so far described the ways in which the sentimental novel presents a world that is in some ways 
opposed to this: a world of shifting feeling that resists identification, a world of bodies that 
(unlike Hogarth’s object or Smith’s agent) refuse to open themselves to scrutiny, in which 
moral lessons taught through affective experience refuse to end with the sanctioned moral 
and so spill over. ‘Weak power’ is a useful concept which can describe the ways in which 
sentiment operates in defiance of pure reason. The rise of sentiment, which is difficult to 
pinpoint, but undoubtedly gained in popularity with Richardson’s novels, demonstrates the 
power such weakness had. I want to be more specific, however, in order to identify exactly 
what I believe to be going on in a text like The Man of Feeling.  
 
When presenting on this novel at a conference on shame at the University of Warwick 
in 2014, I was asked a question afterwards by the poet Denise Riley, who was in the audience. 
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In the course of asking her question, she used the term ‘weak sexualisation’ to account for 
what she had understood of my arguments about Harley. The term has haunted me ever since 
(as has my inability to give her an answer that sounded as good as the question – much to my 
own shame). What this chapter is an account of, then, is weak sexualisation: a style of 
masculinity embodied by Harley that turns away from the positivist narrative of polite 
masculinity towards something less readable by the terms of success as envisioned by a writer 
like Addison. This ‘turn’ is one that favours the past rather than the future; that allows the 
masculine body to fall apart and fragment; that attempts to be productive and fails. Harley’s 
masculinity is a form of weak sexualisation because while it fails to achieve what it sets out to 
do (that is, make a fortune and cross over from the reliquary of aristocracy into the new world 
of commercial masculinity), it opens up instead a space for futility as a sentimental marker of 
selfhood. As the critic James Lilley (2007) has observed: ‘there is a constitutive queerness to 
this sensing self, a peculiarity that patterns all economies of sentimental desire’ (650). The 
peculiar, or the particular, aligns the man of feeling with the feminine, that which is 
unbearably full of meaning, and swerves away from the Addisonian man of politeness, as 
exemplified by Mr. Spectator, an eidolon evacuated of meaning in order to represent the 
universal. Men like Harley suffer and die, then, because they are too good for this world. An 
exemplar of sentimental virtue he may be, but he is also a threat to the ‘useful’ forms of affect 
advocated by the likes of Addison, because his feeling is ultimately self-disabling. 
 
The idea of a ‘turn away’ or a ‘swerve’ is key to my description of what Harley does 
and represents, evoking as it does a rejection of a gathering or established consensus that we 
always find in narratives of progress. I like these terms, ‘turn’ and ‘swerve’, because they both 
have queer origins, and as I began to hint with the Lilley quotation above, I find that there is 
something queer about Harley. My usage of ‘turn’ originates in the work of Heather Love, 
specifically in her book Feeling backward: loss and the politics of queer history (2007), an 
exploration of largely Modernist accounts of often explicitly queer desire or identity. What 
Love does here is to consider the ongoing importance of negative affect to queer history and 
experience. It is her focus on what it is to look backward or even to be backward, in the sense 
of being unwilling or unable to accept progress that I find enabling here. ‘For those marked as 
temporally backward, the stakes of being identified as modern or non-modern were extremely 
high’ (6) Love suggests. We see this in Harley most clearly in his discussion with Ben Silton, on 
his melancholy return journey to Scotland after he abandons his commercial endeavours in 
London. But we also see it in his sympathy with older men, shared by Mackenzie, exemplifying 
as they do a lost time that is sanctified by sadness and wisdom. We see it, too, in his refusal to 
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resolve the heterosexual marriage plot between himself and Miss Walton, voicing his desire 
only at the point of no return. It comes as no surprise to us that his lands are described as 
‘melancholy’ and having a ‘languid stillness’ (2009: 3), nor that his story, seemingly written by 
a man known as The Ghost, is disappearing, consumed as wadding by that most phallic of 
objects, the gun. Harley’s turn, then, is a turning away from a world that he is unable to find 
space in; a world that abuses and rejects him as much as he rejects it.  
 
‘Swerve’, and its specific application in this chapter, derives from Eve Sedgwick. In her 
essay ‘A Poem Is Being Written’ (1994) Sedgwick explores self-fashioning through a 
consideration of queerness and shame, and literary genre, in her case lyric and narrative 
poetry. She writes: 
 
How far can or will an already gendered and physically very localized desire swerve, 
how radically will it misrecognize itself, in its need to join a preexisting current of 
discourse through which to become manifest, to be fulfilled, manipulated or even 
frankly repressed – to become, in short, meaningful? The answer is: quite far indeed. 
Almost far enough. But not without cost; nor perhaps without leaving a trace of its 
own particular itinerary; nor without the potential for changing, for better and worse, 
however minimally along with its own direction that of the discourse it joins. (206) 
 
I find that The Man of Feeling, as a sentimental novel, encourages a swerve in those who read 
it, and in Mackenzie himself. By looking at the reception of the novel, through a reading of 
reviews and one private reader-response, and also by examining Mackenzie’s own swerve 
away from the novel toward the more securely universal (read: masculine) periodical form, I 
will draw out some of the concerns highlighted by Sedgwick here. The responses I discuss in 
this chapter are marked by anxieties about identity, especially gender identity, that hint at the 
shame of having deviated from a sanctified path of masculine progress. That is to say, The Man 
of Feeling acts as a formative but ultimately insupportable text as far as polite, commercial 
masculine identities are concerned.  
 
This is demonstrated by a response which first acknowledges its feminine allure (it is 
emotive, tear-jerking, giddy) whilst subsequently denigrating it for lacking in qualities which 
can be designated masculine (it is not instructive, it is not securely structured, it is imitative). 
Mackenzie’s Lounger essay on novel writing, written over a decade after he published The Man 
of Feeling, seems to reflect back on the genre of sentimental novels in order to assert the same 
conclusions. The reader responses I describe are drawn toward Harley, before swerving back 
to join the world of commerce he abandons. The difference I wish to point to between these 
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terms ‘turn’ and ‘swerve’, is their directionality. ‘Turn’, as Love suggests, is one-directional, a 
turn towards history, and a rejection of progress: it is essentially although not literally a death 
wish. ‘Swerve’, however, is less final. I use it to evoke a dalliance with the anti-polite, an 
experience one must return from in order to live, although not, as Eve Sedgwick’s words 
suggest, without bringing something marked with you.  
 
Why is this deviation from commercial polite masculinity so dangerous? As cultural 
historians such as Matthew McCormack (2005) have pointed out, the ability of a man to ‘make’ 
himself was crucial if he wished to evade the shame of being perceived as dependent: 
‘Independence connoted not just autonomy, but the condition in which self-mastery, 
conscience and individual responsibility could be exercised’ (2). While Harley clearly has a 
conscience, the active virtues of self-mastery and individual responsibility are harder to credit 
him with. Self-mastery, as the second half of this thesis will demonstrate, is easily theorized, 
but much harder to put into practice. We are reminded, perhaps, of the exhortations of 
William Hogarth (1753) to be ‘masters of the meaning of every view of the object’ (32). This 
mastery is here referenced in the context of art, but readily applicable to, and symptomatic of, 
the binary gender discourses growing in popularity in the period.11 A culture which enabled the 
permeation of such coded references to gender expectations was on a collision course with 
the lived realities of individual lives. This includes the futile masculinity that Harley represents. 
As moving as it was, there were (and had to be, in the terms of polite masculinity) limits to the 
acceptability of the man of feeling. Even Adam Smith, who might otherwise approve of 
Harley’s observations of and attempts to enter into the problems of others, would criticize his 
inability to look after his own affairs. It is Smith (2009), after all, who insists that despite our 
duty to always think of how ‘we naturally appear to others’, it is nonetheless true that every 
man ‘is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and right that it should be 
so’ (100). In short, is Harley’s masculinity shameful because it swerves away from the path of 
politeness? 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 See Michele Cohen’s Fashioning Masculinity: National Identity and Language in the Eighteenth 
Century London & New York: Routledge, 1996, especially pages 1-9, and also Michele Cohen and Tim 
Hitchcock, eds. English Masculinities 1660-1800, London & New York: Longman, 1999, especially the 
Introduction pages 1-22. Also of general help is Michael McKeon’s essay ‘Historicizing Patriarchy: The 
Emergence of Gender Difference in England, 1660-1760’ in Eighteenth-Century Studies, 28:3 Spring 
1995, pages 295-322. 
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The swerve: Harley’s readers 
 
 The novel was an instant success, and was read avidly by both men and women. It 
became fashionable to have a particular emotional response to the text, as demonstrated by 
Lady Louisa Stuart, who later recalled in a letter to Walter Scott that: “I remember so well its 
first publication, my mother and sisters crying over it, dwelling upon it with rapture! And when 
I read it, as I was a girl of fourteen not yet versed in sentiment, I had a secret dread I should 
not cry enough to gain the credit of proper sensibility” (quoted in Maureen Harkin: 319). The 
example given here is an entirely female one, but I intend to examine the response to the text 
from a male perspective, that of the poet Robert Burns. Burns’s identification with The Man of 
Feeling swerves from almost total to something more cautious, and the swerve indicates a 
desire to correct both the text and himself in order to conform to a more politely appropriate 
ideal. In his letters, he refers several times to the text, as well as writing directly to Mackenzie.  
 
 In January 1783, Burns wrote to John Murdoch, his former schoolmaster, about his 
own character: 
…as a man of the world, I am most miserably deficient. – One would have thought 
that, bred as I have been under a father who has figured pretty well as un homme des 
affaires, I might have been, what the world calls, a pushing, active fellow; but to tell 
you the truth, Sir, there is hardly anything more the reverse. – I seem to be one sent 
into the world, to see and observe; and I very easily compound with the knave who 
tricks me of my money, if there be any thing original about him which shews me 
human nature in a different light from any thing I have seen before. (vol. 1, 1985: 16-
17) 
 
Burns paints himself here as a Harley figure, unable to concentrate on matters of business and 
committed instead to the observation of and interaction with others, even to the point of 
being duped by them. The reference to the ‘knave’ who tricks him of his money seems to be a 
direct reference to the episodes in The Man of Feeling where this very fate befalls Harley. This 
connection becomes more explicit when Burns states in the same letter: 
My favourite authors are of the sentim [sic] kind, such as Shenstone, particularly his 
Elegies, Thomson, Man of Feeling, a book I prize next to the Bible, Man of the World, 
Sterne, especially his Sentimental Journey, Macpherson’s Ossian &c. these are the 
glorious models after which I endeavour to form my conduct. (17) 
 
The list gives a good idea of Burns’s taste at this point in his life; he is twenty-three years old 
here, and clearly considers himself to need shaping as a man in the world. His choices are all of 
the sentimental kind; elegies, sentimental novels and a faux-ancient nationalist text all hint at 
a sensitivity Burns seems to want to celebrate, but also feels he must qualify, especially when 
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expressing himself under the gaze of another, older and, from Burns’s perspective, more 
‘formed’ man. The sequel to The Man of Feeling, 1773’s The Man of the World, also makes the 
list, indicating a fondness for Mackenzie’s writing beyond the initial bestseller. The 
qualification of his attachment to the sentimental comes a few lines later: 
 
I forget that I am a poor, insignifant [sic] devil, unoticed [sic] and unknown, stalking up 
and down fairs and markets when I happen to be in them, reading a page or two of 
mankind…whilst the men of business jostle me on every side, as an idle encumbrance 
in the way. (18) 
 
Here Burns differentiates between himself and the men around him, a silent body crowded by 
busy ones. These men are productive, they are ‘men of business’, and by implication seem to 
have found their place in the world. They are undifferentiated, indistinguishable from one 
another, while Burns, for all his self-describing as insignificant, is the one separated from the 
herd and able to ‘read’ them. We find in Burns’s self-assessment the same paradox offered by 
Harley himself; he is both precious and useless at the same time. There is just enough of a 
sense of the latter here, I think, to suggest an anxious feeling of disconnect from the world 
Burns feels he should be a part of; his references to his father and the men at the markets and 
fairs as men of business, as well as his frank admission to being readily cheated, attest to this.  
 
 Burns’s admiration for Mackenzie is exemplified in a letter written to the author 
himself in May of 1787, in which he enthuses that: ‘whatever is good about my heart is much 
indebted to Mr. Harley’ (111). This is then followed by an anecdote about how Burns convinces 
a philandering friend of his to be loyal to a woman he has impregnated, by giving him a copy of 
The Man of the World to read. Mackenzie’s own note attached to the letter reads: 
‘Remarkable Anecdote to shew the good Effects of Moral Reading’ (emphasis original). Burns’s 
letter, and Mackenzie’s gratified note, demonstrate that both men are engaged in the idea of 
reading as a morally developmental activity. It highlights, however, Burns’s dependence on a 
literary creation in order to define himself – even if this assertion to Mackenzie is hyperbolic, it 
is still significant as an internalizing of an imagined other. Burns portrays Harley here as a 
version of Smith’s impartial spectator; the figurative man in the breast that one should 
endeavour not just to imitate but become. In situating Harley’s goodness in his heart, Burns 
suggests to Mackenzie that the process of identification is complete. The highly moral 
anecdote which follows is the proof of this.  
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 Ultimately, however, the man in the breast – or in this case, the man in the book – 
cannot function in lived experience. This is because both Smith’s and Mackenzie’s creations 
are imaginative, and live best in the imagination. While Smith’s work acknowledges this 
problem by admitting that the man in the breast is an ideal, it seems that Harley’s origin in a 
sentimental novel makes him attractive in an ultimately defeating way. Smith’s text is 
philosophical, one reads it with one’s academic head on, as it were. But The Man of Feeling is 
designed to speak straight to the heart; Mackenzie himself observes to his cousin in 1769, 
narrative ‘interest[s] both the Memory & the Affection deeper, than mere Argument, or moral 
Reasoning’ (1967:16). The dangers of this come to be acknowledged by Burns in 1790, in a 
letter to Mrs Dunlop in which he discusses The Man of Feeling: 
 
From what book, moral or even Pious, will the susceptible young mind receive 
impressions more congenial to Humanity and Kindness, Generosity and Benevolence, 
in short, all that ennobles the Soul to herself, or endears her to others, than from the 
simple affecting tale of poor Harley? Still, with all my admiration of Mckenzie’s [sic] 
writings, I do not know if they are the fittest reading for a young Man who is about to 
set out…to make his way into life…[T]here may be purity, a tenderness, a 
dignity…which are of no use, nay in some degree, [are] absolutely disqualifying, for the 
truly important business of making a man’s way into life’. (vol. 2: 25) 
 
Burns articulates the central – and it seems to me, specifically masculine – conundrum that 
Harley presents to the young male mind. Identifying with Harley, as we have already seen 
Burns emphatically did as a young man, awakens tender feelings, but these feelings are 
‘absolutely disqualifying’ for becoming a man of business, which Burns acknowledges to be 
‘truly important’. This weak sexualisation, which cannot prepare the young man for survival in 
the commercial society he is expected to succeed in, is even still a thing to be cherished, 
because it allows for humaneness and ‘ennobles the Soul to herself’. Burns genders the soul 
female here, in a sort of allegorical tradition, but what he refers to can be read as equivalent to 
what Smith terms the (masculine) impartial spectator.  
 
Fully internalizing the message of Mackenzie’s fiction, then, leads one to the ideal 
state where one can be fully integrated with the self; in the process this ‘endears one to 
others’. We can see here how the socially-constructed self of Theory of Moral Sentiments 
reappears in sentimental fiction, and in the imaginative identifications of the lived experience 
of men like Burns. Crucially, though, the full identification with Harley, were it really possible if 
one wished to survive in the world, would mean freedom from shame because one would act 
and think so correctly that one would have nothing to feel ashamed of. The reality is that this 
is impossible; it is quite literally unlivable, as Burns acknowledges here, and as Mackenzie’s 
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novel dramatizes. If ‘making one’s way into life’ has become the dominant narrative of men’s 
life trajectories, as Burns’s comment suggests it has, then not making one’s way into life can be 
a source of shame. No matter how much one might identify with Harley, actually behaving like 
him would make one a failure; his example is therefore unlivable. The threat of the shame of 
failure ensures that Harley must remain the man in the book, and that to survive, his admirers 
must swerve back into the rat-race.  
 
The reading above of Burns’s relationship to The Man of Feeling and Mackenzie’s other 
sentimental works raises the issue of readership and community. Maureen Harkin (1994) notes 
that it is common for the sentimental novel to be convicted of failing to create sustainable 
community, citing John Mullan’s critique of Mackenzie. Against this, she insists that this is a 
short-sighted way of understanding these works: 
 
In Mackenzie’s hands, the failure of shared sentiment to effect the production of 
community is not a product of some historical miscalculation, but a problem central to 
the enterprise of writing fiction. In its elaboration of the limits of sympathy to 
reinforce communality, and its testimony to sympathy’s tendency to produce an 
aesthetic pleasure rather than an ethical practice, Mackenzie’s novel furnishes a 
complex valediction to sentimental fiction and a coda to the discourse on the power of 
novelists to intervene in the social sphere. This self-consciousness of certain limits to 
the social usefulness of a sentimental sympathy is quite distinct from failure. (319) 
 
Harkin puts two critical terms in dialogue here, ‘failure’, and ‘self-consciousness’. Both imply 
the presence of shame; shame as an inevitable consequence of failure, but also shame as a 
necessary factor in forming a sense of self-awareness as I described in the chapter on Adam 
Smith. These are two different experiences of shame, of course. Shame after failure is shame 
after the fact, whereas shame as a part of self-consciousness is shame that helps the fact never 
become one. What Harkin is suggesting here is that Mackenzie’s writing has a sense of its own 
limits; it is acculturated enough to know what would lead to shame after the fact, and thus 
circumscribes its own ambition. This is borne out by a less earnest reading of The Man of 
Feeling; a reading in which one could be alert to the ironies of the text. For example, despite 
being known as the man of feeling, and primarily remembered for weeping profusely, there 
are times in the novel when one would expect Harley to cry but he seems unconcerned. His 
initial leave-taking before his journey to London is an example of this; the faithful old servant 
Peter is ‘choaked with the thought’ of London being a ‘sad place’, while Harley shakes him by 
the hand ‘smiling, as if he had said, “I will not weep”’ (15).  
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 Mackenzie’s relationship to the novel he created, and to reading and writing in 
general, is described in his letter to his cousin, Elizabeth Rose of Kilravock. The pair often 
corresponded about their reading (Rose kept a reading diary) and Mackenzie’s ideas about 
literature are presented in a letter from January 1771, three months before the publication of 
The Man of Feeling. In it, Mackenzie describes reading aloud a poem by the painter Allan 
Ramsay: 
 
It is what any one might have written; but the Idea is good enough, and the 
Versification polish’d into a laudable Smoothness. I have read it, only leaving out one 
or Two Lines rather outré, to several People, who said gravely, that it was very well, 
but that some of the Epithets were not quite so proper as they should be. (68-69) 
  
The passage highlights a fundamental seriousness at the heart of Mackenzie’s engagement 
with literature, and a finely-tuned sense of what does and does not constitute ‘proper’ writing. 
This suggests the self-consciousness with regards to writing that Harkin argues is a feature of 
Mackenzie’s work. Despite this, Mackenzie often describes his own work on The Man of 
Feeling, which commences in 1769, as casual, written when he has the leisure to do so. Other 
comments, however, suggest a grander intention: 
 
I would have it as different from the Entanglement of a Novel as can be. Yet I would 
not be understood to undervalue that Species of Writing; on the contrary I take it to be 
much more important and indeed more difficult than I believe is generally imagin’d by 
the Authors; which is perhaps the Reason why We have so many Novels, & so few 
good ones. It is a Sort of Composition which I observe the Scottish Genius is 
remarkably deficient in…yet these Performances are the most current of any I know, 
and need little more than a Jumble of Incidents to please the common-Place Beings 
you mention. (1967: 18) 
 
Mackenzie’s comments here emphasise his feelings about the novel form. His conception of 
the novel as an ‘Entanglement’ and a ‘Jumble of Incidents’ indicates a desire to strip away the 
generic excesses in order to get to what is valuable. He acknowledges the saturation of the 
market, and also the dearth of good Scottish novels, which he may wish to correct. It is 
possible to infer from this, then, that his intentions ultimately lie not only in publication, but in 
making an intervention into the form that would improve it as a whole.  
 
 The novel was immediately popular on its publication, anonymously, in April 1771. As 
its author mentions to Elizabeth Rose, in a letter from June of that year, the editions in 
Edinburgh and London were in need of a new print run already. This letter is revealing, 
however, for the fact that after this assertion of its popularity, Mackenzie admits: ‘I am 
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told…that they [the reviewers] have treated it very roughly: I am a little surprised at this; 
because I confess I have been, for some Time past, of a different Opinion from the Bulk of 
People on that Subject, in thinking them oftner erroneously mild than unjustly severe’ (1967: 
89-90). The hurt in Mackenzie’s tone here is palpable, and it is clear that although he 
appreciates the novel’s popularity, it is critical approval he seeks, and has failed to achieve. 
This seems to be the case given his previous discussions with his cousin on the critical appraisal 
he and respected ‘grave’ people gave Ramsay’s poem, and indeed his echoed reference to 
general novel readers as ‘common-Place beings’. For a man as invested in criticism as he seems 
to be, it is unsurprising that Mackenzie’s failure with critics cannot be overcome by The Man of 
Feeling’s popularity with the general public.  
 
 We could take as an example of the criticism Mackenzie is saddened by the reception 
it got from The Monthly Review of May 1771: 
 
This performance is written after the manner of Sterne; but it follows at a prodigious 
distance the steps of that ingenious and sentimental writer. It is not however totally 
destitute of merit; and the Reader, who weeps not over some of the scenes it 
describes, has no sensibility of mind. But it is to be observed, that the knowledge of 
men it contains, appears to be rather gathered from books than from experience; and 
that with regard to composition, it is careless, and abounds in provincial and Scottish 
idioms. It is probably a first work; and from the specimen it affords of the talent of its 
Author, we should not be disposed to think that he will ever attain to any great 
eminence in literature. He may amuse himself at the foot of Parnassus; but to ascend 
the steeps of the mountain must be the talk of those on whom their benignant stars 
have bestowed the rare gifts of true genius. (vol. 44: 418) 
 
The purpose of the review seems almost entirely to be to shame the author. The second half of 
the review, in particular, directs criticism against the author himself, by implying he is both a 
beginner and short of ability. It attempts to confine him, to put him in his place. By suggesting 
Mackenzie knows little of the world, the review aligns him with Harley himself, a fate which 
was to be Mackenzie’s for the rest of his life. It compares him unfavourably to Laurence 
Sterne, and accuses him of mimicry. Sterne wrote sentimental fiction, but did so with an 
obvious humour that ironises and distances the author and the text from its mode. This critic 
seems to be suggesting Mackenzie has tried too hard, that his effort is too earnest. There is 
much here to be ashamed of, if the target of the criticism is open to being shamed. The public 
space of the criticism, a popular magazine with a good circulation, adds to the potential for 
shame, with only the anonymous publication of the novel acting as a fig leaf to cover 
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Mackenzie’s dignity. A man less invested in critical appreciation may have shrugged off such 
harsh censure, but as we have already seen, Mackenzie places faith in qualified judgment.  
 
 It seems key here that Mackenzie’s recorded response to this critique, as quoted 
above, is registered in the key of surprise; ‘I am a little surprised at this’. Surprise is one of the 
Tomkinsian affects; it is in fact the only one Silvan Tomkins defines as ‘neutral’. This evokes the 
momentary pang that surprise creates, the registering of an unexpected occurrence in one’s 
vicinity that one must then contextualize and comprehend by choosing an emotional response. 
After all, we talk of ‘good’ surprises and ‘bad’ surprises. This surprise, the surprise of being 
misread or misrecognized, was unsettling for Mackenzie because – presumably – he believed 
his novel’s intervention was clear: to display and exhibit masculine moral sentiment. It is 
possible that the surprise of misrecognition could have led him to question the result of his 
work. We actually know very little of his thoughts about the novel’s unexpected reception; 
even in his letters to his cousin, he remains mostly (significantly?) silent on his thoughts. We 
only have one reference to a later review which: ‘made up for the Harshness of the Monthly; it 
is odd to say that I am obliged to your father for his Anger’ (93). Mackenzie’s remarks here 
suggest a personal relationship with his novel, and a need to feel proud of his – and its – 
achievements. What can be stated with some confidence is that this experience would have 
been eye-opening for him, and may have been in his thoughts when he came to write his 
famous critique of the novel form several years later. 
 
 This essay, one of the most famous from his periodical The Lounger (1785-7), tackles 
the subject of the novel form. In it, he develops the argument that novel writing has become 
the preserve of those who are not equipped enough, technically or morally, to produce good 
novels. This echoes, of course, the sentiments he had expressed in private letters to Elizabeth 
Rose and others even before he became a novelist himself. He opens his essay with the line: 
‘No species of composition is more generally read by one class of readers, or more 
undervalued by another, than that of the novel’ (2009: 100). The classes to which he refers 
here are, respectively, the ‘young and the indolent’ and the ‘more respectable class of literary 
men’. Mackenzie suggests here that the novel (and the sentimental novel in particular) is 
caught between conflicting estimates of its value: read voraciously by the wrong sort, but 
unfairly dismissed by the right sort. After these opening comments about the critical capacities 
of readers, however, most of the essay is devoted to a sustained critique of the practitioners of 
the form, novelists themselves. Stephen Bending and Stephen Bygrave see this critique as an 
extension of the debates around sickly sentiment and ‘the “degradation” of the sentimental 
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novel’ (99). They state that: ‘the paradox of Mackenzie, fourteen years on, attacking that 
which had established his own reputation is more apparent than actual’ (99-100). This may 
well be true, but we should also take into consideration the swerve that Mackenzie’s career 
has taken by this point.  
 
After writing two more sentimental novels, The Man of the World (1773) and Julia de 
Roubigné (1777), Mackenzie switched in 1779 to his first periodical, The Mirror, followed by 
The Lounger in 1785. After 1779, there were no more novels. This change in course is not 
explained in the essay on novels – in fact, Mackenzie’s former life as a novelist is not 
mentioned at all. I am interested in this marked change, however. The novel form, as 
Mackenzie describes it in The Lounger, is degraded by the changes he claims to have occurred: 
‘the effects of this have been felt…in its perversion from a moral or instructive purpose to one 
directly the reverse. Ignorance and dulness are seldom long inoffensive, but generally support 
their own native insignificance by an alliance with voluptuousness and vice’ (100-1). Mackenzie 
is vague about the timeline of this degradation, however. Has this occurred in the years since 
he stopped writing novels? Or was this occurring simultaneously? The Monthly Review 
assessment of The Man of Feeling suggests Mackenzie’s own writing could be seen at the time 
as an example of the very mimicry and self-indulgence he criticizes in The Lounger.  
 
I have described my usage of the term ‘swerve’, leaning on Sedgwick, as a move away 
from a divergent discourse toward a more accepted one. As evidenced by the popularity and 
enduring respect of the periodical form, especially the example of Joseph Addison, we can 
understand the polite simplicity and directness of periodicals, over and against the excesses of 
sentimental writing, as representing the ‘accepted’ discourse. In chapter one I explored the 
ways in which Addison and Steele’s choice to ventriloquise through an eidolon allowed them 
to universalize their style, tone and message. This emptying out of the particular, aligned with 
a civic humanism, helped to set the standard for polite masculinity which followed. 
Mackenzie’s swerve toward periodical writing away from the sentimental novel suggests a 
decision to join the accepted masculine discourse and an evacuation of the cluttered, almost 
immoral scene of the divergent one.  
 
The turn: Harley’s futile feelings 
 
James Lilley (2007) reads the relationship between the self and the outside world in 
sentimental fiction as an opening up of the self’s interior to the gaze of others: 
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To be human is to be a self that exercises feeling. Thinkers as diverse as Rousseau, 
Laurence Sterne, and Adam Smith all agree on this fundamental precept of 
sentimentality, on this definitive structure of sentimental selfhood. And yet, as the 
pages of sentimental romance demonstrate, there is a constitutive queerness to this 
sensing self, a peculiarity that patterns all economies of sentimental desire. For it is 
never enough for this self to emote and to feel in isolation: in order to register its 
essential humanity, this self must disclose itself, must direct its interiority outward, 
must cry public tears that somehow materialize and bear witness to its private core. 
Such a self can know itself only insofar as it is a self for another, only through the act of 
transforming its absolute privacy into a communal sentimental spectacle. The radically 
private self-for-itself never participates in the pages of romance or the lyrics of 
longing. (649-50) 
 
This should be clear to anyone who reads The Man of Feeling. All readers look on as Harley 
weeps and reveals to the spectatorial gaze the sensitivity which ultimately renders him unfit 
for the unfeeling commercial world of London.  
 
The idea that this transforms individual privacy into communal experience is not 
without its critics. John Mullan (1988) argues that: 
 
…in no type of text is it unproblematic to resort to passions and sentiments as the stuff 
of social understanding. Any description, for instance, of how, in the novel of 
sentiment, sympathy and the articulacy of feeling hold the promise of unfettered 
communication must refer also to how this prospect, for Richardson and Mackenzie, is 
often remote, oppositional, and even despairing. (25) 
 
These terms, ‘remote’, ‘oppositional’, ‘despairing’, are key I think to understanding the 
melancholy power of Harley’s story. So too is Lilley’s use of ‘queer’, with its suggestion of the 
‘peculiar’ turning of the self inside-out in order to express its humanity. There is a sense here 
of both distance and orientation, in spite of the differing conclusions of the critics. Harley’s 
queer relationship to his own sensibility, his painful and ultimately futile feelings, induces a 
‘turn’ away from the world he enters in London, back towards his origins, toward the past, and 
away from progress. His decision to return to the barren lands from which he had to venture 
forth in order to ‘make his way in the world’ is a self-defeating one; it ends with his premature 
death.  
 
This turn is the aspect that makes the novel so haunting; it is an abandonment of a 
happy ending. Yet, the turn has in some ways already occurred before Harley gives up on 
commercial success. Harley’s orientation toward futile feelings seems to have been there 
already; he is drawn, as if constitutionally, toward the lost and the damaged people he meets, 
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and falls under the spell of those who wish harm to him so that it seems as though he wishes 
actively to become lost himself. Considering Harley is our protagonist, a sympathetic reading 
of Harley’s behavior would be suggestive of the kind of affective community that the 
sympathetic reader may understand himself to be a part of. This community includes both The 
Ghost and the reader who rescues Harley’s history from destruction; ultimately, the novel puts 
pressure on the ‘real’ reader to imagine himself as part of this community as well. But as 
Robert Burns noted, identification with this community separates one from the discourse of 
progress and politeness, and for male readers, undermines their ability to participate in and 
take advantage of the norms of polite masculinity. If Harley is the role model, then he 
ultimately represents a turn away from society and sociability, and towards obsolescence and 
death.   
 
This is demonstrated in Harley’s encounter with the beggar on his journey to London. 
Taken in by this expert in manipulating affect, Harley begins the process of fragmentation 
which accelerates when he arrives in the city. Rather like Mackenzie’s novel, the beggar’s story 
omits detail where necessary and dwells instead on affect. He asserts that, after many 
tribulations which left him out of work, he was ‘seized with a jail-fever’ (typhus) at the very 
moment the assizes happened to be in his district. This jail-fever is a result of a yearning for a 
kind of communion, as the beggar describes it: ‘I was always curious to get acquainted with 
the felons, because they were commonly fellows of much mirth and little thought, qualities I 
had ever an esteem for’ (17). Like Harley, the beggar positions himself as a man of feeling, in 
search of communion with other like-minded ‘fellows’. He experiences esteem for the fellows 
of much mirth, but does not go so far as to say that he is one, carefully retaining the affinity for 
fine feeling, the hypochondriac bond with Harley. As Ildiko Csengei (2012) points out: ‘The 
beggar’s way to earn his payment is often to assume the role of the double with whom the 
benefactor can easily identify’ (129).  
 
It is in the midst of this fever that the very house he is in catches fire, and he must be 
rescued. Here, the sick, yearning body transfers his internal fire to his surroundings, creating a 
tableau of transferable affect that sets his world literally alight. Spectating upon this conjured 
image, Harley can barely control himself, and ends up giving away an unwise sum of money: 
 
Harley had drawn a shilling from his pocket; but virtue bade him consider on whom he 
was going to bestow it. – Virtue held back his arm: - but a milder form, a younger sister 
of virtue’s, not so severe as virtue, nor so serious as pity, smiled upon him: His fingers 
lost their compression; - nor did virtue offer to catch the money as it fell. It had no 
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sooner reached the ground than the watchful cur (a trick he had been taught) snapped 
it up; and, contrary to the most approved method of stewardship, delivered it 
immediately into the hands of his master. (18) 
 
The above passage, with its speckling of hyphens, colons and semicolons, is charged with 
almost erotic hesitation for the reader. The shilling, here closely associated with Harley’s 
virtue, is spent carelessly, and it is at this point that it becomes clear the exploitation in the 
transaction is not of the beggar whose labour produces the story, but of the consumer who 
‘buys’ it. Were he a woman, the message here would be clear. As a man, however, the 
symbolism of the misspent coin is more complex. The shilling falling to the earth could be 
interpreted in a Christian framework as an onanistic failure. But this is also commercial 
onanism. Rather than being put to use in the legitimate economic sector, Harley has given 
(twice) to its illegitimate twin. His body literally fails to keep hold of what belongs to it; it 
allows fragments to fall and be taken away by others. It is the beginning of a depletion of 
Harley that ends finally with his death. The beggar, by contrast, does not even move in order 
to take possession of Harley’s money. Instead, his living prosthesis, his dog, does it for him. 
Whilst Harley’s body fragments in this scene, the beggar’s expands. 
 
It should be noted here that what makes this passage troubling is that a story of 
suffering is transformed – in the most literal way possible – into a transaction. Harley has paid 
for a (prefabricated) melancholy history. Barbara Benedict (2016) sees in The Man of Feeling 
echoes of the older form of miscellany, the seventeenth-century collections of character types 
not unlike The English Theophrastus, Abel Boyer’s collection of observations examined in 
chapter two. Benedict identifies the virtuoso, or collector, as one figure who comes in for 
satirical critique in these works, and identifies Harley as a relic of this style. Collecting, a 
practice Harley participates in throughout the text, removes objects from circulation and could 
therefore be seen as anti-commercial. These collectors were men who, Benedict states, were 
portrayed as ‘ignorant, credulous, self-absorbed’; men who should rightly be ashamed of 
themselves. In Mackenzie’s novel, however, this portrayal is complicated by the representation 
of Harley as ‘misguided and insightful, foolish and perceptive’ (477), qualities we see on display 
here. Whilst Harley is a consumer, then, he is the wrong sort to succeed under the terms of the 
commercial world he moves in. He may have more money than the beggar, but the latter 
seems far more likely to survive than the former, even at this point in the novel.  
 
The episode ends with this theft-by-proxy. We are not given access to Harley’s reaction 
or his thoughts. Instead, we are left with a passive body being plundered. What I want to 
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emphasise here, however, are the ways in which Harley’s need to connect with the beggar on 
an emotional level leaves him open to the experience of shame. In the hesitation which 
precedes the inevitable dropping of the coin, we see Harley’s conflicted feelings about his 
failure to keep himself and his affairs in order: ‘virtue bade him consider on whom he was 
going to bestow it’ suggests a failed intervention from the impartial spectator, an experience 
he seems compelled to repeat. What I mean, more particularly, is that Harley finds, in the act 
of emotional connection, in the depletion of his masculine integrity, in the subsequent shame, 
a stimulating sensation, which motivates him to repeat the experience. This could be labelled 
charity, but when it becomes so utterly detrimental to Harley’s financial, emotional and 
physical wellbeing, it is clearly something more complex. The rest of the novel is largely made 
up of repetitions of this same scene, played out with different partners. Harley is given 
something by a suffering or scheming body, and then must surrender something in return, 
tears, money, or both. Some of these exchanges threaten Harley’s sense of self, as we see in a 
later episode. 
 
 This is the episode in which Harley visits Bedlam. He detaches himself from his group 
to watch a series of men engaged in various activities, one a mathematician driven mad by 
theories of comets, another a former businessman and ‘stock-jobber’ who lost everything in a 
crash, a third a former schoolmaster unhinged by language, and a fourth a man with delusions 
of grandeur (24-5). The section is brief and at first glance simply a catalogue of lunatic ‘types’. 
However, together they provide a microcosm of male middle class shame. The failures of these 
men to cope with their respective professions land them in Bedlam, where they are treated as 
curiosities, to be looked at. While others have hurried ahead to view the female inmates (the 
more natural and alluring objects of the gaze), these men snag Harley’s attention, almost as 
though he feels a kinship with them.  
 
 Unlike other suffering bodies in The Man of Feeling, these men do not speak directly to 
Harley, nor do they themselves tell him their stories. Instead, their histories are related in 
précis form by the final madman, who reveals himself at last as ‘the Chan of Tartary’. There is a 
lack of affective contact here because, despite Harley’s intense stare, the gaze is not returned 
in the first three cases. The mathematician, the stock-jobber and the schoolmaster are all 
absorbed in their own professional worlds, and seem unable to accept that they no longer 
inhabit them. For them, the tools of their trades, the makeshift pendulum and the chalkboard, 
represent these worlds physically. Implicit here is a criticism of men who live too much in their 
heads and not enough in the world, echoing the criticism in miscellanies of character types 
111 
 
described by Barbara Benedict above. These men are all collectors of sorts, their fascination 
with their collections esoteric and unproductive in commercial terms. The objects upon which 
they gaze are both a kind of key and a fetish. Repeatedly handled, revealing nothing but false 
information, the pendulum, the chalkboard and the Homeric verses provide the connection to 
shadowy otherworlds. They have turned away from progress toward self-immolating 
obsession. Harley’s gazing upon them sets up a community in which he is not, at first, aware 
that he is a part, believing himself and his guide to be merely observing. It is only in the flinch 
of realization that his guide is in fact ‘one of them’, that he seems to realise that his distance 
from these ‘turned’ men is not that great. In fact, they foreshadow his own future as a man 
unable to make his way. Like the scene with the beggar, the damage inflicted on Harley 
renders him mute: here, he merely bows before rejoining the rest of his party. These men 
echo, in fact, the very book in which their stories are briefly told. The Man of Feeling connects 
us as readers to the shadowy otherworld of Harley’s ghostly presence, only to remind us that 
Harley’s way is not, as Robert Burns pointed out, ‘the way into life’. 
 
Even still, the very fact that female suffering, in the shape of the abandoned young 
woman Harley weeps for, must be used to provide the narrative climax of the chapter is 
telling. It is not just that this is the more familiar scene of sentimental spectatorship, but also 
that the exclusively male coterie of mad professionals speaks uncomfortably to the dark heart 
of contemporary conditions of manhood. It seems that there is something too horrifying about 
the shame of failed masculinity for the text to name, and Harley himself is rendered speechless 
in the face of it (25). Ildiko Csengei (2012) reads Harley’s stunned reaction as evidence of 
differentiation: ‘The moment otherness is revealed, it is instantly rejected by the man of 
feeling, whose fantasy it has been to see a world of feeling’ (137). It seems just as likely, 
however, that Harley’s shying, flinching, away from these mad men is a moment of 
recognition, of shame-filled connection akin to the imagined encounter with the ‘half-insane 
man’ described by Eve Sedgwick, again a scene of the supposedly sane in close contact with 
the mad. The entirely conventional tableau with the abandoned woman fills the resounding 
silence left by Harley’s recognition of madness in the men.  
 
One passage in which Harley is certainly not speechless is the philosophical exchange 
that occurs between Harley and the elderly Ben Silton during the course of a coach trip north 
from London. This discussion appears late in the novel, after Harley has quit the city. By this 
point, he has failed to make his fortune in the metropolis and has decided to retreat. James 
Lilley (2007) observes that: 
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Never at home with the luxury and commerce of the city (he is thoroughly tricked and 
taken advantage of during his brief visit to London), Harley instead outlines a spectral, 
other-worldly economy, a system of affective values that appear only to the extent 
that they have already been lost, already antiqued and consigned to pastoral 
prehistory or anticipated in the afterlife. (653) 
 
We see in this section of the novel Harley embracing his position as someone ‘turned away’ 
from the world in which he lives. The resultant reflective state means that the conversation 
between Harley and his elderly interlocutor is wide ranging but focuses on mourning perceived 
changes in society. In a letter to Elizabeth Rose, Mackenzie explained that: ‘I somehow affix to 
Age the united Ideas of Tenderness & Dignity…’ (Mackenzie, 1967: 36), and the older 
characters in the novel, Silton, Old Edwards, and Harley’s aunt, are the most convincingly 
drawn. Lilley notes that: ‘Sentimental space thus occupies queer territory outside of the 
heteronormative emplotments of society—a space in which tearful orphans divulge their 
hearts to their same-sex friends’ (657). The dialogue between the two men is not a homosocial 
space because it does not support the progressive narrative of their present; rather, the 
chapter in which Harley and Silton share a coach which is turning back from the scene of 
commercial futurity, back toward the barren lands of Harley’s past, reveals a queer space in 
the terms that Heather Love uses, whereby queerness is bound up with loss, rejection and 
becoming outmoded.  
 
 The discussion starts with Harley producing a notebook in which he has copied the 
poetic scraps scrawled on windows in coaching inns, as he describes them: ‘humble poets, who 
trust their fame to the brittle tenure of windows and drinking-glasses’ ( 2009: 60). Temporality 
and materiality are both cast as fragile and untrustworthy here, with fame being a gift 
inevitably lost, if ever gained at all. Harley’s notebook collects the ephemeral, but these are 
also evidence of the need for anonymous voices and hands to leave traces of themselves 
behind. The notebook is a collection of failed poetry, failed as it has never been published or 
publicly admired, and serves as a miniature version of The Man of Feeling itself: fragmented, 
assessed as derivative at least by its earliest critics, but still articulating the experience of the 
lost. Silton’s response to it is interesting in the context of this discussion of Mackenzie’s 
authorship: 
 
‘From our inns,’ returned the gentleman, ‘a stranger might imagine that we were a 
nation of poets; machines at least containing poetry, which the notion of a journey 
emptied of their contents: is it from the vanity of being thought geniuses, or a mere 
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mechanical imitation of the custom of others, that we are tempted to scrawl rhime 
upon such places?’ (60) 
 
Harley’s conversation with Silton could be cast as conservative nostalgia, rejecting as it does 
the materialist progressivism embodied by the couple they share their carriage with in favour 
of an imagined past; there are also some very contemporary ideas and beliefs running 
throughout, albeit in the service of a backward-looking melancholia.  
 
The image of the ‘machines…containing poetry’ picks up on the eighteenth-century 
fascination with the automaton, and fibre theory that was then emerging in studies of human 
anatomy. Philosophy had adopted ideas of bodies filled with other bodies (one example being 
Adam Smith’s internal impartial spectator from Theory of Moral Sentiments), as had art theory, 
as Hogarth’s Analysis of Beauty shows. The idea of a machine stuffed with words, with poetry, 
that is merely waiting for the opportune moment – such as a journey north in a coach – to spill 
forth and scrawl itself on brittle surfaces, is not entirely ridiculous even to the retiring and 
weary minds of our protagonists. With the machine idea, however, come negative 
connotations also. What can machines do but copy and imitate real humans? When The 
Monthly Review chose to criticize Mackenzie for his imitation of Sterne, was the reviewer 
making a machine of him? It is not just presumption to greatness that provokes this critique of 
Mackenzie, it was also his machine-like lack of originality.  
 
 Speaking of presumption to greatness, poetic vanity forms another strand of Harley’s 
discussion with Silton. Harley pronounces vanity to be ‘immemorially the charter of poets’. 
Warming to his theme, he continues:  
 
In this, the ancients were more honest than we are…ours, in their dedications and 
prefatory discourses, employ much eloquence to praise their patrons, and much 
seeming modesty to condemn themselves…but this, in my opinion, is the more 
assuming manner of the two; for of all the garbs I ever saw pride put on, that of her 
humility is to me the most disgusting. (60) 
 
Disgust is an affect closely linked to shame, and here Harley aims it at the cloaked vanity of 
modern writers. False modesty is identified as being a symptom of the modern age, where 
one’s self-love is veiled under a gauze of polite words. Harley is complaining about those who 
do not speak plainly, who do not say what they mean. This is unsurprising given Harley’s failure 
to read the meaning behind the words of the beggar, for example. Instead, truth is hidden 
under false clothing, and any hidden truth may well be a shameful one, for example the 
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indolence the beggar alludes to but does not name. It is no wonder that the root word of 
shame means ‘to cover’. Are these writers, then, writing with such false modesty to cover their 
shame? If so, what is this shame? Silton suggests it is the very egotism lying behind the 
creative drive, the egotism which is, ‘always the parent of vanity’.  
 
Where does this accusation leave Mackenzie himself? Is Harley and Silton’s creator the 
victim of the egotism he has his characters complain about? John Mullan’s assessment of 
Mackenzie would have us believe not; Mackenzie was a man of the world and looked down on 
those writers who considered themselves a class apart (1988:118). When Harley and Silton 
criticize those who ‘fix their residence, amidst groves and plains, and the scenes of pastoral 
retirement’, they are talking of those who do not live their lives in the real world, and are 
consequently incapable of writing anything true to life. How ironic that Harley himself returns 
to a ruined rural idyll and turns his back on life. How even more ironic that Mackenzie’s very 
first reviewers level this exact charge at him, suggesting the scenes in The Man of Feeling have 
more of book learning than life experience about them. In fact, the critic in The Monthly 
Review may well have been targeting his critique with a knowing wink to this very section of 
the book, as when Silton suggests poetic inclination is an incentive to philanthropy, saying: 
‘many who are not able to reach the Parnassian heights, may yet approach so near as to be 
bettered by the air of the climate’ (61), the reviewer rejoins with: ‘He [meaning Mackenzie] 
may amuse himself at the foot of Parnassus, but to ascend the steeps of the mountain must be 
the talk of those on whom their benignant stars have bestowed the rare gifts of true genius’ 
(Monthly Review, May 1771: 418). In other words, what may be thought of as bettering 
oneself is in fact merely distracting oneself from the truth.  
 
 It becomes clear from the conversation between Silton and Harley that they look 
backwards, rather than forwards, to find a time and place where the values they hold dear can 
flourish. As with many regressive narratives, this time and place are carefully vague – exactly 
when these values were enacted, and by whom, is not specified. It may well be that Harley and 
Silton attach it to the dying system of aristocratic patronage, where virtue was inherited and 
merit was innate. This penniless but prestigious upper class is represented by Harley, whose 
economic inactivity and commercial irrelevance is underscored by his failures in London. The 
grocer and his wife who travel with them represent modernity, and are perceived as smug, 
self-satisfied and lacking in respect as a result. Maureen Harkin argues that: ‘Harley’s hostility 
to social change places him in an older conservative-reactionary tradition’, over and against 
the Scottish Enlightenment writers’ investment in the moral value of commercial society (325). 
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The ‘romantic turn’ Harley speaks of in the above passage seems ultimately one based on loss, 
a susceptibility to fine feeling, and what James Boswell had often referred to as 
‘hypochondria’, the masculine excess of sensibility. It is a turning away from the future 
towards an imagined past, a turning away of the self in shame at one’s failure to be of the 
world.  
 
Whatever it is, wherever and whenever it is located, the lost value system that Harley 
and Silton seem to cling to mark them out as lost, a dying breed. Heather Love (2007) 
describes the mechanics of progress thus:  
  
The idea of modernity – with its suggestions of progress, rationality, and technological 
advance – is intimately bound up with backwardness. The association of progress and 
regress is a function not only of the failure of so many of modernity’s key projects but 
also of the reliance of the concept of modernity on excluded, denigrated, or 
superseded others. (5) 
 
While The Man of Feeling does not entirely denigrate its backward characters, it certainly feels 
ambivalent about them. There is no suggestion that Harley should be considered a hero in the 
same mould as a Tom Jones or even a Tristram Shandy. Instead, he works as a figure of doubt, 
a nodal point for fear, loss, melancholy and shame. Although Heather Love’s book focuses on 
queer characters in Modernist writings, her model of backwardness proves useful for Harley 
too. If queer means ‘feeling backward’, as Love suggests it does, then Harley is also queer.  
  
 Queerness brings me back, not inevitably but perhaps fittingly, to shame. If, as I am 
suggesting, Harley is queer it is not particularly to do with the direction of his desire. Harley’s 
desire for connection is omnivorous; he desires communion with anyone he perceives worthy 
enough. His choices – inmates of Bedlam, fallen women and so on – are typical denizens of the 
sentimental moral tale, but what is queer about his attempts to connect with them is the self-
annihilating perversity of his methods, as well as his insistence on keeping company with the 
casualties of early capitalism. Harley’s fragmentation is so thorough he eventually wastes away 
to nothing, made pale and consumptive by his hunger for affective communion, by his inability 
to feel forwards.  
 
This process is not inevitable. Had he operated more shrewdly and calculatingly, he 
may have made ‘his’ money and claimed ‘his’ woman. Harley’s death, then, is a result of a 
surrender to the winds of human desire. Tugged apart by melancholy, empathy, hypochondria, 
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Harley is immobilized by his own shame. Shame for Harley is the inability to connect, to make a 
difference in the way he wants to achieve. He is ashamed of the world for caring so little for its 
vulnerable, and admiring instead the frivolity and excess of luxury. It seems towards the end 
that he offers himself willingly as a sacrifice, refusing to stand on his own two feet. He turns 
away from the demands of commercial masculinity, refusing independence and stoicism in 
favour of oblivion. He recasts his willingness to die as a rarefied, almost mystical, form of 
masculinity: ‘To meet death as becomes a man, is a privilege bestowed on few’ (96). It may 
seem strange to speak of Harley in such active terms, and indeed for most of the novel, he is 
often passive. However at the very last he begins to stand in, symbolically, for a turn away 
from polite manliness that may well have been representative of a period in the eighteenth 
century where ideas established earlier in the era were beginning to buckle under pressure. 
Published just five years before America gained independence, the political landscape in 
Britain was already beginning to grow divided over the issue.12 As Claudia Johnson (1995) says 
of the sentimental novels of the 1790s: ‘we encounter plots strained to the breaking point 
precisely because characters have learned that their feeling is a matter of national security’ (3). 
Could Harley be symptomatic, then, of a less confident Britain and a less stoical masculinity? 
 
 As for his creator, Mackenzie is an enigma. In his letters to Elizabeth Rose he gives little 
away, keeping his comments on his published works brief. His remarks in The Lounger suggest 
(but do not give definite proof of) a man whose creative past troubles him. His adoption of the 
periodical is a swerve towards the safer form of discourse, perhaps even a survival strategy in 
the face of falling sales and critical indifference. To some extent, the strategy worked, and 
Mackenzie gained respect for his essays, earning the sobriquet ‘Our Scottish Addison’ from 
Walter Scott. Mackenzie swerves to survive, while Harley turns away fully, and chooses death.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 See McCormack, 2005: 92-100 for a good account of the nature of debates around American 
independence and their gendered character. 
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Chapter Five 
‘A manly resolution to improve’: shame as catalyst in James Boswell’s London Journal  
 
In James Boswell’s London Journal 1762-3, discovered in the twentieth century and 
published in 1950, we find a male subject aiming to attain for himself a particular ideal of 
polite manhood. Written when he was in his early twenties, and providing an account of a year 
in the capital, much of the focus of the journal is on the constant improvement of the self, with 
its small triumphs and frequent setbacks. Several critics, as explored below, have theorised the 
London Journal as being concerned with multiple masculinities, of the trying on of different 
male ‘types’, such as the rake, the retenu, the highwayman, the man of letters, and so on. 
Some have also noted the struggle Boswell has with many of the male figures around him, 
especially his strained relationship with his father, and the admiration he has for Samuel 
Johnson. Erin Mackie (2008) summarises this well when she writes: ‘To historians of gender 
and ideology, Boswell’s self-reporting lays tantalizingly open the uneven psyche of a young 
man struggling to find himself within and against familial expectations and socio-cultural 
conventions’ (353). In this chapter, I explore the journal’s significance as a document that 
Boswell uses in his attempt to turn himself into the resolute man of politeness he perceives 
others to be. My exploration highlights the ways in which journal writing makes this goal 
freighted with difficulty because rather than being a tool for resolving Boswell’s disparate and 
contradictory personality, it instead helps to entrench and elaborate it. All self-writing is self-
construction, as several critics discussed below have noted. Boswell’s shame, then, comes in 
part from his inability to become retenu through writing.  
This ‘self-reporting’ gives me the opportunity to consider the impact on an historical 
individual of the polite masculine ideal constructed by the kinds of writing I explored in part 
one of this thesis. I want to show in this chapter that Boswell’s record of his experiences 
demonstrates that shame enables (or perhaps demands) that individual men change. Shame 
marks out the gap between the ideal and reality. Leaving aside whether or not the results or 
motivations look positive from a modern perspective, it seems clear to me that the shame I 
find in Boswell’s journal – shame of his Scottishness, of his difference from his father, of his 
behaviour in company – pushes him to continue the journey toward becoming an 
accomplished, polite and retenu gentleman. In this way, shame can be seen acting in concert 
with polite imperatives to help mould the individual man and maintain the integral role polite 
masculinity plays in a commercialised society.  
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This does not mean that I read shame here as being an innocuous tool for self-help. 
Shame can prompt us to fit in so that we may survive and flourish on some level, but at what 
cost? Critics like Lauren Berlant have shown that a commercialised society offers us a form of 
optimism (the promise of the good life) which ultimately only serves to crush us13. For Boswell, 
this is demonstrated in his anxiety over becoming the sort of man who can make his way into 
life, meaning the capitalistic, polite world he locates in London. This is the very issue around 
which Robert Burns situated his critique of The Man of Feeling and it structures the emotional 
concerns of Boswell’s journal. Boswell’s entries in the Journal are full of emotion, despite his 
constant reminders to himself to ‘be retenu’. Ironically, it is shame over his excess of emotion, 
his lack of focus and cultural identity (his Scottishness, his ‘ridiculous’ gregariousness) that 
drives this need to become retenu. As one of his editors, Ralph S. Walker, summarised: ‘His 
Journal often depicts him as volatile and inconstant, and we come to think of him as 
alternating between shame at his own lack of steadfastness and delight at seeing himself in 
the character of a bright, attractive butterfly’ (1966: ix). It is no surprise that Mr. Spectator, 
embodying as he does a masculine universal that is both unreadable and able to read all, is so 
sacred a figure for the young Boswell. The journal itself is an account of the struggle of an 
historical individual to live up to the example of a constructed ideal represented by a fictional 
character. 
Shame is the right term to apply to Boswell’s struggle because shame attaches to one’s 
sense of self, to what one ‘is’. ‘Being’, inhabiting and becoming a particular identity, is 
everywhere in Boswell’s journal – take his repeated mantra, ‘be retenu’14. Becoming, rather 
than performing, that which you aspire to be, is the highest and most authentic form of 
identity, and is a key part of Adam Smith’s argument about the impartial spectator: ‘he almost 
identifies himself with, he almost becomes himself that impartial spectator’ (2009: 169). Smith, 
however, was far more circumspect about how liveable this position could be; Boswell’s curse 
is to see retenu perfection as vital to his flourishing. Critical attention has been paid in recent 
decades to the ways in which The London Journal in fact explores a host of different types of 
masculinity. These types reflect Boswell’s fears and aspirations and are drawn from cultural 
constructs including literature, politics and nationhood. Gordon Turnbull defines the retenu as 
                                                          
13 ‘A relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your 
flourishing. It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might be a fantasy of the good life, or a political 
project…These kinds of optimism are not inherently cruel. They become cruel only when the object that 
draws your attachment actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially’. Cruel Optimism, 2011: 3. 
14 Boswell’s spellings of this key word are numerous: retenu, retenue and retenué are used relatively 
interchangeably. Turnbull, the editor of the Penguin Classics edition, uses the first spelling, and I have 
followed him in this, except where directly quoting from Boswell.   
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meaning ‘self-disciplined and restrained’, commenting that: ‘Boswell aspires to revise himself 
into the values of mid-eighteenth-century English bourgeois Anglican masculinity: self-
discipline, regularity in habits, lack of flightiness or self-display, with the conversational 
properties of urbanity, understatement, moderation, politeness and gentility’ (2010: xxxix). 
Boswell himself uses the term repeatedly throughout the journal, with variant spellings, often 
instructing himself in his memoranda to ‘preserve retenue’ (30), ‘be retenué’ (65), and ‘learn 
retenue above all things’ (73), to name just three of many mentions.  
His desire to explore and discover himself through the variety of the metropolis is 
reflected in the range of characters he portrays throughout his journal, however. David M. 
Weed (1997/8) sees this exploration of types in Boswell’s diary as representative of mid-
century bourgeois manhood:  
…this intractable division between the retenu and the Cavalier man of pleasure 
bespeaks not only the “radical instability” of Boswell’s self, which he perceives as 
“impossibly divided” in the London Journal, but also demonstrates, through Boswell, 
the mid-eighteenth century class and national conflicts between men’s passions and 
their status as men. (216) 
For Weed, Boswell is representative because he exists ‘at the nexus of several kinds of 
masculine identity’; his anxieties over identity can therefore be parsed as a way of 
understanding the ‘broader cultural tensions’ at work in the conception of masculinity at this 
point in time. As I will examine in part of this chapter, the complex social, political and 
psychological recalibrations of the Act of Union – half a century old by the time Boswell arrives 
in London – are still posing difficulties, especially for a young Scot in the English metropolis.  
My discussion of Boswell’s national identity suggests that Scottishness presents 
Boswell with a problem. This is because he understands polite masculinity - a state to which he 
aspires - to be an English form of masculine expression. In other words, for Boswell, the 
attainment of politeness is synonymous with the attainment of Englishness, and therefore to 
be Scottish was necessarily to be culturally marked in a way that precluded entry into polite 
masculine universalism. The Scottish accent, language, customs and social conduct Boswell 
describes with embarrassment, interspersed occasionally with moments of violent 
identification with certain (often lost or fictional) forms of Scottish identity. This cleaving to 
and renouncing of kinship with a particular idea of self induces feelings of shame, because 
shame is often the fraught relationship to aspects of oneself that one cannot entirely make 
peace with. For Boswell, then, his Scottish origins are not something he can deny (his voice 
gives him away, for a start) but he never wants to entirely deny them anyway. This is a concern 
that is expressed – albeit differently - in Olaudah Equiano’s writings two decades later. It is the 
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shame of the colonial subject having to split off parts of his inheritance in order to understand 
the master.  
 Erin Mackie’s work on masculine identity in the London Journal alerts us to the highly 
literary construction of some of Boswell’s types. She explores two fictional characters she 
believes are equally influential on Boswell’s sense of self: John Gay’s highwayman Macheath 
from The Beggar’s Opera, and Mr. Spectator, the latter closely mapping on to the idealised 
retenu character. Mackie sees Boswell’s journal as providing ‘the first sustained 
documentation of this [self-] invention and the integral role of The Tatler and The Spectator in 
it’ (2008: 354). ‘It is in the provision of such a literary-cultural site…that Mr. Spectator supplies 
Boswell with the most profound relief from the guilty anxieties of either recording or omitting 
his “robberies on the highway”’, Mackie suggests, referring here to the euphemism his friend 
Erskine uses to name the many impulsive acts Boswell commits. Weed recognises the guiding 
influence of Mr. Spectator, too: ‘Boswell’s repeated mention of his admiration for Addison’s 
Spectator appears not only in his journal’s examinations of London life…but also – and more 
importantly – in his performative, spectatorial attitude toward himself’ (1997/8: 218).  
In contrast to Weed, however, Mackie sees the masculine types she describes as being 
‘more or less simultaneously available in Boswell’s psyche’ (355). This goes some way to 
naming the problem that Boswell’s changeable behaviour presents us with: ‘There is the effect 
of fragmentation of identity as he cursorily adopts and casts off role after role’, Mackie 
suggests, indicating that Boswell is constantly tugged in opposing directions by a range of 
masculine types that are either anti-authoritarian or dignified in their deployment of polite 
qualities. Self-spectatorship, the cornerstone of both Addison’s and Adam Smith’s philosophies 
of polite sociability, is a practice difficult to enact in lived experience, as Boswell’s journal 
amply demonstrates, and from this develops shame at the failure to live up to the ideal. 
Boswell is swayed by all sorts of things that Smith, Addison and Shaftesbury before them do 
not always fully account for: national identity, economic circumstances, sexual consequences, 
individual personality; these are all limiting factors that the individual must negotiate in 
varying combinations that polite theory cannot always accommodate.  
For Patricia Meyer Spacks, both Boswell in particular, and eighteenth-century self-biographers 
in general, use the literary mode to not only reflect on their own development, but also to 
engineer it. In Imagining a Self (1976), for example, Spacks observes that: ‘Boswell finds, 
during the year he reports, a more viable identity than that he possesses at the beginning, but 
his finding is also a making, of life as well as literature’ (230). This concept of a literary ‘making’ 
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of self pre-empts Felicity Nussbaum’s formulation of the eighteenth-century text as a 
‘technology of the self’. For Nussbaum, texts such as the London Journal are interesting for 
their non-canonical status; not published during his lifetime, Boswell’s journals ‘stretch to 
“represent” new kinds of consciousness and experience’. This allows the modern critic to 
explore ‘ideological crises…more easily discerned in newly emergent genres because the 
familiarity of entrenched conventions has not fully glossed over the fissures’ (1989: xiii). What 
more explicit crisis could there be, then, than a young man feeling he has to choose between 
varying restrictive modes of masculinity, all the while ashamed at the indecision which keeps 
him held in limbo? For Nussbaum, Boswell’s ideological crisis is one which can be understood 
in terms of both gender and class. Although her emphasis is more on the emergence of a self-
defining feminine voice, as with any point at which women’s subjectivity comes to the fore, 
this very event must needs also generate questions about the nature of masculine identity. ‘In 
short, autobiographical writing,’ Nussbaum reminds us, ‘published and private, serves as a 
location where residual and emergent notions of gender and class clash to replicate and 
challenge reigning notions of identity’ (xiv). We see this in the London Journal in Boswell’s 
repeated attempts to ‘seek sufficiently “manly” self-representation in an attempt to triumph in 
the newly intensified contest against women for narrative authority over the minute 
particulars of private experience’ (xx). Boswell is simultaneously attempting something 
relatively new – the making of self through conscious autobiographical writing, already 
conceived, as Nussbaum suggests, as somewhat feminine – and clinging to a notion of 
masculine superiority which stifles expressiveness at the same time as making the power of 
the universal masculine available to him. With both modes of identity looking shaky, Boswell 
feels shame at his inability to make it all work.  
Each chapter of this thesis has addressed texts of a different form – the periodical, the 
play, the social commentary, the philosophical treatise, the novel and the autobiography. By 
examining a journal, I am turning to a form highly likely to record and express feelings of 
shame, as well as revealing shame less consciously expressed. A journal could be considered a 
private document, a sealed container meant to keep private the innermost thoughts and 
confessions of its writer. Of course, any journal leaks its contents, whether through direct 
spectatorship by others, or the imagined spectatorship conjured by the paranoid owner. 
Boswell’s discovery that his packets to Johnston are being opened by his father participates in 
both of these forms of exposure. The latter form of viewing a journal’s contents is, of course, 
what lends a journal its strong symbolic power, for both the writer of the journal and the 
potential reader who is forbidden to access its contents. As Patricia Meyer Spacks (2003) 
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observes, ‘secrets invite unraveling; privacy stimulates encroachment’ (141). Encroachment, 
the invasion of space reserved as private, is terrifying for the man attempting to create and 
maintain a fragile identity construct, as we saw with anti-fop writing. This is because the 
plundering of the journal, the unravelling of secrets held within the private text, involves an 
exposure of the necessary scaffolding around which the illusion of ideal masculinity is 
wrapped.  
The critics we have discussed conceive of Boswell’s journal as an internal, identity-
forming dialogue committed to paper. Boswell’s journal is a fascinating variant of the typical 
journal form, however. It seems that the young Scot aspires to create himself through writing 
about his own thoughts and actions, and not purely for his own benefit. The journal, unusually, 
has an intended reader, his friend in Scotland, John Johnston, to whom the journal is sent in 
parcels for safekeeping, and who is permitted to read them. Boswell also mentions showing 
the journal to one or two others, and experiments with different styles of writing his entries on 
their advice (London Journal: 130). This document, although not a public one in the general 
sense, is still shot through with the spectatorship of others. This makes it a journal in which 
public and private cannot be held entirely separate, and where the nature of spectatorship 
plays a crucial role. This leads us back to the works of Addison, Steele, and Smith and 
demonstrates the ways in which their theories of self-knowledge through spectatorial mastery 
are played out – with predictable difficulty – in the life of one eighteenth-century man, for 
whom national identity and fraught relationships with other men find no ready answers in the 
books he reads.  
Throughout, I am suggesting that shame is the driving force for Boswell’s 
improvement, drawing on Eve Sedgwick to suggest that shame is a catalyst for change, not just 
an isolating or stultifying phenomenon. As naïve as Boswell’s efforts to ‘make’ himself are, he 
never seems to entertain the idea that polite masculinity is simply not worth the effort. By the 
end of the London Journal, Boswell at least feels more resolute in following a clear path to 
polite manhood. In her book Touching Feeling (2003), Sedgwick explores the ways in which 
shame affects us. She makes clear, through a reading of psychological work on shame, that the 
capacity to experience it starts early in life, with the perceived rejection of the infant when 
‘the circuit of mirroring expressions between the child’s face and the caregiver’s recognized 
face’ is broken (36). This is when the ‘eyes down, face averted’ posture typical to those 
experiencing a flush of shame develops. Shame, ironically, ‘in interrupting 
identification…makes identity’ (36). This can be seen in our inability to stop ourselves 
identifying with those we do not wish to – Sedgwick gives the example of a disturbed man 
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publicly exposing himself. ‘Shame both derives from and aims toward sociability’, she tells us 
(37).  
Quoting Michael Franz Basch, we see how this process leads us directly back to 
Boswell and his relationships with others, especially his father:  
The shame-humiliation reaction in infancy of hanging the head and averting the eyes 
does not mean the child is conscious of rejection, but indicates that effective contact 
with another person has been broken…Therefore, shame-humiliation throughout life 
can be thought of as an inability to effectively arouse the other person’s positive 
reactions to one’s communications. The exquisite painfulness of that reaction in later 
life harks back to the earliest period when such a condition is not simply 
uncomfortable but threatens life itself. (in Sedgwick: 37-8) 
It is useful to consider the implications here of the phrase ‘such a condition is not simply 
uncomfortable but threatens life itself’ in terms of gender construction. Boswell can easily be 
positioned as an extreme case – his father may have been unusually strict, Boswell unusually 
soft – but the very emphasis Boswell places on uniting his disparate ideas of desirable 
masculinities, and on satisfying the demands of his father whilst also sharply distinguishing 
himself from what he perceives his father’s vision for him to be, seems to follow what 
Sedgwick calls the ‘double movement shame makes: toward painful individuation, toward 
uncontrollable relationality’ (37). It is this ‘toward’ which indicates the way in which shame 
drives us and refuses to allow us to be paralysed. Boswell was a sociable person, to the point 
of describing his outgoing behaviour as ‘ridiculous’ (2010: 78). His desire to please others is 
obvious from almost every entry in the journal. It follows, then, that his contact with others, as 
well as giving him pleasure, also exposes him to shame: ‘This is what I ought most to guard 
against. People in company applaud a man for it, very much; But behind his back, hold him 
very cheap’ (78).  
This sociable shame is most clearly examined in this chapter through the section on 
Boswell’s interpersonal relationships with other men. However, it can be seen also in his 
relationship as a Scot to the English. As I demonstrate, Boswell’s journal reveals a desire to 
have his behaviour and character approved of by the metropolitan English, and his attempts to 
disavow his Scottish origins and acquaintances are (sometimes comically) painful. This is not 
without its complexity, however, for Boswell’s feelings towards the English are not without 
resentment, as a particularly charged experience at the theatre, discussed below, reveals. His 
shame over his Scottish origins and his oscillating ideas about how to construct his gender 
pushes himself to attain more; to be more like his carefully-considered role models: to be 
more retenu.  
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The case of Boswell also highlights a central problem of eighteenth-century gender 
identity theory: it considers masculinity as a project that can and must be completed 
successfully, as suggested by fictional representations in The Spectator15. Felicity Nussbaum 
(1989) asserts that a technology of the self ‘rests on the assumption that its truth can be told’ 
(xv). Whilst I am sceptical about the value of a term like ‘truth’ (as is Nussbaum), ultimately the 
truth of the London Journal is an emotional one: that the project of eighteenth-century 
masculinity is one that is painful because of the illusion that it will be fulfilled. We sense this in 
Boswell’s anxiety about getting a commission in the Guards, in his fractured relationship with 
his (equally anxious) father, in his uneasy relationships with the men around him, and in his 
liaisons with women. Through committing his struggles to paper, Boswell underlines the 
urgency of his need to ‘become’ a specific sort of man. This man combines characteristics that 
his father could respect, but that Boswell himself can also feel proud of. The journal is a record 
as well as an instrument for measuring Boswell’s progress. It also acts as a guarantor; its status 
as record shaming Boswell into improving because what is put in writing has the power of a 
promise: ‘knowing that I am to record my transactions will make me more carefull to do well. 
Or if I should go wrong, it will assist me in resolutions of doing better’ (3). It is in this way that 
Nussbaum’s evocation of truth comes back – not as externally quantifiable veracity, but as 
imaginatively constructed, narrativised selfhood. As Nussbaum says of autobiographical texts 
in general: ‘They also offer a private space for experimentation, revision and resistance to 
prevailing notions of identity… In other words, public and private self-writing, for men and for 
women, is part of the conquest over meaning and the contest over the power to name the 
real’ (xxi).  
Boswell’s London Journal, then, is an attempt to name what is real, that is, his lived 
experience both in dialogue with, and sometimes over and against, the polite masculine ideal. 
It is also an experimental document because it tries to overwrite the Boswell that exists in the 
eyes of others. Repeatedly in the journal, the younger Boswell refers to how he is perceived by 
his father, and of how he is characterised as ‘dissipated’ by his friends, who often understand 
him differently from how he understands himself. The journal, then, is an imaginative space, a 
space in which he can create himself in the image he wishes to behold. His deference to ‘the 
truth’, that is, the externally ratified truth, means that he records all his failings, and the 
criticisms of others. It is one of the reasons Boswell is so liable to feeling shame. He imagines 
                                                          
15 I am thinking more of the secondary characters here than Mr. Spectator, who remains largely 
impervious to change, of course. Will Honeycomb, the reformed libertine, is a perfect example, especially 
for Boswell. The journey from rake to willingly polite and domesticated gentleman echoes the very same 
journey Boswell is trying to make, albeit on a much compressed timescale for the latter.  
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‘many People’ reading certain sections of his journal, and concluding they would ‘hold me in 
great contempt, as a very trifling fellow’ (84), suggesting he is afraid of the shame which 
follows exposure. Still, there is a palpable sense in the journal that his continued investment in 
using this ‘technology of the self’ will enable him to conquer what his peers, role models and 
the multitude have signified ‘James Boswell’ to mean, and instead ‘to name the real’.  
This concept of the ‘real’ is hard to put to work, however. Nussbaum herself writes of 
eighteenth-century ‘self-biography’ as, ‘a matrix of conflicting discourses and practices that 
produce, reflect, contain, and transform class and gender identities’ (xiii). Through the writing 
of the journal, Boswell reflects on himself and his development as if he were a character in a 
novel. From this vantage point, he believes he is able to rationalise his actions, understand his 
faults, and begin to improve. Reflection, therefore, requires a sense of shame in order to 
identify character flaws. The journal is a technique of enlightenment, and in that sense perfect 
for its time. Boswell is explicit about using the journal for this very purpose. ‘A man cannot 
know himself better than by attending to the feelings of his heart and to his external Actions 
from which he may with tolerable certainty judge “what manner of person he is”.’ He goes on 
to say: ‘I have therefore determined to keep a dayly journal in which I shall set down my 
various sentiments and my various conduct which will be not only usefull; but very agreable.’ 
(3) Here, Boswell sets out his understanding of the purpose of his journal (and perhaps journal-
keeping as a practice) by defining it as both ‘usefull’ and ‘agreable’; there is both pleasure and 
utility in this writing project. He also links the internal feelings of the heart, to the ‘external 
Actions’, meaning that Boswell understands the fundamental bond between the two. Here we 
have echoes of Adam Smith, in that action and virtue are understood as non-divisible, each 
from the other. Through reflection, then, Boswell also hopes to produce a form of masculinity 
that he can recognise as being ‘whole’. The journal is a crucible for the production of identity, 
as much as a way of recording thoughts and actions and reflecting on their merits.  
‘Plain hamely fife’: Boswell’s national masculinity 
I want to look closely at Boswell’s relationship to his national identity in order to 
highlight a key way in which shame contributes towards the self-construction we see in the 
journal. His attempts to distance himself from fellow Scots when in London provide some 
fertile examples. The arrival of Lady Betty Macfarlane and her family not long after Boswell 
himself has arrived (and crucially, before he has been able to establish himself amongst the 
English) is our first taste of Boswell’s revulsion at his compatriots:  
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To tell the plain truth, I was vexed at their coming [,] for to see just the plain hamely 
fife family hurt my grand ideas of London. Besides I was now upon a plan of studying 
polite reserved behaviour which is the only way to keep up dignity of character. And as 
I have a good share of Pride which I think is very proper and even noble, I am hurt with 
the taunts of ridicule & am unsatisfied if I do not feel myself something of a superior 
animal. This has allways been my favourite idea, in my best moments. (22) 
This passage is typical of the sentiments Boswell expresses over his fellow Scots. The 
descriptive terms ‘plain hamely fife’ underscore what it is that is wrong with them, in his view: 
their lack of refinement, their regional accents (signified by the word ‘fife’) and their 
parochialism. The word hamely, italicised as it is in the Gordon Turnbull edition of the journal, 
is a dialect word, here used mockingly to other the Macfarlane set. As Turnbull defines it, 
hamely carries connotations of familiar and ordinary, ‘shading slightly over into “rough, coarse, 
blunt”’ (n.16, 351). Their presence inflicts shame on Boswell, who admits he has ‘a good share 
of Pride’. Andrew Erskine, who was with the Macfarlane party, noted this sense of injury when 
writing to John Johnston three and a half years later: ‘instead of recieving [sic] me with that 
warmth with that Cordiality which I expected he look’d upon me with a degree of horror…’ 
(n.15, 351). This pride, however, Boswell insists is entirely appropriate for a man in his 
position. The ‘taunts of ridicule’ he mentions here are unattributed, so it is left unclear 
whether these are real taunts from the Macfarlanes over his feigned Englishness, or the 
imagined ridicule he expects from any English acquaintances who may identify him with such 
company.  
Later in the journal, Boswell comments on the inability of the Macfarlane set to 
appreciate the English capital as he does, telling them: ‘…I want to be among english People & 
to acquire the language. They laughed at that. I declaimed on the felicity of London. But they 
were cold & could not understand me. They reasoned plainly like People in the common road 
of life; and I like a man of fancy & whim. Indeed it will not bear reasoning’ (79). As a result of 
an explicit middle-class cultural project, morality and virtue were no longer the preserve of the 
aristocracy, meaning men like Boswell had to find their place between the virtuous and the 
dissipated. Feeling superior, therefore, gives the unanchored Boswell something to define 
himself against, and to protect himself from feelings which do not ‘bear reasoning’.  
 The English provide him with a different kind of difficulty. His initial attempts to be 
more ‘English’ are linked, as David M. Weed points out, to his gender construction. Some of 
these attempts are incredibly clumsy. For example, on Wednesday 15th December, Boswell 
announces that: ‘The Ennemies of the People of England who would have them considered in 
the worst light, represent them as selfish, - Beef-eaters, - and cruel.’ In response to this idea, 
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Boswell resolves ‘to be a true-born old-Englishman’, which involves visiting a steakhouse 
where he ‘swallowed my dinner, by my self to fullfill the charge of selfishness’ (46). He follows 
this with a visit to a cockfight, though he admits he finds this spectacle upsetting. This boorish 
form of Englishness he rarely participates in, however, and generally prefers to name only 
refined activities and even feelings as ‘English’. The following day’s entry, for example, muses 
on the English propensity toward melancholy, as opposed to the flippancy of the French: ‘You 
never hear of madness or self-murder among them. Heat of fancy evaporates in a fine brisk 
clear vapour with them, but amongst the English often falls heavily upon the Brain [.]’ (48). The 
Scots are not mentioned here at all, and as a sufferer of ‘hypochondria’, Boswell clearly implies 
here that he may have Scottish blood, but an English temperament. There is, he insists, 
nothing hamely about Boswell; this is one of the key points that remains crucial to his self-
construction throughout the journal, although he remains concerned that it may be a fallacy.16  
In terms such as hamely, Boswell locates the provincial, the backward, and the 
irrelevant. Whichever way he tries to sever himself from it, however, Boswell knows that by 
virtue of his provincial background and his relationship to the Macfarlanes, among others, he is 
linked to it. It is in this way – in its very inescapability – that the hamely is a source of shame. 
By threatening to claim Boswell for its own, the hamely indicates to him the constant potential 
for humiliation he must face whilst in London. Silvan Tomkins reminds us that humiliation is a 
high-intensity version of shame; it is the explosion of white noise to shame’s long-term 
background hum. It is enough for Boswell only to see the Macfarlanes in order to experience 
this pang of humiliation. The hamely is more than just a personal source of discomfort for 
Boswell, however. It feeds into wider and more complex issues around Scotland and its role in 
relation to English urbanity and political superiority. The term suggests a native characteristic 
(home-ly) and is therefore also an identity marker. Being marked out as provincial threatens 
one’s ability to attain the masculine universal ideal, especially in London’s metropolitan 
                                                          
16 In his book Madness and Civilization (2001), Michel Foucault identifies ‘unreason’, or socially 
unacceptable behaviour as shameful, suggesting it needed to be confined in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries to avoid shaming of wider society (63). It is interesting that Boswell’s ‘treatment’ for 
gonorrhoea is to be confined to his rooms, symbolically removing his hat and his sword (2010: 114). His 
confinement prevents not just the disease but the shame of his unreason from permeating society. 
Melancholia is characterised by Foucault as being something especially applicable to men (113). A vague 
disorder, with a range of symptoms from feelings of misery to excessive apathy, headaches to weak 
stomachs, hypochondria came to be seen by some men as a mark of their fine feeling, perhaps because the 
symptoms were so closely-related to the female disorder hysteria. This seems yet another unintended 
consequence of the period’s emphasis on men conversing with the opposite sex; rather than being shamed 
by a feminised disorder, some polite men actively sought to diagnose themselves under its name. Boswell 
is gratified to discover, for example, that Johnson also suffers from melancholy, stating: ‘I felt that 
strange satisfaction which human Nature feels at the idea of participating distress with others, and the 
greater person our fellow sufferer is so much the more good does it do us’ (287-8).  
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culture. Boswell’s clumsy attempts at being English reveal a man who is still painfully conscious 
of his status as a body laden down with meaning. 
 Boswell’s ideas of Englishness become more qualified by experience as time goes on, 
but his ideas of the Scottish remain troubling to him. They humiliate him by their very 
proximity; on Saturday 9th July, a visit to Green Park is ruined when: ‘we gathered many more 
Scotsmen, and the conversation grew familiar to a detestable degree. I therefore left them; 
happy to be rid of their rude want of distinction, and to retreat to my calm retirement in the 
Temple’ (266). Even at this late stage of his time spent in London, Boswell still seems to be 
unable to shake off his ability to draw in embarrassing Scots as though he were some kind of 
perpetually humiliated magnet. His unwillingness to occupy even an open space with his 
countrymen is suggestive of Boswell’s fear of contagion; like the anti-fop writers earlier in the 
century, he seems to feel that even the slightest of brushes against their hamely bodies might 
be enough to contract an apparent disease that, of course, he already has. Furthermore, their 
conversation is equally discomfiting for Boswell, as the sound of their Scottish accents, as well 
as the ‘familiar’ content of their chatter, marks them – and by extension, him – off from the 
rest of the genteel denizens of Green Park, the fashionable and refined English citizens who 
are not directly mentioned in this passage but whose presence is felt like silent witnesses. 
Boswell’s humiliation here is redolent of the shame of being seen to be part of a group he 
wishes to be far removed from. Spectatorship, as we discovered in the discussion of Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, occurs in various ways, along multiple real and imagined sightlines. The 
example of Boswell highlights why the Scots (Adam Smith being another case in point) might 
have been particularly sensitive to the self-compromising nature of spectatorial issues. 
 In one earlier entry, for the 16th January, Boswell makes it clear what is threatened by 
these issues: ‘I had not been at Lady Betty’s since Thursday se’nnight as I wanted to have 
nothing but english ideas, and to be as manly as I possibly could’ (98). Proximity, even to other 
members of the Scots aristocracy, will disrupt his plan of study of ‘polite reserved behaviour’ 
and deform the fragile construct of his gender identity. His strict regime of ‘nothing but english 
ideas’ is designed to purge him of the particularity of Scots ‘want of distinction’. The phrase ‘to 
be as manly as I possibly could’ signals not only the depth of conviction Boswell assigns to his 
plan of study, but also the shadow of doubt over whether he is strong enough to carry it 
through. Let’s not forget Boswell’s plan to have elocution lessons to rid his voice of its Scottish 
inflections, as mentioned in the memorandum for 25th March (181). Fear of his own dissipative 
proclivities, and shame over their habit of returning with full force, keeps Boswell pushing 
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forward, straining to break the leash his nationality supposedly places him under. Here we see 
that shame, rather than paralysing the sufferer, compels him to constant action. 
Englishness, embodied in the retenu character, is about losing the kind of particularity 
that can be read under the sign of the hamely. Scottish bodies are marked, for Boswell, by 
these embarrassing indicators. They are full of signification which limits their ability to travel 
within (English) metropolitan space. Boswell is a constant generator of this perception, 
remarking on the particularities of eating habits, accents, clothing choices and conversation 
topics which he finds distasteful, inappropriate or humiliating in other Scots in London. By 
contrast, English figures rarely come in for as much vivid description, and the impression we 
get of them is more conveyed through effusive remarks about their general demeanour and 
sense of propriety, as we see, at least initially, in the case of the Northumberlands.17 This 
comparative lack of signification means that, unlike the Scots, the English – and English men in 
particular – are presented as not just finer but also less marked by meaning. The English 
figures Boswell admires, and indeed, the retenu figure he wishes to become, are emptied out 
of particularity.  
We see this in his choice of wording in the Green Park passage; he is ‘happy to be rid’ 
of the unwanted connection with the Scots crowd, and is relieved to ‘retreat to my calm 
retirement in the Temple’. Being rid, retreating, retiring, all are routes to absence, all are ways 
of disengaging from the embarrassment of signification. The Temple is of course a 
geographical area of London, but its connection with the Inns of Court, and of course its 
Classical associations with Greek learning, are doubtless intended by Boswell. Temples are 
sites of emptiness – that which is contemplated and worshipped within their walls does not 
exist in any material form. As we saw in the opening chapter, investment in a disembodied, 
disinterested conception of virtue is advocated by Addison and Steele via their ghostly 
creation, Mr. Spectator, famous for his absence-in-presence, always observing, never 
participating.  Boswell echoes this investment in absence himself in a memorandum for 7th 
December, when he reminds himself, ‘Resolve preserve retenue & as you began. Dont see one 
of them [Macfarlanes] today it is very vulgar. Be absent some days; & then you can be more on 
guard – speak little & stand laugh’ (30).  Although the absence suggested here is literal 
absence, rather than the present absence which is so crucial to the observational commentary 
of Mr. Spectator, it is linked via the semicolon to the idea of being ‘on guard’ – as though 
                                                          
17 Boswell relates, verbatim, a conversation between himself and the Duchess of Northumberland, in 
order to ‘enrich my Journal’ (86-9). The conversational ability of the English upper classes serves to 
make a contrast with the ‘familiar’ talk of his fellow Scots, but also helps Boswell practice being English.  
130 
 
absence of participation can be equally represented by both total absence and retenu 
presence.  
 Boswell’s fixation with The Spectator extends beyond this one reference. Early on in 
his journal, he describes feeling ‘strong dispositions to be a Mr. Addison’. This desire seems to 
be linked to a sense of English propriety. ‘Mr. Addison’s character in Sentiment mixed with a 
little of the gayety of Sir Richard Steele, & the manners of Mr. Digges [West Digges, the actor, 
whom Boswell knew personally] were the ideas I aimed to realize’ (23), he goes on to say, 
linking the two authors of The Spectator with the contemporary actor famous for his manners 
and deportment. The need to take on aspects of the characters of older men deemed 
exemplary is a point I will return to later, but for now it seems important to underline the ways 
in which Boswell situates his aspirations geographically in English bodies and an English city. 
Boswell is not alone in doing this. His close friend John Johnston of Grange, the man to whom 
the journal was sent for safekeeping, is reported within its pages as remarking to Boswell after 
his return from his initial, abortive stay in London two years earlier, that ‘he thought I would 
resemble Mr. Addison’ (22). Boswell and his like-minded Scottish peers thought that 
immersing oneself in the culture of English commercial politeness would produce in the 
expatriate Scot a particular and much sought-after form of polite masculinity. This seems 
exemplified by a kind of pristine, untouchable emptiness, such as that of Mr. Spectator or, 
equally, the Temple as I discussed above. By contrast, Boswell’s journal is voluble, 
contradictory, and emotional because it is a space in which the labour of self-fashioning is 
being carried out.  
Perhaps one reason, then, that Boswell struggles with his Scottish national identity is 
due to his ambivalence over the role of Scotland in the Union. Keenly aware of his presence in 
London as a representative of society north of the border, he swings between rejecting the 
burden and wholeheartedly, if momentarily, embracing it. He repeatedly decries the degrading 
effect of being in proximity to other Scots in London, but there are moments in the journal 
where he defines himself in opposition to the English. On Wednesday 8th December, he 
records the following when attending a comic opera: 
Just before the Ouverture began to be played two highland officers came in. The mob 
in the upper gallery roared out No Scots. No Scots. Out with them, hist & pelted them 
with Apples. My heart warmed to my countrymen [,] my Scotch blood boiled with 
indignation. I jumpt up on the benches, roared out damn you you Rascals, hist & was 
in the greatest rage. I am very sure at that time, I should have been the most 
distinguished of Heroes. I hated the English, I wished from my Soul that the Union was 
broke & that we might give them another battle of Bannockburn. I went close to the 
officers, & asked them of what Regiment. They were of; They told me Lord John 
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Murray’s & that they were just come from the Havannah. And this said they is the 
thanks that we get, to be hist when we come home. If it was french what could they 
do worse. But said one if I had a grup o yin or twa o the tamd rascals I sud let them ken 
what they’re about. The rudeness of the English vulgar is terrible. This indeed is the 
liberty which they have: the liberty of bullying & being abusive with their blackguard 
tongues. (32-2) 
The recollection of the event rehearses the rage of the moment, with Boswell’s syntax faltering 
in the middle line, and his punctuation scattered and fragmented. The unbridled outpouring of 
fury expressed here is unusual for the journal, wherein Boswell consciously attempted to write 
in a retenu manner. The excess of language in this passage mimics the Scottish excessiveness 
of expression and familiarity Boswell explicitly reminds himself to guard against elsewhere. 
Here, however, he allows this frenzied writing to stand. It is one of the very few times Boswell 
identifies uncompromisingly as Scottish.  
However, there are reasons why Boswell may have let this entry remain unedited. As 
he makes clear, it is ‘the English vulgar’ whom he is explicitly attacking – the ‘mob’ confined to 
the upper gallery. Even in one of the most explicitly angry passages in the London Journal, 
Boswell shifts the focus of his ire from a nation, to a class within that nation. The Addisons of 
English society are beyond reproach; it is the vulgar who are the deserving target of revenge. 
That being said, Boswell’s wish to break the Union and ‘give them another battle of 
Bannockburn’ is a far more general expression of dislike. This revenge fantasy wishes to replay 
the medieval Scottish victory over the English, but it also wishes to smash a political union 
which even an Anglophile like Boswell seems to see is not an equal one. As the previous 
actions of the Scottish officers are unassailable in their active virtue, Boswell is able to 
overlook the many ways in which these men, with their Scots dialect, are examples of the 
hamely in its most striking incarnation, rooted as the concept is in the Scottish variations on 
spoken English.  
Anger is characterised here as productive; Boswell’s name calling and ‘histing’ are 
recast as righteous rebukes toward an unsophisticated rabble, reasserting a superior moral 
order. He also allies himself with the two Highland officers, whose masculinity is presented as 
unimpeachable. The threat of violence uttered by one, couched in rough Highland dialect, 
plays directly into a conception of the Highlands, and by extrapolation, Scotland as a whole, as 
a land of warriors motivated by pre-commercial honour codes. Boswell’s aligning himself with 
these men, whose occupations and origins are clearly very different from his own, reveals a 
vulnerability linking both his gender and national identities. English abuse of the Scottish 
provides a rare opportunity for Boswell to confront these frustrations in a way that 
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ameliorates the keenly-felt shame of his provincial masculinity. While in other parts of the 
journal, Boswell reads Scottish ebullience as humiliating excess, as undermining the retenu 
demeanour and character he wishes to cultivate, here instead he identifies with his nationality 
because it allows him to assert a form of masculinity that he believes the English do not 
possess, namely an honest, uncomplicated warrior identity. ‘My heart warmed to my 
countrymen’, he says, claiming a kinship and fraternity with a pair of men with whom he 
shares only one concrete similarity – the always problematic fact of their Scottishness.  
 
 ‘The opinion of the World’: Boswell under the influence of other men 
I want to take the opportunity to consider more broadly how relationships with other 
men help to define Boswell’s identity, and what role shame has to play within that. The letters 
and the journal are intended primarily for the eyes of one man, Boswell’s close friend, John 
Johnston. They form one of the few spaces where Boswell allows his pursuit of the retenu 
character to be visible as a deliberate quest for a constructed selfhood. The journal and letters, 
Christopher F. Loar believes, are an entirely private Scottish space, a refuge from a public 
projection of stability which is defined as English: ‘Grange [Johnston’s seat was at Grange], 
with his sympathetic melancholy Scottishness, belonged firmly in Boswell’s private life. On the 
other hand, [Samuel] Johnson, no matter how close Boswell eventually became to him, always 
represented a stentorian English public life’ (2004: 612). Exploring these particular connections 
with other men further illuminates the ways in which shame works to help construct Boswell’s 
sense of self.  
In order to do this effectively, it seems necessary to me to group Boswell’s major 
homosocial relations under two headings – the paternal and the fraternal. Whilst at first glance 
this approach to analysing Boswell’s connections with other men may seem reductive, I would 
make clear that the terms I am using are fairly wide-ranging in their signification, and are not 
entirely divorced from each other. In fact, they are crucially interdependent, as the case of 
John Johnston shows. For the purposes of this discussion, I am defining the term paternal as 
referring both to older men in Boswell’s life who have a demonstrable influence on his sense 
of self, as well as a more nebulous concept invoking the spirit of ‘completed’ masculine 
development. In many ways, the paternal as represented in Boswell’s London Journal and 
other juvenile writings represents the finished state of manhood he hopes to attain. This is not 
to say that this ‘finished’ state is entirely desirable for the young man: as we will see in our 
exploration of his relationship with his father, he sees faults in those he otherwise wishes to 
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emulate. The point is that those faults often emanate from a stability or stoicism that Boswell 
hopes to grow into. Individuals that could come under the category of the paternal include 
Lord Auchinleck (Boswell’s father) and Samuel Johnson. At twenty-two, Boswell is still 
dependent financially on his father and his eventual decision to study law at Utrecht is one 
made in part to please his notoriously severe parent. Johnson begins to have a profound effect 
on Boswell towards the end of the London Journal, and this is particularly notable for the ways 
in which Boswell’s notion of the paternal is ameliorated through this friendship.  
The fraternal, unsurprisingly, has more of a suggestion of relationships between 
equals. Most of the figures who could be grouped under this category are of similar – but not 
necessarily exactly similar – age to Boswell himself. These include young Scots like Andrew 
Erskine and George Dempster, as well as the Englishman William Temple. Ralph S. Walker 
sums up some of Boswell’s key fraternal relations by referring to Boswell’s ‘conflicting selves’: 
‘the one so deeply attached to the past, to Johnston, and to home; the other reaching out to 
Temple and aspiring to some higher and larger self-realization’ (1966: xviii). By embedding his 
differing ideals in different people’s bodies, Boswell amplifies the drama of his fraternal 
relationships; by making others stand in for aspects of himself, he ensures he is constantly 
comparing himself to others, and that way lies shame. Eleven years older than Boswell, and 
possessed of a less flighty temperament, Johnston still shared much in common with Boswell, 
as the above section on Scotland demonstrates. In his letters to Johnston, and the London 
Journal itself, Boswell frequently reveals the open-hearted side of his nature that often 
appeals to modern readers. His great need to be guided and advised is revealed through his 
often plaintive notes to Johnston when he becomes uncertain of the latter’s regard for him: 
‘You know very well that between friends the slightest neglect cannot fail to hurt’ (1966: 55). It 
is also through these less guarded discussions with his fraternal associates that the challenges 
of masculine maturation in eighteenth-century bourgeois society can be helpfully traced. 
Whilst the ‘finished’ state of the paternal remains a frustrating mystery for Boswell, these 
charged fraternal relationships provide a window onto how the mechanisms of masculinity 
work on an individual level in this era.  
Boswell finds himself caught between relating to both his paternal and fraternal 
influences, whilst also feeling himself to be cut off from them. Loving his friends but knowing 
them to be inadequate role models; resenting his father whilst also wishing to attain both his 
respect and the status of retenu man that he associates him with: these add to Boswell’s 
feelings of being in flux, of having no stable identity. The shame he feels, then, comes from his 
perception that he is not, and perhaps may never be, the kind of retenu man he clearly longs 
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to be. A poem enclosed with a packet of the London Journal gives an insight into these fears: 
‘Tell me good Johnston when you view / This portrait most exactly true / What think you of 
poor Boswell’s mind / Can you ought there of reason find / Or don’t you with himself agree / 
That from it’s influence he is free’ (1966: 27). He has compared himself to the discursively-
constructed ideal and found himself wanting. He is not good enough. If there is a sense that 
these feelings abate somewhat towards the end, it is perhaps because Samuel Johnson’s 
encouragement and retenu perspective enable Boswell to see that the formation of identity is 
a process, and that his shame is ‘the space wherein a sense of self will develop’ (Sedgwick & 
Frank, 2003: 98).    
Some of the most valuable sources we have for examining  how the themes of this 
chapter, masculinity, nationality, and friendship, converge to help construct Boswell’s identity 
through shame are the covering letters sent to John Johnston in the packages containing 
instalments of what, two centuries later, would become The London Journal. Loar (2004) has 
highlighted the ways in which they participate in a different positioning of gender and 
nationhood from the fractured relationship we have examined in the journal itself. Loar sees 
the letters as using a mythological Scottish past to create space for homosocial intimacy, 
predicated on ‘the absence of this past and an acknowledgment of its unavailability’ (596). 
Through imagining a misty past in which Scottish men in particular participated in a form of 
sociality which was both spontaneous in its expression, and uncomplicated in its experience, 
Boswell attempts to absent himself from the complexities of modernity. It seems that the 
journal, with its emphasis on self-reflection and improvement, is a document that must remain 
free of the melancholic romanticism that is natural to Boswell, but which he confines to the 
letters. The letters, ironically, are therefore more private in tone and intent than the journal.  
Boswell and Johnston combine this lost world with their own hypochondria to create a 
representation of themselves as feeling backward, in a way strikingly similar to Harley and 
Silton: ‘We are both Antiquarians which is not the most agreable sort of feeling’ (1966: 14), 
Boswell tells Johnston on 13th September 1762. The problem of having more of an affinity with 
a bygone era than today’s world is transformed into a bond via the exclusion of others who do 
not share their melancholy, ‘the dull Sons of Equality’, or equanimity (14). A homosocial 
connection is made through a form of suffering which serves to prove the fine nature and 
superior understanding of men like Boswell and Johnston. Antiquity, much like the word ‘old’, 
comes to stand in as code for a form of fine melancholy, as Boswell demonstrates on 20th 
November: ‘You must write to me a great deal write freely and easily and if you are old it will 
releive you to open your heart’ (23). As much of a relief as it could be, it was never a cure. 
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Walker (1966) observes that: ‘the incidence of a tendency to “spleen” among the intelligent 
and cultivated in the middle of the eighteenth century seems to have been so high that it is fair 
to conclude that something in the mental climate of that age of uneasy social transition and 
metaphysical deadlock was peculiarly conducive to it’ (xxvi). The mystic ingredient, the 
‘something’ of Walker’s musing is, I am arguing, shame: the shame of being inert in a fast-
moving era.  
Harley and Silton’s attachment to the mythological past as morally purer than the 
present, and their investment in expressions of suffering as a mark of superiority are echoed 
here. Similar values are prized: honour, passion, simplicity and directness are placed in higher 
regard than the modern qualities of calculatingly polite sociability, commercialism and false 
modesty. The privileging of specific blood ties (family, tribe) over the impersonally generalised 
discourse of ‘society’ and the public sphere are also features of both discourses. Both Harley 
and Silton’s dialogue, and Boswell and Johnston’s letters, are melancholy articulations of loss 
and failure. These are men who struggle to find their place in the world, and so construct lost 
worlds to pine for. Boswell’s feeling backward is all the more painful because of his concurrent 
investment in modernity; his sense of shame is heightened to find the world he wishes to 
succeed in laughing at him behind his back.18 To my mind, this discourse also works to resolve 
– if only superficially – the discomfort Boswell feels about his own national identity. Loar 
writes:  
Scotland’s marginal status thus became a resource, for its very isolation, it was 
imagined, preserved it from the ravages of effeminacy and duplicity. Scotland could be 
read, in a way that urbanizing England could not, as a site where the nobly primitive, 
the pastoral, and the heroic had not been entirely extinguished. Scotland’s people and 
history were understood by many Britons – most pertinently, by many Lowland Scots – 
to embody certain masculine virtues that could be imagined as remedies for the 
potentially destabilizing, isolating, and feminizing processes that threatened 
“authentic” masculinity in the eighteenth century.’ (600). 
For Lowland Scots like Boswell, this heroic masculinity is particularly resonant because he is so 
close, and yet so far, from being able to claim it as his own. Instead, he is a member of a 
diluted breed of Scots, a North Briton who has sold his independence for commercial 
participation.  
                                                          
18 It is not just the likes of Erskine and Dempster he suspects of humiliating him – he also imagines 
English figures he previously respected, such as the Duchess of Northumberland, of being duplicitous: ‘O 
these great People! They are a sad set of Beings. This Woman who seemed so cordialy my friend, and 
promised me her good offices so strongly, is I fear a fallacious Hussey’ (196).  
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As Nicholas Phillipson (1981) shows, this anxiety is not peculiar to Boswell: ‘[Hugh] 
Blair and Ossian showed how modern provincials, whose fortunes lay on the side of progress, 
could alleviate any guilt they might feel at making a virtue of adaptability by celebrating the 
past with nostalgia and sentiment and in song’ (34). The Ossian works, to which Boswell refers 
critically in the journal, are a fascinating site of convergence for desire and commercialism, 
which I do not have room to discuss here. The salient point Phillipson makes, however, is that 
men like Boswell turned eagerly to a melancholy fantasy of a lost masculinity, one that, 
because it predates the anxious, self-reflective state of Enlightenment manhood, is perceived 
to be natural, but irrevocably dispersed. I would like to push Phillipson’s description of guilt 
and claim it as shame. Whilst not wanting to draw deceptively hard lines between shame and 
guilt, it does seem to me that any feelings attached to what one is and what one can never 
hope to be, seem highly suggestive of shame, because, as Eve Sedgwick suggests: ‘one is 
something in experiencing shame, though one may or may not have secure hypotheses about 
what’ (2003: 37). It seems fairly clear, then, that shame is the unnamed element in this 
powerful cocktail of ambivalence and loss. For men like Boswell, born into a Scotland stripped 
of political independence, it must have been an emasculating experience, made all the more 
pungent by the very fact of it having been a situation chosen by his predecessors, not forced 
upon them on a battlefield. The Lowland Scots could not even inhabit the character of savagely 
oppressed victims of invasion; many of them were actually prospering under the Union.  
The shame of being irrevocably drawn forward, whilst also looking wistfully back, 
populates the letters to Johnston. In them, Boswell shares with his friend a vision of Scotland 
as a country whose glory lies in the mists of time. In reading Robertson’s History, a Jacobite 
account of the Scottish past, he finds it has ‘carried me back in Imagination to the ancient days 
of Scottish Grandeur; has filled my mind with generous ideas of the valour of our Ancestors’ 
(1966: 15). This emphasises the fantastic nature of the mythos Boswell shares with Johnston, 
and its roots in a literary trope of melancholic loss. Historical figures, such as the doomed 
lovers Mary, Queen of Scots and Lord Darnley, become folk heroes for Boswell as they 
symbolise the disingenuous attraction that made Scotland stand, at least in his frustrated 
imagination, for the private as public. The shameless passion that drove them to their fates 
was also an extroversion of affect that, for the polite (shame-filled) eighteenth-century, was 
untenable. Boswell’s pursuit of a construction of selfhood built on self-restraint and being 
retenu left little room for uninhibited self-expression. Politeness, then, leaves little room for 
affects like anger, destructive but also self-affirming, and instead demands that affect be 
turned inward in order to facilitate sociability. The regulation of affect means that those 
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affects that remain hidden – shame being the preeminent example – can flourish under this 
regime, and Boswell’s journal provides us with evidence: the obsessive self-reflection 
politeness encourages also encourages feelings of shame. Therefore, expulsive desires must be 
relocated to a different time and place – a fantasy Scotland – in order to provide succour 
rather than reproach.    
Boswell’s father, unlike Boswell, has a more pragmatic outlook on both national and 
personal identity. Much of the conflict between the pair was generated by James’s inability to 
submit himself to the necessary grind of a public profession. In an entry of the Journal for 25th 
January, Boswell relates a conversation with Eglinton in which he describes his former visit to 
London being cut short by his father’s interference: ‘My Father then came up & I was hurried 
down to Scotland, confined to live in my Father’s family & pressed to study law; so that my 
situation was very unhappy’ (117-18). Boswell often describes his father in terms of restriction; 
‘confined’ and ‘pressed’, delivered as they are in the midst of his passionately describing 
injustices done to him, link Lord Auchinleck to the concept of parsimony and narrowness that 
is implied elsewhere (240).  
The letters to his friend John Johnston are even more revealing. Realising that his 
father has likely been opening the packets containing the London Journal intended for 
redirection to Johnston, Boswell complains:  
It was doing what no Parent has a right to do, In the case of a Son who is a Man, and 
therefore an independent Individual. It is equaly unjust to steal his secrets as his 
money; especialy when we consider that secrets cannot be restored…But from many 
circumstances, you must see my friend, how very terrible a situation I should be in 
were I to live as young Laird in my Father’s Family. (1966: 59-60) 
Constraint and narrowness are again the defining features of Lord Auchinleck’s paternal 
influence. Here that is augmented by the realisation of unwanted spectatorship. The journal, 
supposedly hidden from all eyes other than Johnston’s, has been exposed to the juridical eyes 
of his father. Boswell’s ‘secrets’ have been stolen. Lord Auchinleck represents a more public 
world than the intimate correspondence of Boswell and Johnston; the patriarch’s reading of 
the journal’s confessions has exposed them. Exposure is always a shameful experience; 
Boswell’s assertion of his manhood (‘a Son who is a Man’) cannot entirely erase the sense here 
of a boy caught making mischief by the father. If this was fiction, Auchinleck’s profession 
would be the most overwrought metaphor: the father as judge is the father who actually is a 
judge. There could be no more exemplary paternal figure for shaming the son.  
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Auchinleck certainly delivered, from on high, judgements of his son’s conduct that 
James found excruciating, especially when he feared they might be accurate: ‘I received this 
day a letter from my Father…’, he writes to Johnston in the plaintive letter questioning the 
strength of Johnston’s affection for him, ‘You will observe how severe he is upon me. How he 
treats my scheme of keeping a Journal and sending it down and in what light he considers 
you…Now, Sir, consider how very galling it must be to me, that at the very time when I 
received this letter I should have a fresh proof of your neglect’ (55-6). Auchinleck’s letter has 
not survived, but this is immaterial. What is important is Boswell’s reaction; the letter to 
Johnston shows the two sides of Boswell, embodied in Auchinleck and Johnston, colliding in 
the most painful and shaming of ways. The romantic and the retenu meet and are found to be 
humiliatingly at odds. We also cannot dismiss the possibility that this letter is indirectly 
addressed to Auchinleck too, given the likelihood of him seeing it, in which case Boswell was 
clearly not averse to exposing his pain and shame even to his most formidable judge. Shame 
works as a catalyst to improvement here by inducing the young man to expose himself to his 
most important spectators. Perhaps he felt that the less he hid his failings, the better would be 
his resolve to change – although this was not a consistent path of action, given his frequent 
attempts to avoid exposing himself to his father.  
Even when not directly involved, Boswell’s father could be used to shame his son. 
Euphemia, Boswell’s mother, wrote to him in March 1763, accusing her eldest son of being 
irresponsible: ‘I know no young Gentelman of this Country that lives ther [London] in that way 
your poor Father is stil in great distress about you your showing A dislike at this Country is a 
thing very disagreabl to him…’ (1966: n.7, 61). Euphemia picks up on the differing 
understandings of provincial identity which drives a wedge between father and son; the father 
secure in his Scottishness, the son far more ambivalent. She also seems to suggest that her 
son’s behaviour is unbecoming to his Scottish roots. Caught by both the romanticism of long-
dead Scottish feudal lairdship, and, as Chauncey Tinker (in Martin, 1999: 27) suggests, the 
anticipation of Romantic ideals, Boswell appeared to vacillate constantly, while his father 
stood conspicuously firm. Boswell himself summarised the difference between them thus: ‘He 
is oak. I am finer but softer wood’ (25). This invocation of difference combines both pride and 
shame; Boswell’s insistence that he is made of more delicate stuff communicates both the 
superior, elegant qualities he has acquired through his cultural experiences and his 
hypochondria, and also a tacit confession of his being, in the eyes of the commercial world, the 
weaker of the two.  
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We only have to look at the London Journal to see how much Boswell has internalised 
this understanding of himself as finer but softer wood. The memoranda that accompany the 
last few journal entries before Boswell departs London for study in Utrecht make frequent 
reference to his father, in an attempt to regulate his own behaviour. On Thursday 4 August, he 
writes: 
Set out for Harwich like Father grave & comfortable. Be alert all along, yet composed. 
Speak little – make no intimates. Be in earnest to improve. It is not you alone 
concerned – but your worthy father. Be reserved in Grief; You’ll be so, in Joy. Go 
abroad with a manly resolution to improve, & corespond with Johnson. Be gratefull to 
him. See to attain a fixed & consistent character to have dignity. Never despair. (2010: 
300).  
This is a charged set of ‘notes to self’, packed with imperatives intended to motivate. It is one 
of the clearest examples from the Journal of shame acting as a stimulant for self-improvement. 
He invokes the personality and example of his father, and something of the latter’s ever-
watching eye. Also present are the watchwords of polite masculinity: ‘reserved’, ‘manly 
resolution’, ‘dignity’. Most evocative of shame are phrases such as ‘Be in earnest to improve’, 
‘Be reserved in Grief…’ and ‘Be gratefull to him’. These urgent commands suggest that Boswell 
still feels he must ‘be’ something other than what he is, that is, ‘fixed’ and ‘consistent’, terms 
which echo the eternal unchanging nature of such masculine ideals as Mr. Spectator and even 
the Temple space Boswell wishes to retire to. He is aiming for an impermeable self, as opposed 
to the extremely permeable nature of the journal and the man we find there. Poised, as he 
seems all too aware, at the start of a new chapter of his life, Boswell seems intent on finally 
making the transition from soft wood to hard that he has been trying and failing to make for 
most of the text. He perceives the solid dignity of his father as being made up of differing yet 
seamlessly fused constituent parts; gravity and comfort, alertness and calm – these are not 
oxymoronic but instead the necessary multiplicities that a man must discover how to merge 
through practice at clear thought and honest action.  
Boswell merges the figure of the retenu with qualities he also assigns to his father, as 
though admitting that the two figures, in their ‘complete’ state, are one and the same. It is 
instructive that Boswell’s thinking around polite masculinity links internal thought and external 
behaviour so inextricably: ‘Be reserved in Grief; You’ll be so, in Joy’. Improvement of the self is 
a dominant theme of the journal as a whole, but that is made explicit in this passage: ‘Be in 
earnest to improve’; ‘Go abroad with a manly resolution to improve…’. It should also be noted 
the slight intention to recede from view here: ‘Be alert all along, yet composed. Speak little – 
make no intimates’ he reminds himself, echoing the critical distance maintained by Mr. 
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Spectator in order to move unsullied through society. The rejection of intimates seems 
implicitly to signal both a frustration and suspicion of fraternal relations, and a belief that the 
transition to a state of manly resolution requires one to jettison external connections, 
especially those fraternities (Dempster and Erskine in particular, but to some extent perhaps 
John Johnston too) where affect problematizes decisive action. The journal has a key role to 
play in this, moving intimacy to some extent from interpersonal relations to the literary space. 
Faith must be put in paternal figures who, due to their seemingly having resolved the disparate 
parts of their identities into one whole, are distant enough from Boswell’s own immediate 
experience of self to act as lighthouses in the night.  
It is not by accident, therefore, that Johnson is also mentioned in such close proximity 
to Lord Auchinleck. The two men were very different, and famously argued bitterly when they 
met, but this does not mean they cannot signify in similar ways for Boswell. With increasing 
integration of self, it would seem, comes increasing impenetrability – the young Boswell, so 
shamefully open to being read and labelled, emphasises by the end of the journal, that he 
must become more retenu in order to participate in the fiction of polite masculinity. Johnson’s 
key role here is to give answers to Boswell’s questions; unlike Lord Auchinleck, who stays 
powerfully (though unhelpfully) silent, Johnson explains to Boswell the ways of being a polite 
man:  
‘Sir…I am a Man of the World. I live in the World, and I take in some measure, the 
colour of the world, as it moves along. But your Father is a Judge in a remote part of 
the country, and all his notions are taken from the Old World. Besides, there must 
allways be a Struggle between Father and Son, while the one aims at power, and the 
other at Independency’ (269). 
Does Boswell feel ashamed that he is not like his father, or like Johnson for that matter? It is, 
as always, not as simple as that. For Boswell, shame works through his profusion of character, 
what he understands as his unformed self. His goal is to unify these warring parts – the man of 
wit, the passionate Scot, the aspiring Englishman, the man of learning, the man of economy, 
and so on, into one dignified, governable whole. For him, Lord Auchinleck and Johnson 
represent wholeness, whereas he is fractured into parts. These parts are continually identified 
by others, and he often reports on others’ assessments of him at various points in the journal, 
underscoring its value in transitioning from an undesirable to an ideal form of masculinity.  
The frustration for Boswell is to find that people continually magnify these parts of 
himself and subsume him under these categories. An early entry from November 1762 gives us 
but one example of many: 
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Lord Eglintoune & I talked a little privately. He imagined me much in the stile that I was 
three years ago; raw curious volatile credulous. He little knew the experience I had got 
& the notions & the composure that I had obtained by reflection. My Lord said I [,] I 
am now a little wiser. Not so much as you think said he: For, as a Boy who has just 
learned the Alphabet, when he begins to make out words, thinks himself a great 
master of reading; so the little advance you have made in prudence, appears very 
great as it is so much before what you was formerly. (13) 
Eglinton is one of many to qualify and sometimes belittle Boswell’s ideas of his development. 
His observations, however, are carefully noted down by Boswell, allowing us as readers to 
glean more of an understanding of the external perception of Boswell by others; and perhaps 
revealing Boswell’s own anxieties about the reliability of his own self-perception. In May, 
Eglinton tells Boswell that: ‘…it was very difficult to make me go on right. “Jamie (said he) You 
have a light head, - but a damn’d heavy A- [,] and to be sure such a Man will run easily down 
hill;  but it would be severe work to get him up.”’ Boswell’s own comment on this withering 
description is instructive, ‘This illustration is very fine: For I do take lively projects into my 
head; but as to the execution, there I am tardy.’ (214). Boswell’s arse weighs him down; it is 
symbolic of the shameful tardiness which prevents Boswell from acting and progressing in the 
world. It recalls, for me, Abel Boyer’s swipe at the fop, ‘he has more learning in his heels than 
his head’, explored in chapter 2. Both parts of the body are posterior; both, as I suggested 
about the fop’s heels, refuse commercial and polite progress by representing something 
entirely self-indulgent: for the foppish heels, dancing and luxury, for the Boswellian backside, 
laziness and even perhaps sensual overindulgence (Boswell was always easy prey for affairs of 
the flesh, of course).  
Boswell’s candid habit of including direct criticism of his character in the journal 
underlines the purpose of writing it in the first place, to provide a written record and evidence 
of both his external and internal self in order to later survey his developing personality with a 
critical distance. As he highlights in his introduction to the journal, writing the account will: 
‘give me a habit of application and improve me in expression and knowing that I am to record 
my transactions will make me carefull to do well. Or if I should go wrong, it will assist me in 
resolutions of doing better’ (3). In other words, the journal becomes a form of internal 
surveillance, a textual impartial spectator along the lines of Adam Smith’s. Boswell uses the 
men around him, meanwhile, as external surveillance, and his ability to recreate conversations 
and scenes, remarked upon by critics such as Patricia Meyer Spacks (2003: 146) as being 
literary in their moral intensity, adds to the sense of the London Journal as a self-conscious 
project, a narrative, even, with the aim of resolving Boswell’s fragmented personality. 
Boswell’s candid recording of unflattering comments or humiliating situations is a ritual of self-
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shaming, contained safely within the pages of the journal. By limiting its external audience 
almost entirely to one other pair of eyes (John Johnston’s), Boswell attempts to experiment 
with shame in a controlled environment, all the while being reminded of the porous nature of 
even the most private writing. As resolved as his tone is towards the end, there is no real sense 
for the reader that he has in fact united his disparities; in fact, writing may perhaps have 
entrenched these differences further.  
In June, Johnston urges his friend to ‘Steadily adhere to this plan [studying in Utrecht], 
otherwise never embrace it.’ Johnston then sets out the consequences of failing to stay firm, ‘If 
you should fail, it is deceiving your father, and undoubtedly must Confirm the World of your 
unsteadiness and want of Resolution; The opinion of the World must not be despised. 
Whenever one Sinks in it’s esteem, he must be unhappy, and rendered useless to his Country 
and friends...’ (80). The leap Johnston makes here, from deception of the father to failing one’s 
entire nation, serves to emphasise the stakes for masculine self-construction in the period. It is 
clear to see why, for Boswell, integrity and solidity were such important and essential goals. A 
man who could not be resolute enough to see through plans agreed with his father could 
never be trusted to serve his country with the requisite responsibility. Respect and loyalty to 
other men was, then, synonymous with that paid to the state, and Johnston reminds Boswell 
here of the ways in which individual men and a nation state were interchangeable. The term 
‘World’ provides a rhetorical link for Johnston between pater familias and father land; ‘World’ 
as used here is a bulging term containing all that society could and did demand of a young man 
such as Boswell.  
One of the arguments I have been making during this thesis is that far from being 
paralysing, shame can act as a catalyst for action. Boswell’s journal provides evidence for this 
argument, as his resolution to follow his father’s wishes and to become retenu is a 
consequence of the influence of shame. His experiences of dissipation, and his disappointment 
in fulfilling his shallow dream of being in the Guards, show him the meaninglessness of living 
purely for pleasure. He dislikes the ease with which he is persuaded to act with impropriety. 
Instead, meaningful relationships with other men who possess what he understands to be 
integrity allow him to understand himself in a more positive light. The Boswell who is of 
interest to the great Samuel Johnson, for example, is a Boswell whom Boswell himself can 
enjoy being. Although there are moments of pride scattered throughout the journal – and 
almost all referring to how well he has behaved himself in social situations, especially in the 
presence of men of integrity – they begin to gather frequency towards the end of the journal. 
This is not to say that the journal’s final few entries do not have a melancholy and, in places, 
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even anxious feel at the thought of leaving a city that, despite its disappointments, he still 
finds stimulating, but that the narrative voice used by Boswell seems to accrue confidence as 
firm plans for study abroad, and regular contact with Johnson, provide not only clear focus but 
also narrative structure to both Boswell’s lived experience, and the way in which he represents 
it in the journal.  
The journal, then, demonstrates that Boswell used homosocial networks to both 
compel himself into action and provide him with succour for his failures. The shame of falling 
short of his masculine ideal propels him forward, and in friendships with paternal and fraternal 
figures, he finds the inspiration to power his self-development towards this very same 
masculine ideal. The writing of the journal itself, moreover, gives the reader some insight into 
Boswell’s relationship with his own gender construction, and the role shame plays in this.  
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Chapter Six 
“To call me after his name”: Olaudah Equiano’s gift of shame 
 
In my final chapter, I want to turn to a writer for whom claiming the status of man of 
politeness was a significant political act. The former slave and abolitionist Olaudah Equiano 
lived through a period of British imperial expansion which saw a capitalist society become 
increasingly reliant on slave labour. Challenging the inhumanity of using racial others in this 
way meant advancing affective and moral arguments against economic (as well as racist) ones. 
There is much scholarship which has enabled us to appreciate the role of the heart in 
arguments over slavery during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Equiano’s 
autobiography, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, 
the African. Written by Himself (1789), is a crucial text in understanding these arguments. 
What is often overlooked in the abundance of critical attention the Interesting Narrative has 
been awarded in recent years is the significance of polite masculinity in the portrait Equiano 
paints of himself. It will be the business of this chapter to demonstrate that in writing his 
autobiography, Equiano uses politeness and idealised masculinity in order to position himself 
as a man of politeness, one whose oppression at the hands of his intellectual and moral equals 
(for so he sees white men to be) is an outrage for which the only appropriate response is 
shame. 
 However, the Interesting Narrative is no diatribe. Equiano intends to use his life story 
to bring black and white together. This is to say that he wishes to use his literary self-
construction to make himself recognisable to a white readership as a man of politeness. He 
demonstrates the ways in which he shares polite values such as practicality, moral compass, 
stoicism and virtuous action, in addition to being learned and highly literate. He does this 
through the Interesting Narrative itself, which combines different genres and styles to create a 
sophisticated account of himself and his experiences which works for the political ends of the 
abolition movement for the very reason that Equiano comes through as a complex and 
reflective man of politeness in a similar way to James Boswell in the London Journal. Both of 
these texts are technologies of the self, to borrow a term from Felicity Nussbaum, because 
they use language, form and narrative to help define and articulate the individual self.  
If the London Journal is a mostly private document, The Interesting Narrative is 
anything but. Written with the intention of addressing a public, at least partly in order to 
influence the abolition debate, the Interesting Narrative uses the particularised experience of a 
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strongly culturally-marked man to claim membership of an abstract idealised identity position 
– the man of politeness. Whilst Boswell’s markers – his Scottish nationality, his fragmented 
personality and voracious sexual appetite – must be resolved and subsumed in private through 
the writing of the journal, Equiano’s particularities instead become part of his public arsenal. 
He marks himself as the other in the title, calling himself ‘the African’, in order to underline the 
false premise this otherness is dependent on. I am arguing in this chapter that Equiano’s 
account of his life does not make a claim to polite masculinity in spite of his African heritage; it 
claims admittance to this hegemony because Equiano embodies the spirit of the age. He 
provides evidence of entrepreneurism, an independent mind and a vigorous morality. Without 
going as far as to say ‘I am just like you’ – which would have struck Equiano as disingenuous, 
no doubt – he secures the white reader’s interest and infuses this reader with shame for the 
outrages committed against him by both individuals and the institution of slavery.  
This shame Equiano gives to his white readers via his narrative could usefully be called 
a gift. In order for Equiano’s text to have had its full impact on a contemporary audience (and, 
perhaps, a modern one for that matter), the white reader, directly or indirectly complicit in the 
oppression of black people, must realise shame, not only for the atrocities committed against 
blacks en masse, but in particular for the treatment of one black man who has demonstrated 
himself to be the equal of his white reader. Derrida describes giving the gift as analogous to 
giving a blow (donner un coup), as though receiving the gift is to be the recipient of an act of 
violence. For Derrida, the gift is annulled ‘each time there is restitution or countergift’ (1992: 
12). There can be no restitution for the gift of shame over the failure to recognise Equiano as 
an equal; abolition, emancipation, even full-blown legal equality, cannot act as a countergift as 
they are not commensurate with the terrain of affective experience that the Interesting 
Narrative powerfully details. Being made legally free cannot ever erase the traces of having 
been bound, and giving legal freedom cannot absolve oneself of the shame of belonging to the 
oppressive group.  
In recognising all this, of course, the gift of shame is no longer a gift in the Derridean 
sense, as recognition ‘annul[s] the gift even before recognition becomes gratitude’ (14). The 
moment when the gift is received, the moment the blow is given, is given (gifted) time, an 
interval in which surprise opens up the recipient to allow shame in. What might be said in such 
a moment? Perhaps something like: ‘I don’t deserve this gift – I don’t want to receive it, 
although I must – It compels me to see me as that which I do not want to be’. In short, the 
Interesting Narrative allows its white readers to see that the institution of slavery is a betrayal 
of polite values; they have failed their own test – and they must learn this through the giving 
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of the gift of shame from the hands of one of those they have betrayed most: a man of equal 
talent, virtue and understanding. It is like the teacher being taught a lesson by apparently the 
most hopeless child in the class: deeply humiliating, humbling and potentially unifying.  
For me to argue that Equiano, a former slave, was in a position to give such a gift to 
those readers may at first seem overstating my case. I should emphasise here that I am 
suggesting Equiano’s gift is an affective one, and therefore works within the polymorphous 
space of affect. In the realms of politics, economics, society, and culture (especially, in this 
case, literary culture) Equiano’s peripheral and unstable status does not allow for his being 
understood as a donor. Affect, as we have noted several times in this thesis, can circumvent 
the discursively-constructed barriers produced by consensus, tradition, or political and 
economic expediencies, as much as it can work to entrench them. This was understood well 
enough by anti-fop writers concerned that their targets could destabilise an ideal masculine 
identity on which so much public ideology rested. Although clearly not a fop, Equiano’s status 
as symbol for the enslaved is made possible by the same massive material culture that enabled 
the rise of the fop. Were it not for the Western dependency on slave labour to produce 
materials in quantities sufficient to allow for sustained economic and political expansion, then 
Africans would never have been enslaved, and it would not have been possible for an 
individual such as Equiano to occupy the position of gift-giver in this powerful way. 
 It is no great insight for me to suggest that the very same culture that enslaved and 
oppressed Equiano also gave him the materials, skills and opportunities to participate in it; 
Equiano often attests to this himself. What this chapter advances as its central claim is that 
Equiano achieves both a persuasive argument for abolition and an affirmation of his status as 
equal in every way to his European counterparts through offering the gift of shame to his 
readers. His emphasis on his own actions, thoughts, and experiences participates directly in a 
tradition of self-making in eighteenth-century writing, as explored with Boswell in the last 
chapter through critics such as Nussbaum and Patricia Meyer Spacks. Ultimately, it seems to 
me, Equiano’s Interesting Narrative was so powerful because it spoke to the eighteenth 
century’s interest in the self, more than pity or altruism for the other.  
Shame and interest are the key affects for my reading of the Interesting Narrative. 
Interest appears in the Narrative’s very title, and pervades its pages in a notable way: for 
example, in Equiano’s curiosity about the new ‘white’ world, in the details of his ‘old’ life, in his 
relationships to both people and commodities. It also stands for the relationship of its readers 
to the text; interested in this life story, they are further primed to accept other affects in 
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response to it. A note on the subject of interest may be helpful here. Interest is defined by 
Silvan Tomkins as one of the nine affects, and is closely tied to all the others. It finds a 
particularly fertile partnership with shame. Tomkins (1995) describes several of his affects in 
terms of their weakest and strongest manifestations. Interest, for example, is the weaker 
sibling of excitement, while a more acute experience of shame is labelled humiliation (73-4). 
The weaker versions of the affects are the ones we can persist to inhabit, across a lifetime in 
some cases. The interest that Equiano retains in his adoptive Western culture is not only 
lifelong, it also leads to a practice of reparative reading and writing which attempts to enable 
connection between white and black. Equiano paints a picture of himself participating in 
commercial society, developing his inherent moral qualities into the polite ones of his adoptive 
culture. This interests the reader in not just his exploits, but in Equiano himself. In my 
introduction, I referred to affect as ‘inherent in bodies and their interrelations with one 
another, and how these charged ‘between’ spaces come to define the functioning of the larger 
societal body’. Interest is an affect which inhabits these ‘between spaces’, helping other 
affects to travel through individual bodies to affect society’s emotional structures.  It is the 
reader’s interest in Equiano as a ‘self’ which allows him to bridge the gap imposed by racism in 
order to make the connection necessary to shame us.  
Shame, as ever, is less easily quantifiable. I do not necessarily want to make an 
argument predicated entirely on race and its relationship to shame, although inevitably that 
will arise. For Equiano, race (his own racial identity that is) is not inherently shameful; there 
are very few passages in the Narrative that suggest Equiano feels shame over his black skin, 
aside from the crucial and oft-quoted passage about washing his face as a child, which I shall 
turn to later. His interest in white culture is not due to shame over his black skin. Instead, I 
want to pursue the ways that shame works to bring Equiano, as a black man of politeness, and 
his readers, as almost universally represented by whites, together in a common humanity.19 I 
mean this in a polymorphic, affective sense, as opposed to the legal or juridical forms of 
togetherness sanctioned and policed by such concepts as ‘freedom’ or ‘citizenship’; in short, I 
am talking about interpersonal intimacy. Shame can be divisive, but it also has the potential to 
draw people together. So while I will argue that there is the shame of both alienation and 
                                                          
19 Whilst the majority of subscribers to Equiano’s Interesting Narrative were white Britons, there are 
some notable exceptions, including Equiano’s contemporary Ottobah Cugoano, listed in subscribers to the 
first edition. See The Interesting Narrative, ed. Vincent Carretta, London: Penguin Classics, 2003: 318. 
Carretta’s scholarly biography, Equiano the African (2005), points out that Cugoano’s name is removed 
from the list of the subscribers from the fifth and later editions, because he had by this point advocated 
open resistance by slaves (353). This, along with Equiano’s increasing inclusion of prefatory letters and 
testimony to his good character from white acquaintances in later editions of the Interesting Narrative, 
suggests to me that he imagined his addresses to be made to a predominantly white readership.   
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assimilation to be found in The Interesting Narrative, the (white) reader cannot remain 
immune to shame if the text is to do its work. As the critic Marion Rust (1996) observes: ‘To 
consider one’s disquisition implicated in another’s silence should be upsetting for anyone who 
does more than listen’ (22). For the white man, whose voice is so often and so readily heard, 
hearing the subaltern speak should be a shame-filled experience if it is heard properly. It is 
thus that Equiano’s text works (or hopes to work) to achieve communion through shame. 
Marion Rust again:  
By placing the African and the European on a continuum and offering the British a view 
of themselves as children, Equiano accomplishes one of his most extraordinary 
rhetorical feats, one perhaps even more effective than the appeal to mercy or greed, 
in that it brings the problem closer to home, turning the slave from a “he” or an “it” 
into an “I” for the European reader, asking Europeans to take care of themselves, 
rather than some distant other. (28) 
Here Rust characterises the Enlightenment view of non-white races as more ‘child-like’ or 
primitive than their white European counterparts as potentially instilling a moment of 
recognition of black not as white’s other, but as a different manifestation of the same self. She 
suggests that Equiano’s rhetorical feat is to store the catalytic energy needed to bring this 
moment into being within his writing.  
This becomes plain to see in the sympathetic reviews of the Narrative upon its 
publication, such as that from the General Magazine of July 1789, which described those 
involved in the slave trade as: ‘those savage dealers in a traffic disgraceful to humanity…which 
has fixed a stain on the legislature of Great Britain’ (in IN, ed. Carretta, 2003: 13). Focusing on 
the experience of the reader, the review then goes on to say: ‘the reader…will find his 
humanity often severely wounded by the shameless barbarity practised towards the author’s 
hapless countrymen in all our colonies: if he feels, as he ought, the oppressed and the 
oppressors will equally excite his pity and indignation’(14). Here we have a clear alignment 
between the text and its reader, an alignment forged through affect, nominally pity and 
indignity but also shame, as alluded to in the phrase ‘his humanity often severely wounded’, in 
this case by the apparent absence of shame in one’s peers. This is Adam Smith’s moral 
transference in action; in observing – through the medium of Equiano’s account - one’s fellow 
Westerners behave in a manner ‘disgraceful to humanity’, the reader takes on the shame 
shirked by the slave traders. It is this shame, then, and the communion with ‘the author’s 
hapless countrymen’, that induces a movement toward political action: ‘That so unjust, so 
iniquitous a commerce may be abolished, is our ardent wish, and we heartily join in our 
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author’s prayer’ (14). The review aligns itself expressly with an abolitionist cause, and cites the 
affective power of Equiano’s account as the key to this political allegiance.  
Most commonly categorised as an autobiography, the Interesting Narrative is more 
properly a synthesis of several forms and styles familiar and accessible to a contemporary 
audience: the colonial romance, the spiritual confession, the picaresque, the entrepreneur’s 
life history. Its compositional style, then, suggests not only a sophisticated writer, but one 
whose ‘reading’ of his potential audience is subtle enough to induce him to smooth over 
difficulties in racial and cultural difference by stylising his experiences in such a way as to be 
comprehensible to his readers. Srinivas Aravamudan writes in Tropicopolitans (1999) of the 
way that expansion of the culture of print in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries needs to 
be read by ‘a scholarship that reimagines its communities of readers rather than one that takes 
those communities to be already imagined’ (10). By this, Aravamudan means that critics must 
resist the urge to play back into ‘colonialist assumptions’ (23) by failing to challenge ‘structural 
aspects of the relationship between the Eurocentric self and its other’ (21). My own reading 
seeks to correct the fault Aravamudan describes by underscoring the ways in which Equiano 
uses his narrative to shame the Eurocentric reader into understanding the black individual not 
as other but as self.   
Aravamudan argues that a tropicopolitan, a colonial subject who both resists and 
utilises the imperatives of colonisation on the self, must be understood as a synthesis of 
conflicting pressures. ‘Responding to the inherited trauma of colonialism,’ he writes, 
‘tropicopolitans revise their “memory-traces” and the colonial archive in a manner that 
reanimates the past and gives it the psychical and material rationale, and effectiveness, of 
agency’ (11). Equiano revises the colonial archive by redeploying the sentimental genre to his 
own purposes, for example the trope of the noble savage which runs through the opening 
chapter set in Africa. ‘Though some critics would have us choose between hybridity and 
authenticity, or collaboration and opposition, the messy legacies of empire do not always 
afford such clear cut choices’ (14) Aravamudan remarks. These ‘messy legacies’ are found in 
Equiano’s tale of abjection, emancipation and collaboration. Aravamudan’s criticism of the 
ways in which Equiano’s text has been subsumed into triumphalist critical narratives has 
helped to nudge my own reading toward something that acknowledges the importance of 
colonialist readings of The Interesting Narrative, but that recognises their limitations. Reading 
it rather as an account of affective transference allows me to examine the interpersonal ways 
in which Equiano’s political agenda works most effectively. As quoted above, Marion Rust’s 
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sense of Equiano’s rhetoric interesting white readers so as to imagine themselves as 
inseparable from blacks is at the heart of my understanding of how this text works.  
For Equiano the stance taken in the Interesting Narrative is a movement toward 
reconciliation rather than a movement from abjection. Equiano’s life story is more interested 
in the point of connection than the point of departure. His narrative, as with his character, is a 
meeting place of influences textual, cultural, and experiential, but contact truly takes place in 
the affective communion imagined by the reading and writing practices he employs. The 
Interesting Narrative is just that, interesting.  It tracks its hero from birth to a triumphal 
maturity where he has become master of himself, despite all the odds. It is the kind of 
narrative both eighteenth-century and modern readers find satisfying. Indeed, it is because it 
deploys the enduring tricks of storytelling so well that a reader is readily able to accept the gift 
of shame that the text offers. It is touching in the sense that his words touch, as will become 
clear when I analyse passages such as those describing his friendship with Richard Baker, or his 
attempting to wash himself white. From this touch, we are moved both affectively and 
politically, as we saw in the General Magazine review. One of the ways in which the Narrative 
is most radical is in its opposition to, and critique of, Enlightenment categorisations of race, 
promoted by Linnaeus and Hume among others, which posited that white and black were 
separated by a cultural and intellectual gulf. The Interesting Narrative pushes us as readers 
toward communion, and out of our separate social and ethnic categories. 
Equiano is not often discussed in terms of his specific gender construction, but rather 
in relation to his status as a resistant figure, or as a universalised figurehead in the struggle 
against slavery. I contend that his gender construction, as detailed in The Interesting Narrative, 
is in fact key to his project. Through his relations with white men, he challenges as well as 
reinforces contemporary ideals of masculinity. I consider his close friendship with Richard 
Baker, the avuncular tutelary connection with Daniel Queen, and the fraught interactions 
between Equiano and his master, Captain Pascal. The simultaneity of these relationships – 
both Baker and Queen serve with Equiano on Pascal’s ship – help to underline Equiano’s broad 
conception of masculine performative possibilities. His experiences do not just induct him into 
the rituals of European imperialism, but also the mysteries of white masculinity. Positioning 
himself as embodying these performances of masculinity, Equiano invites us to make 
comparisons between the manifestations of white imperial manhood as exemplified in Baker, 
Queen and Pascal.  
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His early readers learn, as Equiano does, about the different ‘types’ of man to be found 
in commercial (and, specifically, maritime) society and inevitably, as members of the same 
society, benefiting from the work these men perform, they are invited to decide for 
themselves where on this spectrum they might be located. Baker, as motivated by fraternal 
care and devotion, is privileged as universally good, and Equiano, through his close and 
benevolent relationship with him, is therefore designated as good also. Pascal, at the other 
end of the spectrum, is motivated by commercial and material imperatives, causing him to lose 
sight of the humanity of those he commands, behave in irrational ways, and compromise his 
morality through deception and manipulation. Pascal comes to demonstrate how polite 
masculinity is destroyed by an over-investment in the material. It is through these affective 
relations with white men that Equiano is able to lay claim to polite masculinity, thereby 
strengthening his position in gifting shame to his white readers.  
Whilst aligning himself with whites may strike a modern reader as problematic, this is 
to overlook both the limitations of choice open to a free black, but also crucially the goal that 
Equiano is aiming at here.  For him, the shame his readers should accept as a gift is not just for 
the brutal suppression and denial of black autonomy through slavery, but the failure to 
recognise the relationship between them as being that of men and brothers. One could sum 
this up neatly by saying that unlike many of his ‘wiser’ white counterparts, who focused on 
abolition rather than emancipation, Equiano’s narrative tries to make both inevitable. He has 
read European society; he knows how it imagines itself; he writes himself into this 
imaginarium. Through his alignment with his white colleagues, Equiano makes emancipation a 
fact-before-the-fact. That Equiano is able to write as he does suggests that on the level of the 
individual (of this individual at any rate) emancipation has already happened.  
In order to understand how Equiano offers shame to his readers, we must look at the 
way in which he combines a genuine love for his adopted culture with a dignified refusal to 
have his ‘otherness’ either erased or demonised. The title page of the 1794 edition gives the 
full title of the book, ‘The Interesting Narrative of the life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus 
Vassa, the African. Written by himself.’ We are straight away caught by the alternative name, 
Gustavus Vassa, originally the name of the Swedish king who liberated the Swedes from the 
Danes, and given to Equiano as a slave name by one of his many owners. Gustavus Vassa was 
in fact the name Equiano was generally known by, and so its inclusion on the title page acts as 
a nod to the white colonial culture he lives in. However, his African name, Olaudah Equiano, 
though rarely used in his lifetime, appears first, indicating to his readership that this is the 
name which fits him more closely. It is both an anchor to his African heritage, and a blockage 
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against complete assimilation into the world he now moves in. In keeping with his emphasis on 
his own individual significance, he translates ‘Olaudah’ as meaning: ‘vicissitude, or fortunate 
also; one favoured, and having a loud voice and well spoken’, a reference perhaps to his 
communicative ability in the Interesting Narrative (41). The ethnic appellation, ‘the African’ 
works on similar lines. It allows a buying public interested in the abolitionist movement, or 
indeed those merely seduced by the exotic, to know that they are buying a book which tells 
the story of a non-European. It also, however, reaffirms Equiano’s placing of himself within the 
black diaspora. The final, fragmentary sentence ‘Written by himself’ may seem tacked-on, 
coming as it does after the grandiloquent flourish of the sentence before. However, along with 
the two names, it is italicised, linking the three lines together and impressing upon the reader 
the autonomy that this text represents.  
In his resistance to being merely a figurehead for a social cause, abolition, which is 
inevitably funded and played out by white men, Srinivas Aravamudan (1999) is able to claim 
Equiano as a tropicopolitan. Equiano, and his Narrative, forms a key case study for 
Aravamudan. Those, like Equiano, who merit the name tropicopolitan are those who, in 
Aravamudan’s words: ‘are projections as well as beings leaving stubborn material traces even 
as they are discursively deconstructed’ (6). Equiano’s brilliance lies partly in the way in which 
his book refuses to be assimilated even today. Those wishing to make him an icon of anti-
colonial writing are forced into awkward manoeuvring around his repeated tendency to 
collude with the dominant culture. Those who wished to set him up as a ‘founding father’ of 
West African writing in English must contend with evidence indicating that, despite the rich 
and detailed accounts Equiano gives of his childhood in Africa, it is more than likely that he was 
actually born in South Carolina.20 These stubborn traces merely add to the picture of a skilful 
writer, and even more than that, an instinctual reader; a man who saw British society in 
panorama because of his position on the periphery. He was a man who understood his 
moment as well as any native British man of business, and created a version of himself 
accordingly. Aravamudan assesses him thus:  
From a position that implied a trenchant critique of slavery, Equiano turned the 
opposition of British master and African slave into its dialectical synthesis of 
manumitted black British entrepreneur, or in his case, adviser, lobbying for investment 
                                                          
20 Vincent Carretta comments that ‘Reasonable doubt raised by the recent biographical discoveries 
inclines me to believe that the accounts of Africa and the Middle Passage in The Interesting Narrative 
were constructed – and carefully so – rather than actually experienced and that the author probably 
invented an African identity…The burden of proof…is now on those who believe that The Interesting 
Narrative is a historically accurate piece of nonfiction’ (2005: xiv-xv).  
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in the continent of his origin and occasionally collaborating with the slave trade itself. 
(237) 
 
The black British entrepreneur characterised here spends much of his Interesting 
Narrative detailing the ways in which his curiosity and interest in the world around him set him 
apart not just from other Africans but also from much of white society. Interest, or curiosity is 
a feature of the ideal Enlightenment masculine character, demonstrated by the expansion of 
print media and the development of institutions such as the Royal Academy. Given his 
insatiable appetite for epistemological accretion, it is not impossible that the interest of the 
title is Equiano’s own self-examination. If we are unclear on exactly who Equiano is, then 
perhaps this is because his narrative is a document recording his own attempts to crack the 
very same enigma.  
Black bodies, white faces  
Let us proceed, then, with bodies. Enlightenment interest in black bodies – and 
especially faces – creates a difference that Equiano’s (admittedly scarce) reflections on his own 
body seek to question. Critics such as Silvia Sebastiani (2013) have observed that ‘scientific 
classification, based on “objective” procedures of observation, such as skin color, 
measurements of skull size, and facial angle, would contribute decisively to the development 
of theories about racial inferiority’ (12). We can see this in Linnaeus’ definition of the fifth 
division of humanity in The System of Nature (1735): ‘Black, phlegmatic, relaxed. Hair black, 
frizzled; skin silky; nose flat; lips tumid; crafty, indolent, negligent. Anoints himself with grease. 
Governed by caprice’ (in Eze, 1997: 13. Emphasis original). The project of classification 
evidenced here helped Enlightenment thinkers and imperialists to understand the world 
according to secular scientific values. However, classification also allowed slave-owning 
societies to divide themselves off from the slaves they owned, relieving the shame attendant 
on an often more spiritually-based conception of the unity of all mankind.  
Frantz Fanon articulated the physicality of blackness faced by whiteness thus:  
And then the occasion arose when I had to meet the white man’s eyes. An unfamiliar 
weight burdened me. The real word challenged my claims [of equality]. In the white 
world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of his bodily 
schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity. It is a third-person 
consciousness. (1985: 110) 
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This powerful expression of otherness has echoes in Equiano’s ‘first contact’ accounts. He 
describes his growing awareness of the ways in which Africans and Europeans differ. In his 
Narrative he recasts what must have been deeply unsettling and disturbing experiences as 
evidence of his innate interest and curiosity. He recalls: ‘I was astonished at the wisdom of the 
white people in all things I saw; but was amazed at their not sacrificing, or making any 
offerings, and eating with unwashed hands, and touching the dead’ (68). His wonder veers 
from the customs of white people to their fleshly habits, in particular a fascination with the 
touching, fondling and consuming of dead flesh. Equiano makes the connection several times 
between white bodies and dirt and decay, inverting a prevalent association of pale skin with 
cleanliness. He finds white men’s hair too long, their faces too red and assumes they wish to 
eat him (55). White women are too thin and ‘not so modest and shamefaced as the African 
women’ (68). Here we find shame rationalised as desirable when found in the feminine face. 
Modesty, as highly valued as it is by Western men in their own women, is more commonly 
found among African women, Equiano seems to be saying. This is a barely noticeable but 
nevertheless effective riposte to the idea that Western women, as Silvia Sebastiani (2013) 
summarises, ‘[being] the only ones capable of blushing…gave the measure of civilization’ (16).  
It is perhaps the blush, an indicator of the kind of shame which demonstrates 
understanding of one’s place among socialised others, which Equiano has in mind when he 
describes an instance of embodied difference that he discovers as a child. In a famous passage, 
Equiano describes how he notices the difference in skin colour between himself and a white 
child of similar age:  
I had often observed, that when her mother washed her face it looked very rosy; but 
when she washed mine it did not look so; I therefore tried oftentimes myself if I could 
not by washing make my face of the same colour as my little play-mate (Mary), but it 
was all in vain; and I now began to be mortified at the difference in our complexions. 
(69) 
 
Difference here is inscribed on the skin, with indelible ink. It is one of Equiano’s remarkably 
few concessions in the Narrative to that Enlightenment obsession, the physicality of racial 
difference, and it seems to play on the proverbial act of futility, ‘washing the blackamoor 
white’, which Aravamudan reads with such perception in Tropicopolitans (1999: 1-4): ‘the 
tropological blackamoor becomes the sign of failed whitening or unachievable whiteness’ (4) 
Its place in the early chapters suggests that the author’s concern with this ‘failure’ remains 
located in his childhood, and that experience has taught him there is little to profit in 
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protracted reflection upon it. A careful reader of the Narrative should follow its author’s lead 
and focus instead on Equiano’s spiritual and commercial journey.  
However, its inclusion does point to a necessary move on Equiano’s part: the 
addressing of racial divisions made on corporeal terms, and their subsequent affective 
consequences. It is one of the most touching moments in the Narrative, partly because of its 
fleeting duration, but also because of its universal appeal; we all have bodies, and we can all 
be made to feel ashamed of them. Much was, and continued to be, made of the black male 
body, as we see in Wedgwood’s famous image of the fettered slave begging for emancipation. 
Equiano’s moment of mortification described above works to undermine this idea of the black 
male body as lesser, and brings it instead into the scope of common human experience.  
Rather than make this moment of recognised difference the key to his narrative, 
however, Equiano leaves his remark here as just that: a passing remark. He rarely makes his 
physical appearance the site of difference from the white man. In a telling moment, Equiano 
recalls being embraced as though he were a brother by another black child, who claims kinship 
based on the fact of their shared blackness: ‘I not knowing what he was about, turned a little 
out of his way at first, but to no purpose; he had soon come close to me, and caught hold of 
me in his arms as though I had been his brother, though we had never seen each other before’ 
(85). The initial turning away demonstrates, as Vincent Carretta points out: ‘how quickly he has 
been acculturated into his new self and at the same time readily defined by others as still 
African’ (xix). To make the black body too significant would be to lessen the connection 
between black author and white reader. Equiano’s Narrative is notable for this very trick; 
planting seeds of thought via moments of recognition such as the one just quoted, and then 
pressing on ahead without sentimentalising too much. It is left to us to return, through our 
troubled consciences, to these moments and construct of the headlong rush of events a fragile 
and touching tale of common humanity. The more one examines these individual moments in 
the Narrative, the more one realises Equiano is constantly playing into European ideals whilst 
simultaneously refuting them, using himself as evidence.  
So how can we understand Equiano’s significance within this world in which he loses 
the power to signify? His own account of his worth is, despite the obvious social death which 
slavery entails upon a person, consistent in its emphasis on Equiano’s own individual high 
value. Vincent Carretta observes that: ‘The African boy was father to the author Equiano in 
that both were exceptional individuals ideally located emotionally, intellectually, and socially 
to observe and judge the societies in which they found themselves’ (2005: 10). Equiano 
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emphasises his importance to his family, especially his mother: ‘As I was the youngest of the 
sons, I became, of course, the greatest favourite with my mother, and was always with her; 
and she used to take particular pains to form my mind’ (46). Perhaps more auspiciously, he 
relates a memory of how a poisonous snake passed between his feet ‘without offering to 
touch me, to the great surprise of many who saw it; and these incidents were accounted by 
the wise men, and likewise by my mother and the rest of the people, as remarkable omens in 
my favour’ (43).  
Even Equiano’s enslavement cannot entirely erase his individual import, as he 
becomes both a valuable commodity and is absorbed into a homosocial community when he 
begins to work on a series of ships. Paul Gilroy (1993), in The Black Atlantic, mentions that: 
‘Ships…were mobile elements that stood for the shifting spaces in between the fixed places 
that they connected’. He goes on to suggest that: ‘Accordingly, they need to be thought of as 
cultural and political units rather than abstract embodiments of the triangular [slave] trade. 
They were something more – a means to conduct political dissent and possibly a distinct mode 
of cultural production’ (16-17).  What Equiano presents us with in his account of a seafaring 
childhood and adolescence is both dissent and cultural production embodied in himself. His 
close affective relations with Richard Baker and Daniel Queen, as I discuss below, work both to 
undermine the idea of the slave as ‘social nonperson’ and to bring into being the possibility of 
homosocial connection between black and white men. This nudges the reader toward the 
logical step of realising the natural bond between humans of all shades. In basing the 
argument for abolition on his own singular significance, however, Equiano seems to be 
engaged in an act of ‘writing the self’ more than promoting a political agenda – although 
claiming significance for yourself in these circumstances is inescapably a political move.  
For Equiano, these vessels form floating communities based on homosocial systems of 
affect. His intelligence and curiosity make him valuable to the captains of these vessels, who, 
because of their seniority, fulfil a patriarchal role. Repeatedly, Equiano’s relationship to these 
paternal figures is fraught but close, closer than many of his white compatriots. From 
childhood, he occupies a space adjacent to the nucleus of power, and becomes not just an 
exception to the norm, but a modulator of the affective current in these commercial maritime 
families. He is seen simultaneously as both commodity and comrade by those on board. 
His close friendship with a white boy of similar age, Richard Baker, is testament to this. 
‘Soon after I went on board,’ Equiano tells us, ‘he shewed me a great deal of partiality and 
attention, and in return I grew extremely fond of him. We at length became inseparable; and 
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for the space of two years, he was of very great use to me, and was my constant companion 
and instructor’ (65). A fraternal bond forms between them, broken by Baker’s early death at 
sea in 1759, described by Equiano as:  
…an event I have never ceased to regret, as I lost at once a kind interpreter, an 
agreeable companion, and a faithful friend; who, at the age of fifteen, discovered 
[proved to have] a mind superior to prejudice; and who was not ashamed to notice, to 
associate with, and to be the friend and instructor of one who was ignorant, a 
stranger, of a different complexion, and a slave! (65) 
Baker plays the role here not just of a companion but also a bridge allowing Equiano to enter 
into white society. Unlike his paternal superiors, men like Captains Pascal and Doran, Baker 
shows no signs of seeing Equiano as signifying commercial or imperial value. The ‘purity’ of this 
relationship shows the potential for equality between white and black, and by infusing his 
description of it with sentimental pathos, Equiano advances his cause whilst acknowledging his 
debt to figures like Baker in shaping his Westernised development. It is this knowledge and 
experience learned at the side of the white man, and his explicit naming of this process as a 
pedagogical one (he calls Baker an ‘instructor’) that allows Equiano to both chime in with, and 
subtly undermine, racist discourses around the capabilities of blacks. However, as Equiano 
shows through his description of the bond with Richard Baker, it is not slavery but the 
experience of interracial friendship which allows this transformation to occur. He also 
demonstrates, as I will suggest below, a common experience of fear of the patriarchal white 
man shared by himself and Baker as a unifying factor.  
Another example, this time a more avuncular figure, is the able seaman Daniel Queen, 
or Quin, whom Equiano describes as being ‘about forty years of age, a man very well 
educated…he…dressed and attended the captain’ (91-2). This older man, who fulfils a similar 
subordinate but adjacent role to the paternal figure of the captain – in this case Captain Pascal 
– is able to provide Equiano with several practical as well as spiritual skills, teaching Equiano to 
shave and ‘dress hair a little’, as well as reading and explaining passages from the Bible to him. 
Equiano’s closeness to him means that the crew begin to see him as synonymous: ‘In short he 
was like a father to me; and some even used to call me after his name; they also styled me the 
black Christian’ (92). The transforming of Equiano into a European is not just in his own mind, 
he seems to be suggesting; white Europeans recognised it too, and from an early age.  
The outcomes of the relationship with Queen foreshadow the later directions of 
Equiano’s life, as both practical entrepreneur and devout Christian. ‘I was wonderfully 
surprised,’ comments Equiano, referring to these early Bible discussions, ‘to see the laws and 
rules of my own country written almost exactly here; a circumstance which I believe tended to 
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impress our manners and customs more deeply on my memory’ (92). It is crucial to note that 
learning more about Western religious and moral codes serves to further impress upon 
Equiano the universality of human thought and affect. It is even more interesting to see, as an 
undercurrent to this, the way that this universal human code works to reaffirm his ‘native’ 
moral systems for the young Equiano. Rather than casting off his African heritage, sustained 
engagement with and adoption of Western inheritances works to further entrench them. 
Equiano compares the two systems in order to underscore his point about being morally equal 
to Europeans. As Carl Plasa notes,  
The collective work of exegesis performed here by adept and protégé has a 
significance which extends beyond the boundaries of the text they read: Equiano’s 
emergence as “black Christian” hybridizes and conflates identities that…should 
properly remain discrete. The enslaved African body reveals itself as fully able to 
accommodate the very spirit which supposedly “distinguish[es] white people” from 
black. (Plasa, 2000: 23) 
 
Equiano’s ability to conduct these reciprocal relationships with white compatriots is due in 
part to his Enlightenment personality – his intellectual curiosity, his practical sense, his 
sentiment and moral compass. However, as Plasa indicates, and as Equiano stresses, these 
characteristics are not exclusive to white British natives, but are equally located within non-
white bodies, in the bodies of what Aravamudan calls ‘tropicopolitans’. Equiano’s apparent 
gratitude to the white ‘civilizing mission’ is subtly recast as a critique of Enlightenment 
philosophical conceptions of racial difference. Equiano prevents his success being claimed 
entirely by the West; his claims of personal significance in Africa and his insistence on Igbo 
values being morally comparable – if not superior – to European ones ensures this.  
 In contrast to the fraternal and avuncular relations described above, Equiano’s 
experiences of paternal figures such as Captain Pascal and Captain Doran, two of his most 
significant masters, are less mutually beneficial, although still marked by homosociality. Pascal, 
for instance, repeatedly jokes about eating the child Equiano when supplies begin to wear thin 
on their voyage across the Atlantic to Britain: ‘Sometimes he would say to me – the black 
people were not good to eat, and would ask me if we did not eat people in my country’ 
(Equiano, 2003: 65). The nightmarish image of being consumed by the father here is recast in 
racial, rather than psychological or mythic terms21. Pascal’s question concerning cannibalism in 
                                                          
21 The trope of black people as edible is a widespread phenomenon, used for various purposes, especially 
constructing ideas of white nationalism and superiority. Kyla Wazana Tompkins’s book Racial 
Indigestion: Eating Bodies in the Nineteenth Century (NYU Press, 2012) deals with this topic in a slightly 
later American context.  
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Equiano’s native land others the African child, but it also claims an imagined kinship. Pascal’s 
feigned desire to eat the black body gestures toward an ironic bond with his slave, imagining 
them both desiring to consume the other. The homosociality of this gesture is furthered by 
Pascal’s suggestion that as ‘black people were not good to eat’, he would instead kill and eat 
Equiano’s white companion Richard Baker, followed by Equiano himself. The threat is 
heightened by the feared destruction of the bond between the two boys: ‘I was alarmed for 
Dick,’ Equiano recalls, ‘and whenever he was called I used to be very much afraid that he was 
to be killed; and I would peep and watch to see if they were going to kill him: nor was I free 
from this consternation till we made the land’ (66). Equiano uses this incident to cast white 
patriarchal colonialism as the enemy of true virtue here, allying his fearful childhood self with a 
similarly vulnerable white counterpart whose whiteness, for a European audience at least, 
emphasises the purity of the pair, who together stand for a brotherly bond that is, in its 
transracial makeup, innocent of the self-serving nature of the nakedly commercial Pascal.  
Carl Plasa reads this imagining of the white man as cannibal as a deliberate ‘reversal of 
contemporary historical accounts…of the African as cannibal…In this way, colonizer and 
colonized…exchange places with one another, as the former become endowed with the 
qualities which they themselves attribute to the latter’ (Plasa, 2000: 19). This reminds us, of 
course, of Equiano’s first sight of white men, in which both consumption and reversal are 
prominent features: 
When I was carried on board I was immediately handled, and tossed up, to see if I 
were sound, by some of the crew; and I was now persuaded that I had got into a world 
of bad spirits, and that they were going to kill me. Their complexions too differing so 
much from ours, their long hair, and the language they spoke, which was very different 
from any I had ever heard, united to confirm me in this belief. I asked them [black 
slavers] if we were not to be eaten by those white men with horrible looks, red faces 
and long hair? (55) 
Equiano appears here – as he does repeatedly during his life as a slave – literally as a 
commodity. He is ‘carried’ aboard the slave ship, ‘handled’ and ‘tossed up’ to check his value. 
Like fragile goods, he is examined to ascertain whether or not he is ‘sound’. His physical state is 
taken to represent the whole of him, because as a slave, his value is located here. Whilst his 
black body is deemed acceptable (he is, after all, not thrown overboard), he deems the white 
bodies who evaluate him unsound. Their ‘horrible looks, red faces and long hair’ are too 
different to be assimilated in the child Equiano’s schema of humanity, leading him to read 
them as ‘bad spirits’. In a strong invocation of Linnaean categorisation through division, 
Equiano synthesises the different ways in which the white man is repellent into one mortifying 
whole: complexion, hair, and language ‘united to confirm me in this belief’. This is one of the 
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clearest points in the Narrative at which Equiano ‘others’ his reader, ultimately using this 
reversal of othering to bring the white man closer to the experience of the black through 
enabling them to see themselves as the ghoulish other. This shames white readers because it 
enables them to know first-hand the dehumanising experience of Enlightenment racism, and 
the diminishing of self that follows this. 
 As we see from the above passage, Equiano’s primary relationship with his white 
masters is that of commodification. Repeatedly, Equiano is bought and sold on the merits of 
his displaying desirable characteristics. This conforms to the idea of slave-owning as prestige 
marker, as identified by Orlando Patterson: ‘the honor of the master was enhanced by the 
subjection of his slave’ (1982:79). How much more prestigious is it, then, to subjugate one who 
is intelligent and talented? Equiano is spotted by Pascal while working on a Virginia plantation: 
‘While he was at my master’s house it happened that he saw me, and liked me so well that he 
made a purchase of me. I think I have often heard him say he gave thirty or forty pounds 
sterling for me…’ (63-4). Equiano’s pleasing appearance makes him of repeated value. 
Significant though is Equiano’s emphasis on his monetary value at this time. As Vincent 
Carretta notes: ‘This would have been a rather high price for a young, untrained boy’ (Carretta, 
2003: 252). Equiano seems to wish to convey his inherent high value.  
His desirability as a commodity is something he appears to be proud of, but it also 
seems to get him into trouble with his owner/patriarchs on occasion. When Pascal 
unexpectedly sells him when he is a young adult to Captain Doran, for instance, Equiano 
attempts to resist, invoking British legal precedent in the form of overheard conversations 
between Pascal and a lawyer among others which indicate – to Equiano at least – that Pascal is 
not in a position to sell him:22  
They both then said that those people who told me so were not my friends: but I 
replied – It was very extraordinary that other people did not know the law as well as 
they. Upon this Captain Doran said I talked too much English; and if I did not behave 
myself well, and be quiet, he had a method on board to make me. (Equiano, 2003: 94)  
 
It is Equiano’s mastery of the English language which condemns him here, just as it is this same 
mastery that enables him to rise above the rank of the average plantation slave, and to 
                                                          
22 Equiano may be referring here to precedents such as the 1706 court case which ruled, in light of habeas 
corpus, that ‘as soon as a Negro comes into England, he becomes free. One may be a villein in England, 
but not a slave’ (quoted in V.C.D. Mutabani, ‘African Slaves and English Law’ (1983: 72). The 
celebrated Somersett case of 1772 would not have happened yet, although would have been familiar to 
Equiano’s readers by the time the first edition of Interesting Narrative was published in 1789.  
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become the man of politeness he wishes to present himself as in the Narrative. For Equiano, 
language is always a double-edged sword. In the example above, his superior understanding of 
its technicalities as enshrined in law induce the white man, represented by Captain Doran, to 
revert to the language of the savage, threatening to beat Equiano for his politer masculinity.  
Putting on the white world: Equiano and language 
 Equiano’s claims to independence and polite masculinity are intimately bound up with 
his mastery of language, specifically his ability to write himself through the text. There are 
several texts which work to facilitate Equiano’s transition from ‘unlettered African’ to black 
Enlightenment man. One of these is, of course, his manumission document; another is the 
Bible, which becomes increasingly important towards the end of the Narrative. Before 
examining these texts, however, it is helpful to consider Equiano’s relationship to books and 
the printed word in general. His initial experience with this Western device is described in 
mystical tones, and has been the subject of much scrutiny by critics such as Aravamudan and 
Plasa. Equiano describes witnessing the act of reading in Pascal and Richard Baker, his paternal 
and fraternal figures, thus:  
I had often seen my master and Dick employed in reading; and I had a great curiosity 
to talk to the books, as I thought they did; and so to learn how all things had a 
beginning: for that purpose I have often taken up a book, and have talked to it, and 
then put my ear to it, when alone, in hopes it would answer me; and I have been very 
much concerned when I found it remained silent. (68) 
The act of reading, as witnessed by Equiano, is mystical because of its silence and its physical 
communion with a printed and bound body containing unknowable messages. Equiano 
instantly recognises the privacy of such an act; waiting until he is alone to attempt it himself. 
The privacy of reading is an idea we are all acculturated to; we cannot read what another is 
reading unless he or she reads it aloud, at which point the act of reading has ceased to be just 
that. Alternatively, we can read over the reader’s shoulder, an act filled with self-
consciousness and not a little shame, as we are aware that this constitutes epistemological 
theft. Reading over someone’s shoulder instigates a feeling not unlike the uncomfortable 
interest one is filled with when in the presence of two people enjoying physical intimacy. 
Reading is intimacy, and for these reasons it should be no surprise that Eve Sedgwick and 
Adam Frank draw comparisons between the posture we adopt when reading and the physical 
drawing-inward that we experience when flushed with shame (1995: 20-1). To be wrapped up 
in reading is to be interested, and as I have already suggested, to be interested in something is 
to be a deeply-drawn breath away from being ashamed.  
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 For Equiano, his initial understanding of reading in the passage above is to see it as a 
form of conversation, implying as it does an origin in African oral traditions. It occurs to me, 
then, that Equiano’s subsequent appropriation of the book in order to write The Interesting 
Narrative subtly alters the way in which the book works as a technology of the self. Nussbaum 
defines self-writing as ‘a technology of the middle class self’ (1989: xi, my emphasis). Equiano’s 
usage of the form demonstrates not only his high level of competence with regards to 
speaking in the master’s voice, but it also redefines the boundaries of such a form. Equiano’s 
bursting into language is a political act in both personal and social senses: it articulates the 
experiences of the slave in language comprehensible to the master. It should not, however, be 
understood as a transformational fait accompli. Carl Plasa reads Equiano’s initial contact with 
the book detailed in the aforementioned passage as playing into two very different paradigms:  
If the motif of the “Talking Book” is the sign of a self-consciously intertextual relation 
to an emergent body of black writing – “The literature of the slave” in [Henry Louis] 
Gates’s phrase – it points, in the same gesture, in an alternative direction: the “books” 
over which Equiano’s master and friend labour are, of course, white texts and can be 
read as a synecdoche for the Enlightenment discourse of race which comes to be 
elaborated and consolidated  during the mid to late eighteenth century period 
spanned by Equiano’s narrative. (Plasa, 2000: 11) 
 
It should come as no surprise, then, that in the quotation from Equiano I am discussing, there 
is a notable shift from past to present tense, from ‘I had’ to ‘I have’, which occurs mid-
sentence. There is no ‘before’ and ‘after’ for Equiano. The journey from ‘unlettered African’ to 
ideal Enlightenment man has never ended, and the experience of being ‘very much concerned’ 
at being met with silence will continue. This is because Equiano’s eloquence is either an affront 
to the white man, or induces a recognition of the failure of the white man to value the 
humanity of the black, which is felt as shame. As Frantz Fanon observes: ‘Nothing is more 
astonishing than to hear a black man express himself properly, for then in truth he is putting 
on the white world’ (1985: 36).  
 One of the first texts Equiano uses to put on the white world is his manumission 
document, which he receives from Robert King in Monserrat on 11th July 1766, when he is 
around 21 years old. He presents the document in full, embedded into the larger narrative like 
a guarantee, detailing that he paid seventy pounds for his manumission (Equiano, 2003: 137). 
For Equiano, finally being able to possess the self is the greatest joy, indicated in the wild 
punctuation and fiery imagery of the passage.  Equiano claims the language written by a white 
man in the document for himself, announcing his agency to the world through an affective 
experience originating in language that a white man can never experience.  
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It is not long, however, before Equiano learns the contingent nature of writing even as 
official as a manumission document. He is frequently mistaken for a slave, and is more often 
assaulted by white men after his manumission than before. When he resolves to go to 
England, it is with a sense of disgust at his treatment in the Americas (161). He lays great stress 
on the dangerously liminal position of the black free man, especially in the colonies, explaining 
that the slave benefits from protection under property laws of his master.23 As a free man, 
Equiano is also a man cut adrift. It is to England, then, that he turns for true emancipation.  
 It is here that Equiano’s final transformative experience with language occurs. 
Although nominally a Christian from early in the Narrative, Equiano’s evangelising occurs in 
London. After this, Equiano finds life as a sailor increasingly difficult to make contiguous with 
his devout faith, as the blaspheming common on board ships begins to unsettle him: ‘I feared 
greatly lest I should catch the horrible infection’ (188). This leads to a sort of religious fever 
which finds him at last in a state of holy terror: ‘The Scriptures became an unsealed book…I 
saw the Lord Jesus Christ in his humiliation, loaded and bearing my reproach, sin, and shame. I 
then clearly perceived, that by the deed of the law no flesh living could be justified’ (190). The 
unsealed book is an overwhelming experience for Equiano – it symbolises his final access into 
the language of the white man, as he comes to know the bind that the Christian faith places 
the man of politeness within.  
It is at this point that Equiano’s project, to discover and possess the self, reaches its 
greatest impasse. It is in this impasse, however, that he finds resolution. ‘Self was obnoxious,’ 
he says, ‘and good works he had none; for it is God that worketh in us both to will and to do’ 
(190). The resultant joy at realising, at last, his place in God’s plan strikes a note that seems 
somewhat incongruous to a twenty-first century readership. We have, by this point, followed 
Equiano on numerous criss-crossings of the Atlantic, through entrepreneurial toils and an 
inspiring ‘coming to language’, to be presented with someone who now seems to reject this 
very concept of self. Indeed, critics are often muted on this part of the Narrative, not entirely 
sure how to assimilate it into any discourse they may have brought to bear on it. Carl Plasa 
reads it as an identification with the suffering Christ figure: ‘the phrase he applies to himself at 
the same time perfectly characterizes the one who is…paradigmatically, a “being that is in the 
body yet not of it”’ (Plasa, 2000: 25). It is through his strong identification with Christ that 
                                                          
23 The dangerously vulnerable position of freed blacks, especially in the Caribbean, is well attested to in 
critical work such as Orlando Patterson’s Slavery and Social Death: ‘freedman status was not an end to 
the process of marginalization, but merely the end of the beginning…As a marginal person the freedman 
continued to be viewed as something of an anomaly and, like all persons in transitional states, was 
regarded as potentially dangerous’ (1982: 249). 
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Equiano reminds the white reader of his ultimate difference – as a man who has known the 
suffering of the ‘social nonperson’ in Orlando Patterson’s phrase, Equiano is closer to God than 
the white man, the apparent arbiter of Christian virtue. He is not the only former slave to 
inhabit or be placed in this role, but as a strategic move in this particular narrative, it has a 
unique ability to shame because of how close Equiano has brought his reader to his 
experience. 
 However, it is on a worldly note, not a spiritual one that Equiano’s narrative draws to a 
close. Equiano makes the case for an independent black state in Africa (Equiano, of course, 
was involved in the failed Sierra Leone repatriation project) along economic lines, offering 
arguments as to why this would be a more profitable venture than continued slavery. At the 
last, Equiano sets aside his tale of self-realisation in order to talk money. In doing so, he proves 
that he knows how to speak in the master’s voice: 
Population, the bowels and surfaces of Africa, abound in valuable and useful returns; 
the hidden treasures of centuries will be brought to light and into circulation. Industry, 
enterprize, and mining, will have their full scope, proportionably as they civilize. In a 
word, it lays open an endless field of commerce to the British manufacturers and 
merchant adventurers. The manufacturing interest and the general interests are 
synonimous. The abolition of slavery would be in reality an universal good. (234) 
While these religious and entrepreneurial versions of Equiano seem odd bedfellows, it is the 
very essence of what the eighteenth century saw the ideal man as embodying. As Srinivas 
Aravamudan comments, ‘Displaying his complicated difference alongside the achievement of 
his Anglophone identity, Equiano participates in a religious and political commingling – of 
differences and identities – that makes him meritorious in the eyes of his readers’ 
(Aravamudan, 1999: 236). It is not, then, his blackness, nor his metaphorical whiteness, that 
makes Equiano such a powerful voice in his era. It is instead, his ability to mix the two, to 
provide a bridge between European and African cultures and experiences that makes him an 
ideal Enlightenment man.  
From the perspective of narrative, however, this final argument seems to me the most 
difficult section of the text to assimilate into my own reading. Why, after such an intricate and 
acute blending of critique and praise for Western (and specifically, British) culture, does 
Equiano resort to making such a flat plea for emancipation grounded purely in base 
commerce? It reads as though the text – and by extension, Equiano himself – loses confidence 
in the power the narrative holds. Despite the text being a patchwork of styles and genres, this 
final brief section bears a sense of paranoia, as if Equiano suddenly doubts whether or not his 
transcultural narrative does its job.  His positioning of Africa as the next stage in commercial 
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and imperial expansion is made in the following terms: ‘A commercial intercourse with Africa 
opens an inexhaustible source of wealth to the manufacturing interests of Great Britain, and to 
all which the slave-trade is an objection’ (234). The language here shifts expertly to the 
discourse of imperial domination, at once both dispassionately economic (‘commercial’, 
‘source of wealth’, ‘manufacturing interests’) and the figuratively sexual (‘commercial 
intercourse’).  
 Of course, one cannot perform such a radical altering of a continent – transforming it 
from one’s own motherland to stockpile for one’s oppressors – without some form of 
humiliation. It is this that I read in the language of the last pages of The Interesting Narrative. 
Throughout, Equiano has shown that blacks like himself are the equal of whites. At the end, 
however, he resorts to telling, via assertion. See, for instance: ‘Query. – How many millions 
doth Africa contain? Supposing the Africans, collectively and individually, to expend 5 £ a head 
in raiment and furniture yearly when civilized, &c. an immensity beyond the reach of 
imagination! This I conceive to be a theory founded upon facts, and therefore an infallible one’ 
(234-5). The didacticism of this passage – especially in its taking the instantly recognisable form 
of a mathematical word problem – stands in stark contrast to much of the preceding pages. 
Equiano appears not to be merely speaking with the master’s voice, but thinking with the 
master’s brain. It is a step too far, and the shaky assertion of the last line, ‘This I conceive to be 
a theory founded on facts…’ is none too convincing. Which facts? From whom? Equiano, of all 
people, surely knows better than to trust too entirely in the Enlightenment and its close links 
to capital.  
It seems here as though the text becomes ashamed of itself – shuddering at the final 
moment at its inability to resist parroting white economic arguments for the abolition of the 
slave trade: ‘If the blacks were permitted to remain in their own country, they would double 
themselves every fifteen years. In proportion to such increase will be the demand for 
manufactures’ (235). Equiano brings us to a close with two hurried paragraphs, the 
penultimate detailing almost as a footnote his interracial marriage to Susanna Cullen.  
 As a freed slave, Equiano’s acceptance by the society that had enslaved him was 
always contingent rather than guaranteed. It is an achievement that he was in a position to 
write the Interesting Narrative at all, let alone that it take the complex form that it ultimately 
did. Synthesising forms and genres familiar to a British and American readership in order to tell 
an unfamiliar tale, Equiano does much more with the text than just argue for abolition of the 
slave trade. Even his bold proposals for emancipation, repatriation and the opening of trade 
166 
 
links between the West and Africa are not, ultimately, the Narrative’s most daring 
achievements. Instead, as I have been arguing, what is at the core of this text is Equiano 
himself; it is the life story of a man who has mastered the values of politeness. He is learned, 
articulate, pragmatic, philosophical and independent. Even his collaborative tendencies are 
further proof of his polite masculinity, he would no doubt argue; unlike Cugoano, he resisted 
the temptation to promote insurgency in order to articulate his case within the paradigms of 
Western cultural hegemonies.  
 Ultimately, Equiano’s calls for respect for his fellow slaves serve to highlight the very 
special nature of the author himself. I have been arguing here that whilst assisting the struggle 
for abolition is an intended outcome of the decision to publish the Interesting Narrative, it is 
more properly driven, as a text, toward making the self visible to others. It is Equiano’s 
testament to his own polite masculinity, and it should be no surprise to find that he kept the 
rights to it and revised it constantly, editing for both accuracy and in order to manage his 
public image. Equiano understood, much like James Boswell did, much like Joseph Addison, 
and Adam Smith, and the anti-fop writers, and even poor Harley did, that being a man of 
politeness meant acting the part. He was an accomplished performer, more convincing than 
Boswell, Harley and the fops certainly. Counterintuitively, this may have been due to his alien 
status, so marked by the colour of his skin that he could not – unlike Boswell – even try to 
labour to be something he was not. Instead, the most radically particularised individual that 
this thesis has considered perhaps embodies politeness most thoroughly. The greatest 
achievement of the Interesting Narrative is that it presents a man of politeness whose 
commensurate otherness serves to shame his white peers for ever assuming that their virtues 
were theirs alone. I have been calling this shame a gift because there can be no restitution for 
Equiano’s erased agency; instead all the donee can do is to allow themselves to be bound by 
the bonds of shame and interest.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to explore the impact of a particular affect on the formation of a 
particular cluster of gender identity positions at a particular time in British cultural history. 
Perhaps inevitably, it has become more than that. Shame, nominally the star of the show, has 
found itself sharing the stage with a host of other affects, particularly disgust, contempt, 
anxiety and interest. Polite masculinity, the aforementioned gender identity position, has in 
turn revealed its mercurial nature; less a monolithic hegemony, and more a fragile, elusive 
aspiration.  
 However, in focusing my study on a particular historical period, my intention has not 
been to provide a history of male shame per se. Instead, this project has aimed to make space 
within literary critical studies of the eighteenth century for the important role of shame in the 
construction of hegemonic masculine experience. As has been noted especially in the first half 
of the thesis, this hegemony was constructed to a greater extent by the printed word than at 
any prior time in British cultural history. It is the culture of the eighteenth century – I am 
referring to that which Habermas calls the bourgeois public sphere – that has made this period 
so pertinent to this study. The explosion of print culture and a discursive public rhetoric 
exemplified by the success of The Spectator meant that ideals, and the acceptable limits of 
those ideals, could be constantly discussed and developed. This meant that polite masculinity 
had to be reiterated, performed and altered in order to survive. At the level of individual 
experience, as we see most acutely in James Boswell’s journals, this meant that this ideal was a 
constant source of anxiety and shame at perceived failings to attain the gold standard.  
 The example of Olaudah Equiano, as discussed in the final chapter, indicates just how 
discursive the basis for polite masculinity could be. Equiano convincingly presented himself as 
a man of politeness, embodying the values of the time in a body marked by otherness. The 
very fact that he seems to perform polite masculinity in a way apparently free of the crises 
that beset Boswell indicates that there was nothing racially innate about politeness. Of course, 
there is no indication that the eighteenth century saw politeness as innate anyway, very much 
the opposite. Society as a whole acknowledged that the self was a work in progress. This does 
little to allay the private shame of men like Boswell, or his fictional near-counterpart Harley, 
however. It is striking how these two men, one historical and the other supposedly a prime 
fictional example of virtuous sensibility, experienced their worlds in such similar ways. Both 
abandoning Scotland for the English metropolis in order, in Robert Burns’s useful phrase, to 
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‘make [their] way into life’; both finding themselves perpetual outsiders; both coming to grief 
through their inability to swerve away from self-injurious over-investment in affect: they are 
case studies in the damage done to men who try to live in a world that appears increasingly 
hostile to dreamers. Indeed, as John Mullan says of Harley’s creator Mackenzie: ‘he sets feeling 
simply against an impervious “world” which is the cause of every misery...The world is not 
society: indeed, with respect to the attempts by philosophers and essayists in the eighteenth 
century to describe social relations, it is imagined as “non-society”’ (1988: 122). Shame is a 
relation of the self to the world in which the individual finds himself deficient in those qualities 
the world demands he possess. For Harley, this results in a turning away from the world back 
to the fantasy of an imagined past where his sensitivity is not a barrier to his flourishing. We 
see this most clearly in the conversation he has with Ben Silton discussed here in the fourth 
chapter. In his letters to John Johnston, James Boswell displays a similar (although often 
temporary) wish to turn away from a world in which success is continually out of his reach.  
 I have demonstrated that the shifting boundaries of politeness make polite masculinity 
a difficult identity position to enact and live with. The anxiety and shame attached to imagining 
oneself on the wrong side of such a fickle boundary is a powerful regulatory set of affects, as 
Boswell’s journal entries make clear. It would be tempting to position Boswell as an extreme 
case, partly because he is so keen to imagine himself as a hypochondriac. While Boswell is 
unusual in his candidness, all the texts examined here betray evidence of the same battles; 
whether it be Shaftesbury’s urgent self-questioning in his diaries, later transformed into polite 
conversation between characters such as Theocles and Philocles, or Adam Smith’s various 
characters locked in eternal discourse with their own men within the breast; all are subject to 
similar pressures. This is partly to do with the illusion that all ideals were democratically 
condoned through egalitarian discourse. My emphasis on shame has thrown light on the 
struggles of polite masculinity because I have demonstrated that privileged interlocutors such 
as Mr. Spectator on one side, and threatening peripheral figures such as the fop on the other, 
in reality work to pin the aspirational man of politeness between Scylla and Charybdis.  
 These texts, The Spectator and the loose body of writing I have called fop literature, 
were examined in the first half of this thesis along with Smith and Shaftesbury in order to 
establish the climate within which shame circulated. They are disparate works, written 
between the late seventeenth and mid eighteenth century, but what they have in common is a 
tendency to describe the society which made them. They measure the social currents swirling 
around gender identities and their relationship to politeness. Highly conscious of having a 
potentially sizeable public audience, these writers aim their writing toward a general, relatively 
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diverse readership; in doing so they both establish new norms and acknowledge pre-existing 
ones. Their writing is concerned with society, sometimes specifically British society, as in 
Boyer’s differentiations between English stoicism and French foppery. More often than not, 
especially in Smith, there is an attempt to universalise polite gender expression under the 
heading of ‘mankind’, albeit a recognisably western European one. Either way, polite 
masculinity is established in these texts as a universal good.  
However, these writers also engage in imaginative exercises about the nature of 
individual experience. In chapter one, I explored in depth Richard Steele’s vivid account of the 
shame felt by a man of pleasure on the morning after. Abel Boyer’s account of Sir John 
Foppington is bitter mockery; nevertheless his description of the fop relies on some 
speculation about the feelings of his target. Adam Smith is the most prolific – and perhaps the 
least caricaturist – writer in terms of accounting for lived experience. His exhortation to 
imagine ourselves into the lives and situations of others is modelled by his own repeated use 
of this technique to exemplify his theories. On occasion, this practice is developed enough to 
be almost literary; recall the long and powerful description of the man who experiences shame 
as remorse. It is for this reason that Smith forms the gateway into Part Two.  
The second half of the thesis has concentrated on the lived experience of men in the 
climate of polite masculinity. It has posed the question: What toll did polite masculinity take 
on men who felt compelled to live up to its demanding standards? It may have seemed 
counterintuitive to answer that question by beginning with a novel; after all, it is a stretch (not 
to mention poor critical practice) to conflate the experiences of a fictional character with ‘lived 
experience’ in the historical sense. However, as I argued in Chapter Four, Harley as a man of 
feeling provided an example followed by historical individuals. This tends to overshadow 
somewhat the ultimately unsatisfying way Mackenzie’s novel resonated with the aspirations of 
polite men. My account of a reader response, in the form of Robert Burns’s letters, instead 
highlights that Harley was only useful as a wistful fantasy figure; he is an embodiment of a lost 
or entirely mythical masculinity that privileges spontaneous affect and self-sacrifice. As Harley 
gains symbolic pathos via his self-immolating turn from society, so those historical individuals 
like Burns and Mackenzie that followed or created him must swerve from his example toward 
a compromise with the impervious world.  
Fantasy forms a key part of the experience of all three male figures discussed in the 
second half. Boswell’s fantasy of a Scottish masculinity free from the taint of the compromises 
and constraints of politeness have already been commented upon here; this fantasy co-exists 
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with his equally deep investment in the polite masculinity he characterises as English and 
which obsesses him in the pages of his journal. Harley’s fantasy of a past time in which he 
could have been successful is shared with Ben Silton, an older character who embodies what 
Mackenzie referred to as ‘the united Ideas of Tenderness and Dignity’ (1967: 36). Age, with its 
legacy of the past, is an evocative phenomenon for Mackenzie and for Boswell (for whom it 
becomes a code word in letters to Johnston for melancholy) because it situates feelings of 
shame at being misplaced in their own time in a sense of being both too fine and too wise for 
the grubby modern world of capital. Equiano, by striking contrast, remains young almost 
throughout his Interesting Narrative, emphasising his vitality, resourcefulness and 
attractiveness to others. His fantasy is not one of a return to a lost world (although out of any 
writer examined here, he surely has the greatest claim to this). Equiano’s fantasy is one of 
progress: of connection between the black man and the white. For him, shame is located in the 
failure of others to grant him an equal stake in a common humanity. His Narrative vividly 
articulates the shortcomings of European ideologies about race and mankind in a way that 
only a highly personal account of lived experience could do.  
It is in this sense that the second half of the thesis has examined creativity as much as 
personal experiences of affect. All three texts, though written at different times and in 
different forms, exploit the opportunities offered them by literary conventions developing and 
crystallising in the eighteenth century. They are texts that are of their time, but also remain 
evocative for modern readers. The Man of Feeling has lost some of its impact in the 
intervening period largely because of changing ideas about the expression and representation 
of feeling. However, for the modern critic, Mackenzie’s novel is a fascinating object of study 
because of its ambivalence – both that of its presentation of contemporary masculinity and in 
its reception by its readers. For Burns, it was both ‘a book I prize next to the Bible’ and 
‘absolutely disqualifying’ for young men wanting make their way in the world. I examined 
Mackenzie’s creative process, suggesting that the swerve away from the ambivalent 
sentimental novel towards a more apparently resolute form of literary expression in the 
periodical indicates that the novel had ceased to be a viable method of clear communication of 
intent. The novel itself, refusing to express with clarity and vigour those ‘proper’ sentiments 
Mackenzie seems anxious to espouse, becomes a form that generates shame and anxiety.  
Anxiety is evident in Boswell’s style too. Whilst his faith in the journal form remains 
mostly unshaken, the style he employs is subjected to several attempts to render it more 
‘polite’ and therefore more ‘masculine’. In this, we see reflected Boswell’s own shame about 
his marked nature: namely that he is too provincial, indiscreet, loquacious, and informal. His 
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aspiration to incorporate elements of Joseph Addison into his own character indicates a desire 
to do this partly through writing; the London Journal, as I discussed in Chapter Five, is nothing 
if not an attempt at self-construction. It is in his self-perceived inability to write himself into 
politeness that Boswell’s shame lies, just as it lies in his inability to reconcile the various 
features of his fulsome character. By contrast, Equiano’s self-construction deftly employs a 
variety of recognisable genres, from the noble savage narrative of the opening chapter, which 
recalls Oroonoko or Rasselas, to the tales of adventure such as his trip to the Arctic. Most of 
all, however, The Interesting Narrative draws on the apologia which seek to explain the lives 
and characters of various figures in eighteenth-century culture. It serves to highlight the many 
ways in which Equiano participates in British polite society at a level comparable to the 
idealised view of masculinity presented to us by Mr. Spectator et al. His understanding of 
cultivated, polite writing; his knowledge of both classical and contemporary culture; his 
business acumen: all these are evidence of a polite masculinity. It is perhaps best exemplified, 
however, in the distance Equiano maintains from his reader: like The Spectator, we get to 
know very little about Equiano beyond that which is advantageous for him to reveal. The 
Interesting Narrative exploits affect expertly, but nearly always that of his reader, whether that 
be pity for his suffering, or shame at the discrimination he encounters and that his white 
readers were (are) complicit in. Here we come full circle: from The Interesting Narrative back 
to The Spectator, we are in the presence once again of a writer hiding himself behind a text. 
This thesis set out with the aim of making an intervention in the study of gender 
construction and gendered experience in the eighteenth century. My key concern has been to 
utilise the insights of affect theory to underline the importance of shame in the formation of 
the eighteenth century’s hegemonic male identity, polite masculinity. This emphasis on shame 
in relation to hegemony has implications for future research. Shame’s powerful presence in 
queer gender identities has been ably explored by theorists including Heather Love, Eve 
Sedgwick and Jack Halberstam among others.24 Elspeth Probyn’s work in cultural studies has 
examined shame felt by those in particular professions (writers) and with certain national 
identities (Australia’s National Sorry Day).25 There is ample evidence for shame’s extraordinary 
influence in arenas from the individual’s self-reflective space to the national and international 
                                                          
24 I am thinking particularly here of Heather Love’s Feeling Backward, and Eve Sedgwick’s 
Epistemology of the Closet, Tendencies, and Touching Feeling in particular, all of which have been 
discussed or referred to in the course of this thesis. Jack Halberstam’s oeuvre includes In a Queer Time 
and Place (2005), and The Queer Art of Failure (2011) are both texts that engage with the pain and 
shame of queerness while also considering ways in which these feelings might open up new ways of 
engaging with and thinking about the world.   
25 See Probyn’s Blush: Faces of Shame (2005), especially chapters 4 and 5, pp. 107-62.  
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debates around collective responsibility, trauma and community relations. I have engaged with 
both the individual and society in this thesis. Further research into the various ways in which 
shame and polite masculinity influenced the eighteenth-century Western world would be 
instructive in understanding its politics, its economics and its burgeoning imperialism. In what 
ways, for example, could we build on Matthew McCormack’s work on masculine independence 
and eighteenth-century British politics if we introduced shame and its related affects into the 
mix? Can we subject Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations to the kind of examination his earlier 
book received here? What implication does that have for capitalist economics and venture 
capitalism of the period?  
There are numerous ways in which the central themes of this thesis speak to topics 
outside of its disciplinary and temporal boundaries. There has been for the last thirty years or 
so a growing body of work which interrogates hegemonic masculinity in cultural studies and 
the social sciences, much of it indebted to the lucid work of Raewyn Connell in works such as 
Masculinities (2005) in particular. Connell’s empirical observations and sensitive writing have 
contextualised modern gender hegemonies and led to a greater awareness of the ways in 
which social factors and contradictions impinge on the discursive construction and individual 
experiences of men. In recent years, organisations like CALM (Campaign Against Living 
Miserably) among others have focused their efforts on alleviating the damage done by men’s 
understanding of themselves as incapable of attaining or maintaining hegemonic traits. With 
that in mind, one of the interventions that this thesis makes is to deconstruct and undermine a 
hegemonic form of gender identity which, allied as it was with a bourgeois and commercial 
public sphere, still has echoes today.  
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